In an exclusive interview with the Post, Germany's Ambassador to Ukraine discusses his country's veto of Ukraine’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) bid.
German Ambassador to Ukraine Reinhard Schaefers is a career diplomat with more than 31 years of service, including a posting to the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. He served as the head of the German Federal Chancellory’s Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe department between 1992 and 1998. Schaefers has served as German Ambassador to Ukraine since July 2006. In an exclusive interview with the Post, he clarified his nation’s controversial veto of Ukraine’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the April 2 to 4 NATO Summit in Bucharest.
KP: On April 3, the NATO council released a communique stating that Ukraine will become a NATO member. Does Germany support these views?
RS: These are no longer views. We are talking about facts here. Look at paragraph 23 of the NATO Bucharest Summit communique (see sidebar on page 7). This compromise was the result of a long and difficult consultative process. First and most important is NATO is using more explicit language than in the past.
And the socalled “open door” policy was reconfirmed by the summit.
We are saying that Ukraine and Georgia will be NATO members and this is something we have never said before with such clarity. And now we start the processes that will eventually lead to a MAP for Ukraine. The first review of this process will be held at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in December of this year.
KP: Does this mean that Germany and NATO see Ukrainian membership in their interest?
RS: Let me put it this way: we see, and have said, that Ukraine will be a NATO member, of course, under conditions that Ukraine has imposed on itself. They have a broad agreement between all political parties and circles here that there will be a referendum before Ukraine enters the alliance. So a majority of the Ukrainian people will have to say yes to NATO.
In regards to our interests, they are very strongly connected to this fact. An expansion, an enlargement of NATO, can only be in our interest if it is being done by a stable country with a stable majority advocating the goals and principles of NATO. This is what we want to see. And this coincides with what the Ukrainians themselves have agreed upon. And only in this case will it be in our interest.
KP: To follow that up, some describe Ukraine’s political scene as a lowgrade civil war between rival fractions, east and west. Additionally, experts agree that due to the unparalleled security guarantees, Ukraine’s membership is clearly in the country’s interest. Yet polls reveal the Ukrainian body politic does not see it this way. In international parlance, is Ukraine a unified rational actor? Is this causing Germany’s hesitance?
RS: Our hesitance is precisely based on our look at Ukraine’s internal public opinion. We see a persistent majority of the population is against NATO rapprochement, against NATO as a whole and that includes NATO membership. The worst thing about this is that these negative views towards NATO have been stable for quite some time and the Ukrainian government has done nothing substantial to rectify it. That is bad.
So our main concerns when we look at the MAP candidature of Ukraine are: Is it in the interest of the Ukrainian people? Is it in our interest or the alliance’s interest to have a state of Ukraine’s size and split like this moving forward toward membership? After all, the NATO charter states that the accession of a new member must not only improve the security of the aspirant, but must boost the security of the alliance as a whole. So in my view, this is an important criterion that has not been fully discussed over the past few weeks.
KP: So, Ukraine’s divided electorate which is manifested in the country’s fractious politics is the fundamental reason Germany opposed MAP status?
RS: Yes, it is not only divided, but a stable majority consistently rejects NATO rapprochement and membership.
KP: Some say that due to your country’s special relationship with Russia; that Germany acted as her proxy on the MAP issue. Is that true?
RS: Some of my friends who are emotionally frustrated on this issue use this argument. I have told them perhaps undiplomatically, that those who say that Germany made the decision solely because of the Russia factor are wrong. This is not a basis for discussion. It is rubbish.
Of course the Russian factor has played a role, but a secondary role after the factor we already discussed. The Russian factor plays a role in terms of regional and European stability.
So I go back to what I asked before: does Ukraine in MAP increase or diminish stability in this region, in Europe as a whole and the Alliance as a whole? And we see that Russia has expressed not only doubts but sincere hostility toward Ukraine’s MAP status. This would not be decisive nor by itself sufficient to withhold status. But we must take into account the perceptions of such an important player as Russia.
