The U.S. decision to revoke plans to build a missile shield in Eastern Europe provoked speculations that it will strengthen Russia’s position in the region, enabling it to push its interests in Ukraine more aggressively.
The U.S. decision to cancel plans to build a missile shield in Eastern Europe has provoked concern that Russian may be emboldened to push its interests in Ukraine more aggressively. The decision, announced on Sept. 17, has been interpreted in Ukraine as a sign of waning U.S. support for pro-Western allies in the region, a tradeoff to help U.S. President Barack Obama win Russian cooperation on more pressing American foreign policy priorities.
Speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on Sept. 21, President Victor Yushchenko obliquely criticized the decision. “To make defense stronger and make it more efficient is always good. And this gives more benefits than the policy of risk balances, because risk management … is not a stable policy,” he said.
Yushchenko also stressed Ukraine’s vulnerability to moves from Moscow, particularly on the Crimean peninsula, and the need for protection by the West. “We don’t want to lose our independence like we did many times in the 20th century. NATO membership and Ukrainian independence … are synonymous,” he said.
But polls show that most Ukrainians – about 60 percent – are against joining NATO, and would prefer a different security arrangement, according to Ilko Kucheriv, head of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, a think tank.
The $56 billion anti-missile system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic was the brainchild of the previous administration of U.S. President George W. Bush. It was perceived by Russia as a direct threat and was a major sore point in relations. Obama’s cancellation was seen as an attempt to secure the Kremlin’s cooperation on a number of issues, including Iran and nuclear disarmament, by removing a system that may have been ineffective anyway due to technical shortcomings.
But while Russia and U.S. taxpayers may cheer the decision, it was booed by governments and people of Eastern and Central Europe, including Ukraine. Some said Russia would interpret the U.S. decision on the missile shield as a sign of weakness.
“Russia will perceive the move as a step back from the region,” said Adrian Karatnycky, a senior fellow of the Atlantic Council of the United States. “Russia is going to test the U.S. in the coming months and years with probes and moves to see how far it is prepared to turn the other cheek.”
Karatnycky also predicted that “Russia will step up its pressure on Ukraine and try to reassert itself as the dominant force in the region.” This is of particular concern in Ukraine with the Jan. 17 presidential elections approaching, given Moscow’s overt interference in 2004. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has already set out the Kremlin’s vision for the new president’s domestic and foreign policy in a forceful letter sent to Yushchenko in August, criticizing the president’s “anti-Russian” policies.
There are also fears that an emboldened Russia will step up its opposition to Ukraine’s efforts for deeper integration with the European Union, alongside its continued hostility toward Ukraine’s NATO ambitions. The Kremlin is also likely to press for the extension of the Black Sea Fleet’s presence on Ukrainian territory beyond 2017, when the current agreement runs out. Observers in Kyiv are also concerned that Russia may go as far as using a provocation by pro-Russian groups in the Crimea as a pretext for intervention on the peninsula. A bill was recently passed in the Russian parliament to provide a legal basis for “defending” Russian citizens abroad using force.
“Russia will more and more think about real power in Eurasia. It can now demand a special sphere of influence including Ukraine,” said Yuriy Shcherbak, a former Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S.
Although the Obama administration has repeatedly stressed its opposition to the whole concept of a Russian sphere of influence, Russia’s intervention in Georgia last year revealed the limits of Washington’s ability – and willingness – to support its allies in the region. Iran and Afghanistan remain overwhelming priorities for the U.S., and rapprochement with the Kremlin is seen as a way to secure support for Obama’s positions.
“I remember a time when Ukraine occupied fourth of fifth place on the priority list for the U.S. administration. But now I don’t believe we are even 20th or 30th on the list,” said Shcherbak.
The blame for Ukraine’s slide down the list of Washington’s priorities, however, doesn’t rest alone with the U.S.
Ukraine-Russia relations have soured under the presidency of Yushchenko. As president, Yushchenko has admirably held firm to pro-democratic and pro-Western principles, but relations with Russia have noticeably soured. Some Yushchenko critics say he has been sucked into repeated confrontations with Moscow on a broad range of issues, which the Kremlin uses to meddle in Ukrainian affairs and could utilize as a pretext to intervene on a bigger scale.
Moreover, people who attended Yushchenko’s appearance earlier this week at the Council of Foreign Relations privately said there was widespread consternation at his perceived detachment from reality. He opened with a speech on Ukraine’s economic achievements, despite an estimated 18 percent plunge in gross domestic product in the first half of the year. “Many saw it as his last hurrah,” said one attendee, adding that people know he is unlikely to be re-elected.
