Historian-turned-politician Hryhoriy Nemyria, a former top aide to ex-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, will be on hand if U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meets Tymoshenko during Clinton’s visit to Kyiv on July 2-3.
The 50-year-old political scientist was elected to parliament in 2006 and served as deputy prime minister in Tymoshenko’s government from 2007-2010. Prior to entering politics, the Donetsk-based native spent almost a decade chairing the Kyiv-based International Renaissance Foundation funded by billionaire George Soros. Nemyria is currently assessing mistakes by Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland” [Batkivshchyna] party in recent years and discussing fresh ideas to attract new ways of attracting support from a new generation Ukrainian voters.
The Kyiv Post on June 29 sat down with Nemyria in Kyiv to talk about plans to change the Fatherland Party and the upcoming visit of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on July 2.
KP: Several more parliament deputies recently left the Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine parliament factions lately to join the pro-presidential majority coalition. Can you convince us that the opposition today is not weak and divided?
HN: Elements of an authoritarian regime have emerged during the past four months. Some authoritarian regimes consolidate power by mobilizing society, while others strengthen their grip on power by de-mobilizing and atomizing society. Ukraine’s new authorities are pursing the latter course, on the one hand, by reconstituting the administrative vertical. On the other, they are attempting to fragment the opposition. The latter task is accomplished by co-opting lawmakers, that is, increasing the size of the parliament majority coalition by means of bribes and threats.
Ukraine’s system of law enforcement, meanwhile, is being used arbitrarily to exert pressure on the political force, which poses the greatest threat to the authorities. This shows where they see a threat. Many repressive measures have been taken against the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, Tymoshenko herself and her closest allies. In this sense, the authorities answer the question about the strength of the opposition. By introducing changes to the Law on Local elections, they are trying to limit the political space of Tymoshenko and her party.
Hryhoriy Nemyria: We will try to figure out whether the United States is indifferent to what is going on here. There are many observers who think that U.S.-Russian relations have been reset at the expense of other countries, including Ukraine, just as the modernization of EU-Russia ties has taken place at the expense of other countries.
The defeat of Tymoshenko in the presidential election was a very painful experience. The magnitude of the loss led to us to spend a great deal of time analyzing our mistakes. It is now not only essential for there to be a revitalization of Fatherland ranks, but for there to be a modernization of the party itself.
This is why we are meeting with civil society leaders on a broad array of issues. We are listening now more than we talk, an acknowledgement there are also people with new ideas are outside of the “Batkivshchyna” [Fatherland] party and the BYuT [Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko] Rada faction. Our aim is to revitalize the party long before parliament elections [scheduled for 2012]. We are focusing on people in their 20’s and 30’s, who, perhaps, want to get involved with politics for the first time.
One of the reasons for the fiasco following [2004] Orange Revolution was the fact that very few civic activists, academics and analysts were appointed to high government posts. We now recognize this mistake and want to correct it. The relative success of the Velvet revolutions in 1989 in Central Europe to a large extent owes to more significant involvement of the civil society and higher quality of the intraparty democracy process.
In addition, we are trying to maximize the contact the party has with a widest possible array of democratic forces within Ukraine and in European countries. While the authorities are busily co-opting, subjugating and centralizing, we are doing the exact opposite, concentrating our efforts on decentralizing party bureaucracy and attracting new people.
KP: Are people happily joining you in the opposition these days?
HN: People held back and waited during the first months following the presidential election, thinking [President Viktor] Yanukovych wouldn’t turn out to be as terribly as initially feared. But a critical mass of evidence has emerged to the contrary.
KP: How do you see your own role and place in Tymoshenko’s party?
HN: As deputy head of the Fatherland, my job is to deal with international issues. I also help create working groups and facilitating their dialogue with representatives of non-governmental organizations on a wide array or domestic and foreign policies.
One of the problems of the last presidential elections was the absence of a battle of ideas. In this respect, discussion of substantive issues was less important than what the individual candidates stood for. The authorities still try to limit the scope of the discussion.
KP: Do you think Yanukovych and his aides are deliberately attempting to stifle debate about public policy? Do you think that Yanukovych and his top advisers, including Presidential Administration head Serhiy Lyovochkin, gather in [Prime Minister Mykola] Azarov’s office on Fridays to discuss measures aimed at weakening their critics?
HN: It would be more accurate to say that the current authorities know better how a penitentiary system works than a mature democracy. But this is too simple an answer. Yes, I believe there is a deliberate attempt to weaken the opposition. The goal of the exercise is to ensure the authorities stay in power for a lengthy period of time. Yanukovych is already saying that a minimum of 10 years is necessary for his program to work.
The leaders of Belarus and Central Asian republics said the same thing. The Party of Regions received power, but now they are changing the rules. The result is a dress-up game, a democratic facade designed to show that constitutional means are being used to conduct judicial reform and introduce constitutional amendments.
KP: You frequently travel to countries in the European Union. Do you get a sense of growing criticism among European politicians directed at Yanukovych?