And why is Russia an important player? Because we need Russia as a partner and active player in quite a range of fields of a European dimension: a new conventional arms reduction treaty, a new Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement. We want them to play a stabilizing role with the unsettled question of Kosovo and constructive role in missile defense in support of our American friends.
We want to see Russia in terms of security and stability as an active and cooperative player. So we have to take their perception of a threat into account. This is at the core of our view of the Russian factor.
KP: Aren’t Russia’s views and hostility myopic?
RS: Of course, to see NATO expansion and enlargement as a threat to Russia is objectively wrong. We are no longer in the Cold War and the situation in European has changed. But, what we have to take into account are the perceptions of not only Russia’s leaders but the Russian people too. This has to be differentiated, objectively, between the reality, in terms of security and perceptions. And perceptions are a political factor as well. We as neighbors must account for that, because it influences European stability.
KP: While discussing security, you didn’t mention energy security. Many German firms have deep energy supply partnerships in Russia and German firms are actively supporting Nord Stream. What role did GermanRussian energy relationships play?
RS: The energy relationship is only one aspect of our deep rooted and broad based economic relationship with Russia. We are the main Western economic partner of Russia. This is important. It is not just about energy, which is strategically important. But this has developed for decades, even throughout the Cold War. At the height of the Cold War, we were very good at developing economic relationships with the Soviet Union.
Economic relations, stability and security concerns must be separated. It is just too shortsighted to do otherwise. The economic relationship will go on regardless of the political situation. There is a kind of mutual dependency in the energy field. They have to sell and want to sell; we have to buy and want to buy. But I want to repeat the interdependency of the German and Russian economies goes far beyond energy.
KP: Last Thursday you were on 5 Kanal, and you said, to paraphrase, Ukraine did not do all its “homework” for MAP. Can you specifically tell me what “homework” they didn’t complete?
RS: This is a very specific point. Here I referred to the process which has been ongoing over the past five years between NATO and Ukraine. We relied on socalled Annual Target Plans to gauge Ukraine’s readiness for MAP and eventual membership. But over the last few years they have not been fulfilled and this fact should not be overruled by a political decision. Of course, Ukraine was in political turmoil. The same is true for the Intensified Dialogue phase.
We acknowledge that Ukraine is the only nonNATO country to contribute, sometimes only symbolically, to all kinds of the alliance’s peacekeeping and crisismanagement operations. This does not mitigate the fact that critical work was not done.
This is like the school boy telling the teacher that, “Yes sir, I didn’t do my homework and did not work properly this year, but if you let me pass to the next grade I will work doubly hard.”
But in our argument this is problem number three. The first problem as discussed is the political instability and the people’s persistent negativity towards NATO, the second European stability including the Russian factor and third is this “homework” issue.
KP: Specifically, how has Ukraine done meeting the five criteria for MAP accession?
RS: Ukraine has made quite some progress in democratic reform and establishing democratic control of the military. On the other hand we are all aware of shortcomings in the reform process and the underfunding of the armed forces. Overall they have done more than 50 percent, but far short of 100 percent.
KP: What is the German government, in conjunction with NATO doing to assist Ukraine on the path to membership?
RS: In the NATO framework, we will assist Ukraine as laid down in the communique. We are now beginning the long process, jointly, of identifying the deficiencies and outstanding tasks. Here we will take an active interest and assist our Ukrainian friends in meeting the requirements.
Specifically, I would like to refer to what we have done since Ukraine’s independence. Annually, we have spent on average 5.5 million euros assisting the country through a constant process of formal training, projects and seminars, and military advice.
KP: In news reports Ukraine’s and Georgia’s MAP bids became linked. Do Ukraine’s aspirations depend on Georgia’s?
