The
AA was finally initialed in mid-2012, although many in the EU were
against this mostly formal step given the undemocratic trends
underway in Ukraine ever since Viktor Yanukovych ascended the
presidency in 2010.
In
December 2012 the European Council made it clear that Ukraine has a
chance to have the AA signed during the Eastern Partnership Summit in
Vilnius in autumn this year. It also formalized the conditions
Ukraine needs to fulfill to sign the AA: end selective justice
and implement decisions of the European Court of Human Rights,
organize a new and fair vote in five contested parliamentary
districts and adopt an electoral code, and undertake a number of
steps to enhance the rule of law, fight corruption and improve the
business climate.
In
a nutshell, Ukraine must deliver by May in order for the AA to be
signed in November at the Eastern Partnership Summit.
Will
Ukraine deliver?
So
far Ukraine has done everything possible to make sure the AA doesn’t
get signed this year. The October parliamentary elections were poorly
conducted, oppositional leaders Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko
are still in jail. Freedom of media has been squeezed quite recently.
No
progress was made in other key areas. Public procurement practices,
which result in large shares of the public budget end up in private
pockets bypassing tenders and even the minimum level of transparency,
have persisted.
President
of the European Council Herman van Rompuy and the President of the
European Commission Jose Manuel Barosso in a joint article on the eve
of the summit said, Ukraine “holds the keys” to signing the AA.
But expectations both in Ukraine and the EU have become increasingly
low.
Many
Western leaders, including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, tried to
convince Yanukovych to stop selective justice back in
August-September 2011. Back then Yanukovych gave the impression that
he took note. Yet, as it soon became evident, the impression was
false. Yanukovych has proved highly immune to external pressure and
incentives.
He
has also showed quite clearly that the real interest for him is
winning presidential elections in 2015. Losing elections for him
means losing everything, including personal freedom -it’s
improbable that his political opponents will leave him alone. He
cannot let Tymoshenko go – this will reduce his already low chances
to win the elections democratically. Neither can he afford total
isolation from the EU, which serves as a safeguard against Russian
imperial ambitions, not to mention that business interests of
Ukraine’s and Russia’s rich people clash on many occasions.
The
current status quo is the best deal for Yanukovych all the way until
2015. Yet, his space for maneuver is becoming increasingly narrow.
The EU is pressing for the deal to be made either this year or never.
At the same time, Russia uses every chance possible to have Ukraine
dragged into its Customs Union project, which would block the
possibility of signing the AA between the EU and Ukraine
indefinitely.
The
costs of political survival for Yanukovych are becoming increasingly
high – they amount to no less than isolation from the EU for years
to come and becoming a vassal of Russia. Yet, the costs of losing
power might be even higher. This has left Ukraine and its society
hostage of ambitions, and the particular interests and fears of a
small group of incumbents.
The
Brussels dilemma
For
the EU, Ukraine used to be the flagship country of its Eastern
Partnership policy. Ukraine served as a testing ground for major
instruments of this policy: the AA including a free trade agreement
and visa liberalization that might lead to abolishing Schengen visa
requirements altogether. Ukraine was the first country to have
started negotiating these documents. Other Eastern Partnership
countries followed.
The
EU hoped that Ukraine would be a success story they so badly need –
but it won’t happen. The EU cannot compromise on its values by
going forward with signing the AA with Ukraine under the current
circumstances.
Such
a move on the part of the EU would undermine its “more for more”
principle, which is the foundation of its European Neighbourhood
Policy and send wrong signals to other countries as to what standards
of democracy the EU expects from its partners. As a result, the EU’s
leverage in the region might diminish.
Proponents for unconditionally signing the AA argue that the AA as a legally binding framework once signed will help push forward implementation of EU standards. Yet, the key argument is that the risks resulting from postponing the signing of the AA overweigh the possible negative consequences of this step. There is a fear that if the AA is not signed this year, Ukraine might end up in the Customs Union, where the EU would have no influence over it whatsoever. On the day of the EU-Ukraine Summit a number of Ukrainian civil society organizations appealed to the EU outlining this particular argument.
To
be or not to be
The risk of not having an AA with Ukraine (or any other country in the Eastern Partnership program) signed raises the question about the EU’s “transformative power” in its backyard. One day there were hopes that Ukraine and other countries of the region could repeat the success of other former Soviet-bloc countries who already joined the EU. As time passed it has become clear that things might not be so easy.
The scholarly discussions of the recent years also point in the direction that the realities of post-Soviet countries might be less optimistic. Those debates try to get away from the transition paradigm of linear transformation from autoritarianism to democracy. They offer a different vision, which might be closer to reality: the vision of being stuck in the grey zone of a hybrid regime indefinitely. Being there makes return to authoritarianism as possible as the ultimate transition to democracy.
Moreover, it has become increasingly clear that many of such regimes are based on a neo-patrimonial model of patron-client relationship where informal and formal decision making are closely intertwined. In this situation external factors play a much weaker role.
It takes time until the critical mass of actors who are guided by state-building interests and are interested in reforms emerges.
The EU’s current dilemma – the choice between “losing the face” and letting Ukraine slip into Russia’s arms is a wrong approach. It is a choice between two evils. The choice should be between more or less efficient strategies of promoting reforms in Ukraine.
For now, if Ukraine does not show progress and the Association Agreement cannot be signed this year, the EU should not close the door. The discussion about 2013 being the last chance is not productive. It is important that the EU keeps the option of signing the AA with Ukraine open, if not in 2013, then in 2014 or 2015 – whenever the conditions are fulfilled. In the meantime the EU should work with Ukrainian reform-minded actors on promoting the debates about the AA and the opportunities it offers to Ukraine. These debates have a potential to undermine the regime from inside.
Iryna
Solonenko is the DAAD/OSF scholar, European University Viadrina,
Frankfurt/Oder, Germany.
