The recent parliamentary split was a logical continuation of the division of about everything else in our country: parties, movements, churches.
The only thing that is left singular is the president. But even the executive is divided into two branches – the Cabinet of Ministers and the presidential administration – but this kind of 'bicameralism' should be discussed in a separate article.
Now let's look at the Verkhovna Rada, namely the majority, its components, its driving forces and its prospects.
I do not claim to be able to make fully accurate definitions, and, for the sake of brevity and without attempting to offend anyone, I put a number of definitions in this article in quotation marks.
Let's start with the prospects. The majority, in which 'democrats' have united with 'businessmen,' is doomed to split. Some outside forces will contribute to the split, or it will occur because the majority already has achieved the goal that united it – ouster of the speaker [Oleksandr Tkachenko].
The primary reason behind the majority's would-be division is that political interests of 'democrats' and economic interests of 'oligarchs' not only differ, but are diametrically opposite.
The former see Ukraine's future in a unified Europe, while the latter only stand to gain a triple disadvantage from that outcome.
Firstly, Ukraine's integration into Europe will entail for 'oligarchs' the necessity to put up with new and rather aggressive competitors.
Secondly, Western rules of doing business will definitely put an end to the kind of 'business' in which the size of profits depends solely on the proximity to the top of the political pyramid.
And, finally, the enforcement of European legislation in Ukraine will result in that the present reports of accounts being frozen in Western banks will grow into detention and sentencing of their Ukrainian owners.
Of course, Ukraine won't be in a position to join the European Union until at least 2010 even under the most favorable circumstances. That's why the interested persons should not have any immediate reasons to worry. But even a remote prospect of having your future comfortable life in retirement disrupted can hardly be consoling.
What is the conclusion? That certain 'oligarchs' can choose a different path and – judging their actual capabilities – can force the president, the executive and the whole country to follow them.
That path – by definition – can only lead in the direction opposite that of Europe. And this will mean an end to democracy, free market and the rule of law. The political essence of this movement will be dictatorship or authoritarian rule, at best.
There are two possible scenarios in the latter case. One can be labeled as 'Chinese' and the other 'Small-Russian' [Small Russia, or Malorossiya, was the name of the present territory of Ukraine when it was under Moscow's rule in the 18th and 19th centuries].
The latter scenario is the simplest because it is familiar to Ukrainian elite and implies that it will surrender to Moscow. For this to happen, 'oligarchs' have to throw out the 'democrats' and reconstitute the 'majority' with 'communists.' Ukraine will again become an 'undivided and indivisible breadbasket' and will disappear altogether from the political map. But after Russia swallows Ukraine politically, the next step will be to absorb it financially. And those not possessing Ukrainian residence permits will likely be the ones who gobble up Ukraine's business.
Such a turn of events may be temporarily delayed by the 'Chinese' scenario, which ends in self-isolation from both the West and the East. Should this occur, under the pretext of defending the interests of national producers, Ukraine's 'patriots' will find their niche. Most important, though, will be the strategic and political partnership forged between 'communists' and 'oligarchs,' who will unite around their shared distaste for the 'soulless cosmopolitan values of the West.'
As the sad history of Serbia has demonstrated, distancing from Europe will lead to confrontation. Prerequisites for this kind of confrontation seem to be appearing in Russia and the existence of two political and geographically close twins defending themselves from everyone will sooner or later result in their unification.
Both variants lead to the separation of 'oligarchs' from 'democrats,' to a union with 'communists,' and in one direction: first to Moscow, and then to a dead end. The reunification of Ukraine with Russia will immediately transform Russia back into an empire, which again, inherently, cannot be democratic. Moreover, millions of Ukrainians – not only those in Galicia – will continue to consider themselves and Ukraine as independent. Also, the success of Ukraine's Western neighbors, who yesterday were Ukraine's colleagues in the 'Socialist camp,' will remain a catalyst and will give birth to dissatisfaction and unstability.
For those who view an alliance of big business with the Communist Party as utopia, look at Russia's State Duma, where the Unity faction allied with the Communists and easily cast aside yesterday's allies and, it would seem, their democratic friends. The liberal ideology was sacrificed to more important financial interests. What can thus be advised to players on the political field?
• Democrats should learn to control their emotions and calculate their moves and the moves of their partners in advance.
• The West should stop attaching so much importance to individual politicians. The West should remember what Churchill said about permanent friends and permanent interests, and understand that the matter is not in the 'three officials,' who should be barred from participating in the affairs of the state. The West should focus on the principles facilitating the possibility of such participation. Only by changing principles according to which business is conducted and the state is governed will Ukraine achieve a reliable basis for genuine democratic transformations [the writer is refering to recent reports in foreign media that the U.S. government allegedly handed President Leonid Kuchma a list of his allies who it wanted to be excluded from influence over policy-making];
• And, finally, the financial skeleton of the current 'majority' – it is always a good idea to calculate the lesser of two evils. Also, it is worth keeping in mind the sad fate of Savva Morozov and prevent things from developing according to a well-known aphorism coined by [former Russian Prime Minister] Viktor Chernomyrdin, who said: 'We wanted the best, but it ended as always' [Savva Morozov, a prominent Russian businessman at the beginning of the 20th century, collaborated with Bolsheviks but was executed after they came to power in 1917].
Pavlo Zhovnirenko is adviser at the Center for Strategic Studies, an independent research institute in Kyiv.
