In 2006, Gazprom threatened to cut off gas to Georgia unless it received much higher prices. It did the same with Ukraine and Belarus.Georgia, which has a highly reformed but struggling economy, balked at complying with the demands.
As tension over this issue built in late 2005 and early 2006, Gazprom reported that an explosion had damaged the pipeline in southern Russia that it used to deliver gas to Georgia. That meant no Russian gas to Georgia in the dead of winter.
Just hours later, on the same day — Jan. 22, 2006 — Russia reported two explosions to its main electrical cable to Georgia, cutting off more than half of Georgia’s power.
The gas-pipeline explosion also led to a shortage of gas in my homeland, Armenia, because Gazprom sends part of its supply to Armenia through pipelines in Georgia.
Russia has since consolidated its energy stranglehold on Armenia, supplying it with most of its gas and owning Armenia’s electrical grid.
Not surprisingly, Russian ownership of the grid led to another example of blackmail last year. Nationwide protests greeted the power company’s demand for an immediate 17 percent jump in electricity rates.
That issue still has yet to be resolved satisfactorily.
The official Russian account of the gas pipeline and electric cable explosions in 2006 was that they were the result of unspecified Caucasus saboteurs.
Georgians would have none of that.
Most saw the cutoffs for what they were: An unmistakable Russian message about what would happen to Georgia if it failed to accept Gazprom’s price-hike demands.
Then-President Mikheil Saakashvili spoke for much of Georgia when he accused Russia of blackmail in the severing of the gas and power supplies.
In the end, Georgia had no choice but to capitulate to the Gazprom price increase demands.
A footnote in this story that has important implications today is that Iran stepped in to supply gas to Georgia during the Russian cut off.
Iran would like to become a permanent supplier of gas to Georgia now that global sanctions against Tehran have been lifted.
The sanctions were imposed when Iran refused to pledge not to build nuclear weapons. Last year a deal was reached between Iran and several other countries under which Tehran agreed not to develop a nuclear bomb.
The deal led to the lifting of the sanctions against Iran, making it possible for Tehran to supply oil and gas globally, including to Georgia.
Russia has long worried about Iran trying to increase its influence in former Soviet republics like Georgia. One way Tehran could do that is by selling oil and gas to those countries. Iran is a low-cost oil and gas producer, so it would likely be able to offer Georgia a much better price for energy than Russia.
Fear of Iranian encroachment in Georgia and the rest of the Caucasus is just one reason Russia wants to supply more gas to Georgia, however.
Another is that it likes Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili’s policy of resetting relations with Russia, and believes that a new gas deal will lead to Tbilisi being even more pliable.
It is one thing to do a reset with Russia to normalize relations that ended in a war between Russia and Georgia in 2008.
It is quite another for Georgia to take a step — buying more Gazprom gas — that will increase Tbilisi’s susceptibility to Russian blackmail.
I find myself wondering what the heck the accommodating Margvelashvili administration is thinking when it considers a deal that would make Georgia more dependent on Russian energy.
Many Georgians are questioning the move as well. In fact, some have engaged in public protests against the gas talks. Georgia doesn’t have to display open hostility toward Russia, as the Russia-hating Saakashvilli did when he was Georgia’s president.
But neither should it give Russia a larger opening to meddle in its affairs.In recent years Azerbaijan has supplied most of Georgia’s gas.
Tbilisi sees it as a steady and reliable energy partner.
Iran, whose help with emergency gas supplies in 2006 still resonates in Georgia, is also ready to sell gas to Georgia.
It’s smart for any country to diversify its energy supply, but it isn’t smart to increase its dependence on a supplier with a history of using energy blackmail as an instrument of its foreign policy.
Armine Sahakyan is a human rights activist based in Armenia. Follow her on Twitter at: www.twitter.com/ArmineSahakyann
