Social Democrats refute oligarch label
The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) has taken on a difficult task.
Widely known as a collection of heavyweight businessmen, the party is now trying to transform itself into an ideology‑based political movement, promoting social‑democratic values.
Headed by a handful of influential businessmen, including deputies Viktor Medvedchuk, Oleksandr Zin‑chenko and Hryhory Surkis, the party has been trying to rid itself of the oligarch rap.
That hasn’t come easy for SDPU(u), whose members have wide business interests in energy, mass media, agriculture and heavy industry.
Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine’s first president and an SDPU(u) member, is something of a mentor for the party’s young and enterprising members. A Communist Party boss in the Soviet days, Kravchuk is now promoting the ideals of democratic socialism.
“Capitalism teaches that if you are strong, you will survive. If not, you will perish,” Kravchuk says. “Our principles – social democratic principles – argue that society should not leave a person to perish.”
Together, Medvedchuk, Kravchuk, Surkis and Zinchenko have built the SDPU(u) from the ground up, since they were elected to parliament as party candidates back in 1998.
In the current parliament, the SDPU(u) faction has ranged from 20‑35 members (of a total of 450 deputies). The faction includes deputies who aren’t members of the party.
Current polls show that between 3 percent and 7 percent of Ukrainians are ready to cast their votes for the SDPU(u), just a fraction of the 20 percent support that Viktor Yushchenko’s newly created Our Ukraine bloc receives.
Still, the SDPU(u) is developing into one of Ukraine’s most structured, organized and fastest‑growing parties. Today, it has about 350,000 members, Kravchuk said. Only the Communist Party is in the same league in terms of membership and organization.
While other Ukrainian parties and blocs tend to appear and disappear between elections, depending upon who is in power, the SDPU(u) claims to be in for the long haul.
“We don’t unconditionally support the president or the government,” Kravchuk said. “Our party has a long‑term strategy for the party’s development and for Ukraine. It is one that doesn’t depend on who is in power. We support those steps of the president that we see as appropriate … that are in the interest of Ukraine and our social‑democratic program.”
This approach distinguishes the SDPU(u) from other centrist oligarch parties or blocs, such as the For a United Ukraine bloc, which practically broadcasts its loyalty to the president.
Kravchuk said the SDPU(u) has developed into a genuine party.
According to Kravchuk, in past parliamentary elections the party concentrated mainly on constituencies in Zakarpattya oblast, just to make sure its candidates got elected.
“In the last parliamentary elections our party didn’t really exist as a true, genuine, functional party,” Kravchuk says. “We were just an illusion of a party. That’s why we concentrated mostly on the Zakarpattya region. But now, we have large party organizations in each oblast. We will absolutely break through the 4 percent barrier [for representation under the party‑list system].”
That’s something the party barely achieved in 1998.
Political analysts find it hard to predict exactly how many seats the SDPU(u) will gain in these elections.
Oleksandr Derhachyov, editor of Politychna Dumka, a political journal, believes the party could capture 5 percent to 7 percent of the vote, enough to give it about 15 seats based on the party‑list system. Derhachyov found it more difficult to predict how many seats the group would win in single‑member districts.
Mykhailo Pohrebinsky, director of the Ukrainian Center for Political and Conflict Studies, was more optimistic. He described the SDPU(u) as a fast‑growing party with a dedicated electorate (which he estimates at about 10 percent of voters), and predicted that it could muster up to 50 seats ‑ half from party lists and half from single‑mandate districts.
“The people who join this party, as opposed to other parties, tend to be more educated, more successful in their careers, economically stable and more optimistic,” Pohrebinsky said. “These are people who want stability, not erratic changes. They are not dependent on an oppositionist stance toward the government.”
But being an advocate for the lower stratum of society can be tough for a party still viewed by many as a party of tycoons.
“The SDPU(u) is no doubt a party that belongs to a group of oligarchs,” said Derhachyov. “It differs from other oligarch parties in that it has made serious attempts to develop a classical party structure. But there is only a very small chance that this party will develop or evolve into a real genuine social‑democratic party.”
Unlike Derhachyov, Pohrebinsky believes SDPU(u) is capable of spearheading a genuine social‑democratic movement in Ukraine.
Kravchuk admits his party has rich and influential members. He also admits that the SDPU(u), to a certain degree, pushes party dogma through major media outlets that it has influence over, such as the television channels Inter and TET, and Kievskiye Vedomosti newspaper.
“Do we have rich people in our party?,” he said. “Yes, we do. But so do other parties. Isn’t Petro Poroshenko rich? Isn’t Tymoshenko rich.”
At the same time, Kravchuk said that so‑called oligarchs make up only a small part of the party membership. He insists that the party’s true spirit is tenacious fighting for social‑democratic tenets in Ukraine, rather than lobbying for the interests of business groups close to the party.
The party is betting big on its image as a proponent of social‑democratic doctrine.
“The experience of Europe is on our side. Of the 15 countries in the European Union, 13 are governed by social democrats. People can see that living standards in these countries are higher,” Kravchuk said.
In a recent blitz of television ads, the party tried to entice voters by suggesting that since most of Europe is ruled by social democrats, voting for their Ukrainian counterparts could bring Ukraine closer to Western Europe.
Like the other oligarch‑labeled parties, SDPU(u) has proven that it is a political force to be reckoned with.
One of the best examples of this occurred last spring, when it joined forces with other influential centrist parties to oust reformist Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko.
“Our party voted almost unanimously for Yushchenko’s candidacy to the post of prime minister,” Kravchuk said. “But he later divided the parliamentary factions into ones that he liked and ones that he disapproved of. Access to him was practically closed for our party members. He should have accepted parliament the way it is, not the way he wanted it to be.”
Many analysts insist that the party turned against Yushchenko because of his government’s energy reforms, which they say cut sources of shadow income from businesses close to the SDPU(u).
But Kravchuk said his party’s differences with Yushchenko were rooted in ideology, not business.
“We clashed with former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko’s government and their programs because they failed to compromise on some of our social‑democratic principles, namely providing adequate privileges and protection for society’s lower classes,” Kravchuk said.
“We understand that privileges are not the best variant for a balanced budget. But if we can’t give people normal salaries today, then we believe social programs like privileges should be left in place and even increased if needed.”
One of the Yushchenko government’s most commonly cited achievements was the payment of pension arrears.
Analysts, like Derhachyov, say that another reason the SDPU(u) decided to cut Yushchenko’s term short was because his popularity was rising quickly. That didn’t appeal to party leader Medvedchuk, considered – along with Yushchenko – to be one of the leading contenders for the 2004 presidential elections.
“Obviously, Medvedchuk is a very good presidential contender,” Kravchuk said. “I have been watching him develop as a lawyer, politician and professional since 1994. He is very capable of this.”