RS: Unfortunately, I was a little bit surprised, when the Ukrainian request came out in January, that the two countries bids were tied together in Brussels. This decision wasn’t made by Ukraine or Germany. It was done by Brussels or by the United States. I don’t know who finally pushed for it.
Each country should be individually judged on their own merits. The countries and their situations are quite different; Chancellor Merkel made this very clear.
In the interest of our Ukrainian friends, I would greatly welcome the decoupling of each nation’s bid. This is my personal view.
KP: How has the veto affected bilateral relations between the two countries?
RS: In the first place I do not see what we did as a veto. The alliance forged a real compromise. This was not a German veto or a German French veto. It is a compromise, a good compromise.
As for the bilateral relationship I haven’t seen any specific reactions, and I don’t expect any. I would understand a certain degree of frustration. But, professionally the focus remains on the practical issues affected the relationship. We still are acting as Ukraine’s friend. Don’t forget Germany is Ukraine’s second ranking trading partner and first in terms of investment.
KP: Is Ukraine a European country? Does old Europe view Ukraine as European?
RS: This question is being raised more in terms of future European Union membership for Ukraine. This question is not being openly discussed but it plays a certain role in Brussels and some European capitals when the look at the future of the Union and when they look a Ukraine’s bid to join.
When I look at Ukraine, which we have long historical, economic, and cultural ties with, in fact I cannot see a sphere of human endeavor that we do not have traditional links. So in my mind there is no doubt that Ukraine is a European country.
KP: Some have mentioned the possibility of joining NATO without going through the MAP process. Is that realistic?
RS: No. As we discussed today, it is not the way we should proceed.
KP: In your view, how long do youforesee it will take Ukraine to become a full NATO member?
RS: Even those who are advocating speedy membership say, including the president, that this is a very long term process. (Ukraine’s Parliamentary Speaker Arseniy) Yatsenyuk, after all, says decades. It is difficult to give an accurate timeframe. Now we are heading towards a MAP, we do not know how long that will take. Then they have to go through MAP. Then finally they have to have a referendum. It will take some time to overcome the people’s aversion to NATO and build a solid majority supporting NATO and NATO ideals. I can foresee the process taking five to ten years.
KP: Otto von Bismarck, perhaps Germany’s preeminent statesmen once opined, “The Balkans are not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.” Fast forward to the present: what would Bismarck say today? Is Ukraine worth a German grenadier?
RS: It is difficult to put myself in his shoes. He was obviously the preeminent statesman of his time. He was the essence of realpolitik, able to think through the consequences of any foreign policy decision. If he were to look at Ukraine’s situation, he would make a clear, calculated decision.
KP: Is that what Chancellor Merkel and Germany did here?
Yes, particularly with regard to the three criteria outlined above, Ukraine’s political stability, European stability including the Russian factor and Ukraine not doing its home work.
KP: Is there anything you would like to illuminate that we haven’t discussed?
RS: I would like to highlight one aspect that hasn’t been discussed in the media. In my arguments with my friend (US Ambassador to Ukraine) Bill Taylor and others, there is a clear divergence between our view and others’
My friends argue, “Come on, we do not have to have a fundamental political discussion about Ukraine’s membership now. This is not about membership. This is about MAP. It is a rather technical issue. The membership discussion is years away.”
My response to that is – and here we have the divergence with our American friends, in the case of Ukraine – given its size, population, its significance as a regional heavyweight and its history, you recognize that geopolitically, this country plays a special role. Talking of a MAP for Ukraine in such a context means an important change to the geopolitical landscape.
This question is being raised when you decide on a MAP. The M is there. You’re not talking about a small country in Southeastern or Central Europe. This is specifically about this heavyweight of Ukraine and its geopolitical position and where it has always been and will remain so for a thousand years. For these reasons politically you cannot divide MAP and membership. This is the political context. When the time comes to discuss the actual membership will come around it will be a technical decision following a benchmarked process.
This is why in the last few weeks this has become the most important, the number one political and security question in Europe.