HN: The first 100 days of Yanukovych’s presidency was a wait-and-see period. Few had high expectations of Yanukovych. Nevertheless, no one expected him to tilt Ukrainian foreign policy so far in the direction of Russia. A next step was to re-open several criminal cases, including one against Tymoshenko. That was followed by pressure on independent media.
Many questions have arisen in connection with so-called judicial reforms proposed by the president. But instead of sending planned legislative changes to the [European Commission for Democracy through Law] Venice Commission, the authorities are attempting the rush adoption of the changes, which includes an element of political revenge, since it was the Supreme Court which ordered a repeat runoff after Yanukovych prevailed in the [2004] rigged presidential election. Under draft changes proposed, the Supreme Court’s authority would be substantially curtailed.
The first government statement expressing concern about human rights and speech liberties in Ukraine came following a May meeting in Aachen, Germany between Tymoshenko and [German Chancellor Angela] Merkel. In this light, it’s ironic that Ukrainian authorities last weekend attempted to prevent Nico Lange, the head of the Adenauer Foundation’s Ukraine office, from entering Ukraine.
The Lange incident reminded me of when Belarusian authorities in November 2004 turned back the head of the regional bureau of Friedrich Ebert Foundation at the airport in Minsk. They held him at the airport over night and sent him back to Europe the next day. The same thing happened with Lange. The incident shows the emergence of an alternative or parallel power network – a characteristic of semi-authoritarian regimes, which tend to use crude tools to accomplish what they can’t change democratically. The state security service, as in Lange’s case, usually performs this role. The incident involving Lange is not a mistake of one bureaucrat.
Nemyria is currently assessing mistakes by Tymoshenko’s “Fatherland” [Batkivshchyna] party
The State Security Service is turning into an instrument to pressure political opponents and civil society, and, simultaneously, has become part of the mechanism of economic and other interests pursued by oligarchs close to the president. An example is the latest scandal over the murky Rosukrenergo gas intermediary. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, meanwhile, has turned its attention to conflicts of interest involving the the president’s appointment of SBU chief Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy to the High Council of Justice, the constitutional organ charged with hiring and firing judges.
KP: You of course criticize the authorities now because you are in the opposition. What can you say about what you didn’t do when you were in power to strengthen the role of the opposition and check the power of the executive?
HN: We could have accomplished a lot more, such as adopting a law on access to information. Tymoshenko, when she was a premier, also spoke in favor of passing a law on the opposition, but a conflict within groups in the executive branch prevented passage of the measure. This was not a conflict of personalities, but a deep divide between those who supported Viktor Yushchenko and who viewed Tymoshenko as an ever-present danger. The absence of a unified [parliament] majority prevented passing the law, which would have come in handy today because the Party of the Regions controls all levers of power.
KP: What will Yulia Tymoshenko talk about with U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton during her visit in Kyiv?
There has been much talk about Russia being prepared to pay for carving out spheres of influence. We hear this constantly that the U.S. does not recognize the concept of spheres of influence in this region, but the facts speak for themselves. Following the [April 21] Kharkiv agreements [between Ukraine and Russia, in which Russia gives Ukraine preferential pricing on natural gas imports for the next 10 years in exchange for a 25-year extension on the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s base in Sevastopol], we see the re-emergence of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty.
Tymoshenko will also share her position regarding new threats to [Ukraine’s] energy security that are related to "penetration into power" of the Rosukrenergo’s owners and "political sponsors."
KP: Do you have any expectations for Clinton’s visit?
HN: Ukrainians must solve their own domestic problems themselves. But inasmuch as Ukraine does not exist in a vacuum, the principled position of those countries, which Ukraine regards as its partners and friends, is very important. It will be very important to hear the detailed American assessment of several steps taken by Yanukovych.
KP: How long will it take before another protest movement emerges and how will the Fatherland Party react?
HN: In order to change the situation, it is necessary to constitutionally arrange for holding early parliament elections. This would let society let off some steam if pressure continues to build. We would be the allies of the opposition movement. There would be a division of labor since the Fatherland Party is represented in the legislature and any new movement would a priori exist outside parliament.
KP: Many today complain about a lack of new political leaders in power and in the opposition. Are you considering becoming one of them?
HN: I am one of the new political leaders. I came to politics at a relatively late age following an academic career. I have been involved in politics five years ago when I began advising Tymoshenko. I knew what I wanted then and when I worked as deputy prime minister in her government. Solo politicians don’t go far. I am a member of a political party led by Tymoshenko, who, in addition to being an effective leader, is capable of listening to others. A leader isn’t only someone who heads a party or government. It has to be someone who is able and wants to take responsibility. Therefore, I also consider myself a leader. I see my mission as working with others in the party to change the situation in Ukraine for the better. I do not see any need to head my own political movement or project.
Kyiv Post staff writer Yuriy Onyshkiv can be reached at [email protected] and Peter Byrne can be reached at [email protected]
