Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine arrived in Kyiv this week after almost six months of delay – an action that was widely interpreted as a sign that the Kremlin does not mind either of the presidential candidates left in the Feb. 7 runoff.
Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine arrived in Kyiv this week almost six months after Russian President Dmitry Medvedev delayed sending him in protest at Ukraine’s “anti-Russian stance.” Mikhail Zurabov’s arrival comes after President Victor Yushchenko, to whom Medvedev addressed his protest, was eliminated in the first round of the presidential election on Jan. 17.
Analysts say Moscow’s decision to send the ambassador shows its main goal was to ensure that Yushchenko was not reelected, and that it is prepared to work with either of the runoff contenders – opposition leader Victor Yanukovych or Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. After its blatant interventions in favor of Yanukovych during the 2004 election campaign, Russia has been more restrained, leaving analysts scouring official comments for any sign of favor. Medvedev had been banking on a defeat for Yushchenko since his August missive, which blamed him for the deterioration in relations. “In Russia we hope that the new political leadership of Ukraine will be ready to build relations between our countries that correspond to the genuine aspirations of our peoples,” he wrote.
He got what he wished for on Jan. 17 when Yanukovych and Tymoshenko – both of whom say they want to repair relations with Moscow – won through to the second round on Feb. 7. With Yushchenko out of the running, the envoy was dispatched.
Andrei Ryabov, a political analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Center, said the move was “symbolic” to emphasize that the era of Yushchenko is over. “It’s a message for Ukrainian elites that the Russian government is ready to cooperate with either Yanukovych or Tymoshenko,” he added.
Zurabov avoided meeting Yushchenko, but handed over credentials to Petro Poroshenko, the foreign minister. According to Russian state news agency RIA-Novosti, he will begin working de facto, but not de jure until he meets the president.
Before Zurabov’s departure from Moscow, Medvedev told him he hoped for “functioning and effective authorities, open to the development of constructive, friendly, comprehensive relations with the Russian Federation.”
After the failure of its overt display of support for Yanukovych in 2004, Russia has been largely equivocal over whom it would prefer as president.
“It’s difficult to say which one will carry out more favorable policies for us,” said Kremlin insider Gleb Pavlovsky on the Ekho Moskvy radio. “Yanukovych is more popular among Russian-speaking voters in Ukraine, which … is convenient leverage for Russia.” Tymoshenko “is unreliable – she can carry out any policies at all if it’s beneficial for her … But she always finds a reason to reach an agreement and finds the price of agreeing.”
Yanukovych’s star has fallen in Moscow after his loss in 2004, and his ineffectiveness at pushing through promised measures favored by the Kremlin, such as making Russian a second state language. The Kremlin is also wary about his insistence that he will seek to renegotiate gas contracts.
Tymoshenko, on the other hand, has recently forged cordial relations with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, even laughing at a joke he made in Yalta in November at the expense of Yushchenko and Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili. At that summit, Putin praised work with Tymoshenko’s government as “comfortable.”
Many analysts saw this as a signal of support for Tymoshenko. “It may be easier to reach agreement with Yanukovych on the Black Sea Fleet, on World War II, but for key questions of economic and security cooperation, it’s easier with Tymoshenko,” said Ryabov. “All the greements about gas supplies – formal and informal – were reached with her.”
If Yanukovych no longer has a monopoly on Russia’s sympathies, he has attempted to recast himself as pro-European, speaking of “leading Ukraine on a European path.”
“There are businessmen in his party who indeed are very pro-European, which is a major factor driving policy,” said Andrew Wilson, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations in London. Ihor Zhdanov, president of the Open Politics think tank, said Yanukovych “doesn’t have a clear position on Europe.”
Others say he needs to make a clear break from the past in order to give credence to his words. “How can you talk about rule of law when there has been no reckoning with [the electoral fraud in] 2004?” asked Wilson.
Tymoshenko certainly talks the talk on Europe: She has optimistically promised membership in the European Union within five years; she has trumpeted ties with the European People’s Party, the largest in the European Parliament; she has promised to “build Europe in Ukraine.”
But “there are also question marks over Tymoshenko – how can you talk about rule of law when there is so much [Tymoshenko’s camp] control over the judiciary?” said Wilson. “[Her words] need to be backed up by solid evidence of policy generation and implementation. The tragedy of Yushchenko was the gap between nice words and delivery.”
Zhdanov says Tymoshenko has chosen Europe, but the question is whether she can push through tough, potentially unpopular decisions, from raising gas prices to administrative and budget reforms.
Ultimately, “the ball’s in our court,” Zhdanov said referring to Ukrainian citizens. “Reforms may not be popular, but we want to marry Europe. If a fiancй arrives in a worn suit, he’s told to go away and sort himself out, then come back in a better state.”
Kyiv Post staff writer James Marson can be reached at [email protected].
