Ukraine is often described as a country that has yet to make it out of the feudal stage of political evolution, but I'd say that's giving Ukraine's political elite an undue compliment. Ukraine's feudal system was crushed centuries ago, and ever since, Ukraine has had a despotic political system. In feudal systems, there are established limits to the national ruler's authority vis-a-vis the aristocracy. There were no such limits in the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, and there are not yet any in Ukraine.
Ukraine's transition from Soviet republic to independent, democratic state was engineered by the local communist nomenklatura, who introduced an extremely limited form of democracy, which I would call democratic despotism. Ukrainians freely elect their president, but local power lies with administrators, police and prosecutors, who can be replaced by presidential whim at any time. Mayors are elected but have very limited authority. Elected municipal, raion and oblast councils are mere talk shops. Parliament theoretically acts as a check and balance on the president's power, but since the courts are not independent, parliament cannot actually push through laws that the president opposes, as the president simply refuses to implement them.
The problem with this system is that it is inherently unstable. It is always presented as a transition stage between despotism and normal democracy. But most often it deteriorates back into raw dictatorship. None of the countries that implemented democratic despotism after communism's collapse has made much progress toward greater democracy, while many have reverted to dictatorship.
Despite all that, ardent supporters of democratization and liberalization in Eastern Europe continue to invest their hopes (and more) in elected despots. They buy into the despots' claim to need more power to be better able to push through programs that will supposedly turn their countries into normal democracies. What it really boils down to is belief in the ideal of the benevolent dictator or, put another way, childish admiration for extreme personal power and naivete about its corrupting influence.
Of course, there have been many cases in history when a supreme leader has dismantled his own power. Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin are the most remarkable recent examples. Both of them did much to preserve or even strengthen despotism, but they also made key moves to dismantle it. Gorbachev gave power to republican leaders and allowed Russia to elect Yeltsin as its republican leader, who ended up saving democracy in 1991. Yeltsin allowed oblast governors to be elected, and those governors are now the best hope for saving Russia from a reversion to dictatorship.
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has done little to weaken despotism and a lot to strengthen it. He blocked a move by parliament to make oblast governors elected. He has used police and prosecutors to oust elected mayors who openly opposed him. He has used the state apparatus and alliances with wealthy businessmen to suppress or buy out independent and opposition media. He is now quite crudely using the state apparatus to engineer his re-election. The one important election Ukrainians have has already been severely compromised and could end up being a complete sham.
Kuchma has one argument in his defense: He is the only alternative to a reversion to communist dictatorship. Indeed, Kuchma's main leftist opponents want to turn Ukraine back into a party state. Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz is the only leftist leader whose promises to dismantle despotism are even partly credible, which is why most leftists won't support him and why he won't make it into the final run-off. Kuchma is most likely to face one of two hard-line Marxist-Leninists, Natalya Vitrenko or Petro Symonenko, in the final election round. Either one of those two would be much worse than Kuchma.
But that is not a choice between democracy and dictatorship, that is a choice between a dictatorship that will seek to ally itself with the West and a dictatorship that will seek to ally itself with Russia. Kuchma would continue to make a show of wanting to liberalize the economy while increasing political control over it, whereas Symonenko or Vitrenko would assert political control openly and aggressively. Kuchma would strengthen despotism, but Symonenko or Vitrenko would do it more quickly and harshly.
A real alternative could arise. Perhaps National Bank Governor Viktor Yushchenko will sacrifice his career by making a bid. Or Henady Udovenko, a professional spokesman – originally for Leonid Brezhnez, later for Leonid Kravchuk, now for a wing of the nationalist Rukh party. More likely there will be multiple right-wing candidates, each with no hope of entering the run-off. But that is no reason not to support the most credible democrat running.
