http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/heir-not-so-apparent/201506.html
Recently, there has been renewed interest in Kadyrov, his
relationship with Putin and his role in Russia’s murky political system. This
interest is likely to grow with Russia’s sudden entry into a military conflict
in the Muslim World. Kadyrov, like most Chechens, is a Sunni Muslim..
Since the murder of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov,
allegedly committed by Chechen security personnel acting on orders of a close
Kadyrov associate, it has become clear that the Chechen leader either carries
out political assassinations for the Russian president or makes bloody presents
to him – the way your cat occasionally brings you a decapitated corpse of a
sparrow.
Thus, there are indications that Kadyrov was ultimately behind
the murder of investigative reporter (and US citizen) Anna Politkovskaya,
killed on Putin’s birthday in 2006.
There are also many unanswered questions about the bombing of
the Boston Marathon in 2013, which was carried out by two Chechen immigrants
just as the anti-American rhetoric began to heat up in Putin’s media.
Putin shows no inclination to act as a responsible cat owner
and to tie a bell around Kadyrov’s neck. On the contrary, he invariably turns a
blind eye whenever the Chechen leader settles scores with his rivals, be it
under the walls of the Kremlin – as in the case of Ruslan Yamadayev, gunned
down in Moscow in 2008 – or in foreign countries – as in the case of his
brother Sulim killed in Dubai in 2009. The murder of Yuri Budanov, a Russian
military officer convicted of atrocities during the Chechen war and then
released, may be added to this list
Putin also uses Kadyrov for other purposes. “Kadyrovtsy” were
prominent among Russian “volunteers” fighting in Russian-occupied Donbass.
Kadyrov has just offered to send Chechen soldiers to fight a ground war in
Syria.
At home, Kadyrov is a typical despot vested with unlimited
power, doing whatever he wants without the slightest regard for Moscow. He
openly sanctions Muslim polygamy, knocks down the houses of his opponents and
does plenty of other things that contravene federal laws. In this respect, he
has won far greater independence than Chechen separatist fighters ever dreamt
of during their rebellion. Even better, he manages to combine flaunting de facto independence with getting lavish
subsidies from the federal budget. Subsidies measure hundreds of millions of
dollars every year and show no sign of diminishing despite a collapsing Russian
economy and severe belt-tightening in all other regions..
For his part, Kadyrov really appreciates this nice treatment.
His devotion and admiration for Putin are genuine, and some observers note that
the two men have a kind of father-and-son relationship. Kadyrov’s own father,
whose memory he honors incessantly in Chechnya, was assassinated in 2004.
In Russian history, this relationship has eerie parallels with
the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. Here, too, in a classical colonial
and even vassal-seigneur tradition, we have a rough thug from the Caucasus
discovering a kindred soul in a seemingly more polished Russian Big Brother,
who becomes his role model, inspiration and father figure.
According to British historian Simon Montefiore, young Josef
Dzhugashvili, then a leader of a criminal gang with socialist leanings, came
across Lenin’s writings and was enthralled by the man’s determination and
complete lack of moral scruples, which echoed his own personality. Stalin
became Lenin’s lifelong admirer. The two men established a connection and
Stalin quickly got to be indispensable to the Bolshevik leader: he was robbing
banks in the Caucasus to provide Lenin with funds to live on in Switzerland and
to carry on his revolutionary activities. Stalin was considered a weakling
among Lenin’s more educated entourage, and his rise to power over their heads
came as a big surprise. However, Stalin’s relationship with Lenin seems to have
been far closer than is traditionally believed, involving highly sensitive
matters such as money, and it had been Lenin who kept promoting him within the
party..
There are differences, of course, and certainly the situation
with Kadyrov’s possible succession is probably trickier. When Lenin became
incapacitated and died, Stalin was an insider in the Soviet government and was
able to make crucial personnel decisions within the Bolshevik party thanks to
his position as its First Secretary. He gradually promoted his loyalists and
isolated his rivals. Kadyrov, on the other hand, is an outsider living far from
Moscow and, moreover, he seems content
with being a Padishah in Chechnya and has no nationwide aspirations.
However, many analysts believe that after Putin Russia may
slide into some kind of bloody chaos. The institutions of state, even the weak
ones Putin inherited after the incomplete political reforms of the 1990s, have
been hollowed out, corrupted and privatized over the past fifteen years.
Competing criminal clans consisting of security officers, bureaucrats,
oligarchs, state-owned company managers and common thugs are likely to duke it
out whenever a power vacuum occurs.
Kadyrov has mortal enemies in the Russian military and the FSB.
The investigation into Nemtsov’s murder showed that some elements in Russia’s
security apparatus were eager to get Kadyrov but were prevented from
prosecuting him by higher authorities in the Kremlin. Once there is no Putin,
they will not be kept at bay. Kadyrov may have to move aggressively in order to
protect himself when Putin goes.
Kadyrov is well-equipped for a fight. He has a strong military
muscle, which he had built up since the end of the Second Chechen War. His is
probably the most disciplined, motivated and battle-hardened military force in
all of Russia. He has a network of loyal Chechens in every region of the
country, including, most importantly, in Moscow.
Ordinary Russians tend to fear and loath Chechens, but it is
not at all clear whether this would keep Kadyrov from becoming their next
leader. For instance, many Russians combine nostalgia for Stalin and Brezhnev
with hatred of Georgians and Ukrainians. Last year, all of a sudden, there was
a burst of affection for the Chechens among Russian nationalists, of all
people, because Kadyrov had sent his soldiers to fight in Eastern Ukraine. For
whatever reason, public opinion in Putin’s Russia has been almost
pathologically susceptible to manipulation, swinging literally overnight from
mad obsession with Ukraine to equally insane interest in the Syrian civil war.
In any case, the Russian political tradition requires not to
question who rules the country and why but to express love and support for
whoever does.
More fascinating from the psychological point of view is Kadyrov’s
loyalty to Putin. There are suspicions that Kadyrov’s father was assassinated
with the connivance of the FSB, an organization for which Putin used to work
and at one point head. And Putin has been systematically reviving the
personality cult of Stalin, the man who was responsible for the deportation of the Chechen people in 1944, in which thousands of Chechens perished.
