'When there were illusions, there was much more freedom'
managed various media and media-related projects in Ukraine.
In 1991, he left his job as a correspondent for the Moscow-based daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta and accepted an offer from Egor Yakovlev, editor of another Moscow paper, Moskovskie Novosti, to run the paper's bureau in Ukraine. There, Ruban doubled as a commentator on Ukraine's political affairs for Radio Free Europe's Russian service. Ruban added to his responsibilities in 1993, when he created UNIAN, now one of Ukraine's leading news agencies, and ran it for the next three years.
In 1996, Ruban started the daily newspaper Den. After editing the paper for five months, Ruban fell out with Den's owners and moved on to another daily, Vseukrainskie Vedomosti, which he and his team soon transformed into one of the most readable and successful tabloids to appear in Ukraine since independence. However, Ruban's success was short-lived. During the run-up to parliamentary elections in early 1998, the paper was charged with libel and forced to close. Since then, Ruban has worked as a consultant on various media projects in Ukraine.
Q: Have Ukrainian media always been as far from feeling independent as they are today?
A: When there were illusions, there was much more freedom. The early nineties were good years for Ukrainian media, which could then still report independently. At the time, the press was relatively profitable, because successful businessmen had a lot of money, and at times so much that they didn't know where to spend it all.
Over the past two years, the political situation has grown increasingly harsh, which has negatively influenced the development of media in Ukraine. The changes began during parliamentary elections in 1998, when for the first time officials resorted to force to achieve political ends.
Their objective then was to prevent candidates from the Hromada Party [led by former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko] from being elected. Two newspapers supporting Hromada were closed during the campaign, Vseukrainskie Vedomosti and Pravda Ukrainy, as well as a television channel in Dnipropetrovsk. The tactics employed by authorities were partially successful and set a precedent, which was repeated on a massive scale during last year's presidential campaign.
Q: How soon could the media be shaken out of their doldrums?
A: The next parliamentary elections scheduled for 2002 could be a stimulant for liberalization within the framework of a 'love our leader' policy. Money would be invested, editors replaced, projects initiated, etc.
Q: Do the owners of Ukrainian media outlets and politicians, to whom they are linked, even desire diversity of opinion?
A: It has been months since most of the 'unsuitable' media were closed down or taken over, and the population has already grown accustomed to the lack of choice among the remaining newspapers, magazines and TV channels. I do not yet sense any striving for diversity of opinion. Anyone who wants to watch television news can switch on Studio 1+1 or Inter, for example. And if you are interested in political talk shows, you have the choice of watching or not watching Studio 1+1's Epicenter on Sunday evenings.
For those who enjoy reading the news, there are Fakty, Segodnya, and Kievskie Vedomosti. Nowadays, there is no principle difference what oligarch – [Viktor] Pinchuk, [Oleksandr] Volkov, [Hryhory] Surkis, or [Viktor] Medvedchuk – stands behind which media outlet, because the print media have been successfully homogenized. Kievskie Vedimosti is not doing well these days, Den is on death's doorstep, and Fakty, ahem, is Fakty.
Those who run Ukraine today were bit players in the former Soviet Union, where all political decisions were made in Moscow. Officials here used to think like shop wards executing decisions made by factory directors. When the Soviet Union fell apart, officials received an enormous amount of power and were faced with the task of creating an independent state. Most still have a difficult time putting state interests ahead of their own.
There remains no political stimulus for the state to develop its media – or for those who manage state media to develop the skills of their employees. The bottom line remains the same: Keep the 'boss' happy.
As for moguls, they are not stupid. Adept at making money in certain conditions, they are masters at preserving their political influence, manipulating regional authorities and pressing the buttons, which ensures them an audience with those influencing decisions.
Q: When did you decide to specialize in running media projects in Ukraine?
A: It dawned on me in 1992 that Ukraine's media market had become separated from Russia's information sphere and so I began to look for emerging new media in Ukraine. I waited amd waited, then asked myself, 'Who is going to start something new?' I concluded that there was no one to wait for, so I drafted what now seems like a naive project to create a serious national newspaper and began looking for investors. As it turned out, I ended up starting a news agency, the Ukrainian Independent Information Agency (UNIAN). That was the beginning of 1993, when I made the decision to leave journalism and concentrate on the administration of media.
Q: What drew you to Vseukrainskie Vedomosti?
A: First and foremost, I was interested in the commercial aspects of that project. I had no problems working with the newspaper's backers [Lazarenko and associates], because I understood that they were the only people willing and able to make the necessary investment.
I understood that to achieve the goals of the project I had to take into consideration their interests. And I agreed with the condition that I receive carte blanche editorially in order to create a successful commercial enterprise. Over the next eight months, we increased the paper's circulation from 20,000 to 180,000. Vedomosti was an irreverent tabloid with bold headlines and large photographs. We gave the paper pizzazz.
Q: What has been, and should be, the role of the West in promoting democratic media in Ukraine?
A: First off, the West did not anticipate that the Soviet Union would fall apart as quickly as it did. The first three or four years of independence, the media were relatively uninhibited in Ukraine. By the time authorities began the squeeze in late 1997, it was already too late. Diplomats and politicians in the West had already established and heralded ties with Ukraine's moderate 'democratic' reformers, whom they entrusted with billions of dollars of loans and assistance. So they were unable to turn around and now advocate support for government-subsidized media projects. That would be tantamount to admitting that past policies – which assumed a commitment on the part of Ukrainian authorities to respect press liberties – had failed to produce the desired results. To be fair, though, few, including me, expected that things would end up as badly as they have.
Back in 1994 and 1995, when I negotiated with representatives from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and representatives of various foundations on financing for [media] projects, people had the impression that within three or four years the situation in Ukraine would improve. It was possible then to anticipate receiving dividends from the investments, which, by and large, were never made.
Readers of the Ukrainian press have forgotten how good journalism tastes and smells, much less how it looks and reads. Training, trips, and giving away computers are nice gestures, but that's about it.
Q: How long will it take for substantive political change to occur in Ukraine?
A: As an optimist, I would predict real changes to occur following the next presidential elections [in 2004]. As a pessimist, I would say that over the next seven to eight years Ukraine will become a wholly owned Russian colony, like Belarus, with a marionette government, a sovereign flag, and a famous soccer team.
