chenko remains the frontrunner, and would take about 20 percent of the vote if the election were held tomorrow. Communist party boss Petro Symonenko polls at about 13 percent, with Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych not far behind. Several other candidates trail behind him.
Yushchenko’s numbers should reassure him; were we forced to bet today on the outcome of next year’s elections, we would put our money on him.
Given his popularity, we’re all the more intrigued by the low profile he’s kept for the last several months. We’re even a bit concerned. Given what’s going on in Ukrainian politics currently, why isn’t Yushchenko demanding attention, making noise?
We suspect that the failure of Yushchenko or any other candidate to distinguish himself has partially to do with the “constitutional reforms” the odor of which has been drifting from the Presidential Administration building for almost a year now. To remind those of our readers who, more sensitive than we can afford to be, have ignored this issue, impartial political observers believe that these “reforms” are a scheme to either extend the sitting president’s term or keep power out of Yushchenko’s hands in the event he is elected. Given a favorable ruling from the Constitutional Court and the strenuous efforts needed to overcome a fractious parliament, it might indeed be possible for the president’s partisans to pull off a maneuver that would make it possible for Kuchma to continue in office almost indefinitely. The damage that would do to Ukraine is too obvious to bear going into.
Even if these reforms don’t pass, they’ve been a distraction. They’ve forced potential aspirants back onto their heels and into the defensive posture of having to react to every new provocation that emerges from Bankova St. It must be nerve-wracking to run a presidential campaign under such circumstances. It’s akin, if we’ll be forgiven a parochially North American metaphor, to trying to dedicate oneself to spring training knowing that, come opening day, a clique in the commissioner’s office might cancel the season, drum up phony tax-evasion charges against uncooperative owners, divvy up the property among its members, and generally wipe out the league.
We’re aware that President Kuchma isn’t the only one behind the reforms. But having said that, we can see how, even if they don’t pass, they’ve become an effective political tool, even if an unwitting one. Whatever the intentions behind the reforms were, they’re now being used to fuel a harassing “permanent campaign” with an effectiveness politicians in the West should admire.
But the measure of a leader is his ability to overcome the type of adversity the Ukrainian political scene sets its participants. A leader has to wrest control of the national agenda from the hacks and unambiguously lead, or at least make a lot of noise trying. Which brings us back to Yushchenko. We’ve long supported the presidential aspirations of Yushchenko, the photogenic favorite of Ukraine’s reform-minded and westward-leaning. As prime minister, Yushchenko was tough and tremendously effective. His government accomplished more in a year and a half than any other government before or since.
Now, though, we’re having mild second thoughts, recalculating Yushchenko’s chances of actually pulling this election off. His quiescence of recent months is making us rethink whether he has what it takes not only to punch his way through the opposition, but also to take control of a large, complicated country. Why isn’t he campaigning? Where is he lately, and what is he doing? Has he lost his nerve, gone soft?
One credible answer to that question is that, at this early stage, he’s staying quiet on purpose. That would be consistent with the street-fighting principle that one should never throw a punch before one has to. Yushchenko could let the warfare now in progress between the Viktor Yanukovych’s Donetsk faction and the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) weaken both sides. Then he could emerge next spring to stand tall among the wounded, and stroll into the president’s office.
We’re willing to entertain that theory. But we fear the small chance Yushchenko could turn into a sort of Ukrainian John Kerry. That is, an attractive figure, but somewhat low in grit, and of little use in a fight, which is what Ukrainian politics is. We’d like to see fewer photographs of Yushchenko wading through adoring Lviv crowds and leading gentlemanly jaunts up Mt. Hoverla, and more of the fire his government displayed when he was prime minister.
Politics, especially Ukrainian politics, require someone who can win. When we look at, say, Yulia Tymoshenko or Serhy Tyhypko, we see seasoned operators who haven’t let their relatively advanced scruples impede their ability to gouge eyes. When we look at today’s Yushchenko, we increasingly see a fellow with an earnest expression who wouldn’t look out of place as governor of Connecticut.
We could be overreacting. But we’d rather overreact now than express regrets later. Yushchenko may still be the best choice for the job, but he must first convince more of Ukraine’s voters before he has a chance to prove it in the office.
