Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical mass of international scholars, analysts, diplomats, business leaders and journalists has agreed that the fate of Europe, and indeed the world, over the next decades will depend to an important extent on what happens in Ukraine. That places Ukraine on top of a geopolitical pedestal.
In policy circles in the United States, Canada and EU countries, the question is constantly raised as to whether that country can make the transition to democracy, free markets and stable progress. If Ukraine does make this transition successfully, the argument runs, all of Eastern Europe, including the Russian Federation, will have a chance to escape its history of alternating periods of instability and repression. But if Ukraine does not, it is argued that this important geopolitical region will once again become the seedbed of conflict that it has been in the past.
Because of Ukraine's importance, observers repeatedly have offered their assessments of just where things stand in Ukraine. All too often, however, their assessments recall those of blind men evaluating the elephant. Some focus on the disasters Ukraine has avoided and the progress it has made in some areas to conclude that 'the Ukrainian problem' has been solved. Others focus on issues Ukraine has not been able to avoid or still faces, concluding that the Ukrainian problem cannot be solved now or ever.
Taken in isolation neither of these assessments is correct. Reality is clear for all to see – Ukraine has not overcome its past and faces serious, massive political and economic problems. But the good news is that Ukraine is not what it was in 1990, in 1994 or even a year ago. Those who assess Ukraine as a hopeless, irrational entity that will soon disappear only promote passivity in Ukraine and the West, in the first case by suggesting that there is nothing more to be done. Such passivity, whether in Ukraine or the West, almost certainly will guarantee a bad outcome regardless of anything else that happens.
Ukraine and Ukrainians have always invited apocalyptic judgments about their land. Since Ukraine recovered its independence in 1991, many Ukrainians and even more people beyond Ukraine's borders have continued that tradition. And they have painted a picture of Ukraine's future either in the brightest or gloomiest colors, often shifting quickly from one to another on the basis of a single development.
Immediately after independence, certain people decided that Ukraine, with its educated population and abundant natural resources, was destined to become a new major, European power. And precisely because they decided that this new status was somehow inevitable, they ignored the very real problems Ukraine faced to make this dream a reality.
But at the same time, another group of people reached exactly the opposite conclusion and suggested it was doomed to fail whatever anyone did. They suggested it would split into three or more parts, that ethnic problems in Crimea and the east would make democracy impossible and that the antiquated, Soviet economy and politically-driven integration of Soviet times, would pull the country down into a disaster from which it would never recover.
For adherents of this view, no piece of good news from Ukraine mattered or matters because there is so much bad news and because the underlying structural situation appears to be so negative.
But any thorough review of the situation in Ukraine suggests that there are reasons for both optimism and pessimism and that the outcome will be affected by what Ukrainians and others do.
Politically, Ukraine has presented a very mixed face since independence. On the positive side, the worst has not happened. Ukraine has not collapsed into East, West and South. It has not been riven by ethnic violence. It has not been reabsorbed by a new Russian Empire. And it has not seen a retreat from democratic processes. Indeed, if anything, Ukraine has had a better time of it than many other former Soviet republics. It is one of the few former Soviet republics where transition from one president to another because of an election did not provoke violence or disaster.
Ukraine's elections have been more open, free and fair. Its approach to citizenship has been civil rather than ethnocratic. The Constitution gives the right to own property and Ukraine's laws on religion and social organizations are significantly closer to Western standards.
But these remarkable achievements have often been overshadowed by more negative political developments. Political parties remain numerous and fragmented. The Communists control the parliamentary agenda and retain an effective veto on reform. Government structures remain little reformed from Soviet times but extraordinarily more corrupt.
Even more, Ukraine seems to lack direction on many political issues and to have behaved in less than the wisest way on others or to be able to set and retain priorities. For example, Ukraine offended returning Crimean Tatars by denying them automatic citizenship, something that would have guaranteed Tatar loyalty to and support for the Ukrainian Government.
Economically, the record is also mixed and Ukraine has not made significant progress in transforming its Soviet-era economy into a free market one.
Monetary policy remains a bright chapter and National Bank chief Viktor Yuschenko successfully introduced a new currency in September 1996 and it stabilized quickly. Inflation has been brought down from hyper-inflation levels but Ukraine has not reduced interest rates to the point of encouraging significant outside investment. It has failed to meet a variety of other fiscal and budgetary targets, not yet solved the back pay issue in many industries and failed to put pensions on a sound financial basis. In short, structural reforms and budgetary consolidation have been far too inadequate and following the parliamentary elections last March, progress on the reform front appears more unlikely.
And perhaps most depressingly, Ukrainian officials have failed to communicate to their own people or to Western visitors that they are committed to making these transitions or taking the kind of responsibility for their own future that is absolutely necessary if Ukraine is to succeed. Instead many resemble both Soviet-era officials in their desire to be told what to do from above and post-Soviet officials in their all too obvious corruption and their passivity in the face of Ukraine's still enormous problems.
Geopolitcally, Ukraine has not done as well or as poorly as many expected. Its moves toward cooperation with the West – such as its willingness to remove Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia and its accession to the Non-Proliferation treaty – were often undercut by what many in the West saw as pettiness and even whining about the problems Kyiv faces. Its demands for expanded assistance, aid that the West has given more generously than to any other post-Soviet state, have not been accompanied by reforms that will allow that assistance to be most effective.
Reflecting the uncertainty of its own elite and general population, the Ukrainian government has pursued an on-again, off-again agenda regarding Nato and only seemed to have recently recognized that it actually enjoys the support of the West even if it does not get into the alliance. The Gore-Kuchma Commission (of which I was a member until last summer) has played a key role in that.
Not surprisingly, Ukraine's relationship with Russia has been complicated and difficult. But despite a great deal of rhetoric to the contrary, it has been remarkably good and both countries understand that neither can achieve its goals without taking into account the interests of the others.
Russia is often given credit for its willingness to come to terms with Ukrainian independence, something everyone acknowledges has been very difficult for Moscow. However, Ukraine rarely gets credit for its willingness and ability to come to terms with the Russian federation. Prior to independence and even since that time, many Ukrainians have defined their state in terms of not being part of Russia, and it would have been very easy for Kyiv to drift toward a hyperbolic, anti-Russian nationalism as it strove to build a state and redefine a nation.
The Ukrainian Government did not take this counterproductive step, a fact that is rarely acknowledged, but President Leonid Kuchma and his team deserve high marks for their decision to strengthen Ukrainian statehood and security by cooperation with Russia as well as with the West.
In all three of these areas – political, economic and geopolitical – Ukraine remains very much a work in progress, one where things could still go very well or very badly depending on what Ukrainians do and what outsiders do to help.
(Thomas A. Dine is president of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. He was formerly a member of the Kuchma-Gore Commission, which seeks to develop relations between Ukraine and the United States.)
