Ukraine, its East European partners, and many members of the Euro-Atlantic alliance are still stunned by the U.S.-German deal to allow the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that, when combined with the existing line, will allow Russia to pump 110 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Germany. The latest indications add to the concern, for they suggest that Berlin has not been entirely upfront with Washington about its real intentions.
Perhaps it’s wise to withhold for a while a longer judgment about the seemingly disappointingly wimpish response of U.S. President Joe Biden to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive affrontery and his collusion with Germany; to await any clarification Biden’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the end of August will bring.
Or for that matter, to see if Washington will issue a statement on the 30th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence on Aug. 24 that will go beyond the usual general statements of support. That will indicate if the Biden administration is willing to bolster Ukraine’s security by promoting its integration into Euro-Atlantic structures with deeds, not only words.
Or, failing that, to propose something similar to the exemplary political, free trade and strategic partnership agreement which London concluded with Kyiv in October 2020. At the very least to lend its weight to the flagging international effort to get Russia to end its war against Ukraine.
While clarity is sought from Washington as to the extent of its support, Germany, or rather its ambiguity in East-West poses a real dilemma for Ukraine and others. This concerns not only Nord Stream 2 and doing business with Russia, but also Germany’s attitude as a “mediator” within the Normandy Four negotiating arrangement along with France, Russia and Ukraine to end Russia’s war in eastern Ukraine.
It’s probably not fair to blame everything on German Chancellor Angela Merkel. What’s important is to understand where she’s coming from – the domestic context and foreign policy traditions that have shaped Germany’s foreign policy, and to draw appropriate conclusions.
Merkel may have remained the leading figure in German politics for the last 16 or so years, but she has not been the architect of any new German policy towards Russia.
As leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), to remain in power, Merkel has since 2005 had to rely on maintaining a “Grand Coalition.” Its axis has been the working arrangements with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), renowned for its softness on policy towards Russia.
The prime example of this was the SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder under whom, according to experts, “Germany accordingly came to be recognized as Russia’s strategic partner or even Russia’s advocate in Europe.”
In November 2004 Merkel criticized him for describing Putin as a “flawless democrat.” The following year, before leaving office Schröder concluded a controversial, and many claimed corrupt, deal with Moscow to build the Nord Stream 1 pipeline to bring Russian gas to Germany. He was handsomely rewarded for his openness to Russia – since leaving office he has held leading, enormously lucrative, positions in Russian energy firms.
And guess who Schröder’s closest political associate was while he was Chancellor? Today’s German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, best known in Ukraine for his controversial “formula” produced in 2016 to end the deadlock that the Normandy Four format had encountered.
Schröder gave Steinmeier responsibility for the intelligence services, so he clearly knows about Putin’s years in East Germany as a KGB officer, Merkel’s youth there, and how the North Stream pipeline project was developed. From 1999 to 2005, he relied on him as chief of staff of the Chancellery.
In November 2005, after Merkel took over from Schröder, Steinmeier became Germany’s minister of foreign affairs until 2009. He criticized the new chancellor for being too critical of Moscow and accused her of trying to isolate Russia. He went on to promote, from 2008, a strategy termed the “Partnership for Modernization with Russia.”
Germany’s policy towards Russia was upset by Putin’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, first the occupation of Crimea and then the military intervention in the Donbas. Merkel initially adopted a tough stance and supported the application of sanctions against Moscow.
But Steinmeier, who returned to the post of foreign minister in December 2013, initially opposed applying sanctions against Russia and excluding it from the G8.
According to British expert John Lough, Merkel “was instrumental in initiating the Minsk peace process aimed at resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine.” But “the poorly drafted Minsk agreements led to predictably few results…Crucially, Berlin never officially challenged Moscow’s claim to be a facilitator of peace when it was, in fact, a party to the conflict.”
Behind the scenes, during the summer of 2014, Merkel reportedly sought to broker a solution whereby Russia would accept Ukraine’s association agreement with the EU and continue to supply gas to its neighbor in return for the West abandoning the idea of accepting Ukraine into NATO and lifting sanctions. The status of Crimea was glossed over.
Re-enter Steinmeier. In 2016 he put forward a recipe to bring peace to eastern Ukraine. But, yes, you’ve guessed, essentially on Russia’s terms.
His “formula” reflected the Russian narrative of the crisis and proposed a sequence of actions that fall neatly in line with what Moscow has been calling for: first elections in the areas of eastern Ukraine occupied by Russia; Kyiv then grants the areas a special self-government status enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution; and, only then, Ukraine regains control of its eastern border with Russia.
Ukraine, on the other hand, insists that the occupied areas are first de-occupied – that is Russian forces and their local armed proxies are removed and the necessary security arrangements for holding genuine elections are created. Including, Ukraine regaining control of its eastern border. Not surprisingly, Steinmeier’s “formula” was hardly welcomed in Ukraine and since then, with official Kyiv insisting that, if it is to be useful, at least the order of the steps to be taken be rearranged, appeared to have been quietly forgotten by all but Moscow.
But even before Biden and Merkel announced their deal on Nord Stream 2, Zelensky received another shock. At their press conference in Berlin on July 12, Merkel unexpectedly embarrassed him by publicly declaring that Germany expects Ukraine to implement the Steinmeier formula. And on July 22 Germany’s foreign minister, Heiko Maas, also from the SPD, reiterated this.
Zelensky was a gentleman and kept his composure. He could have reminded Merkel, Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and Steinmeier, publicly also, that Russia continues to shift the goalposts and Germany for some reason pretends not to notice.
How can free and fair elections under Ukrainian law be carried out in areas occupied by Russian forces and terrorized by their mercenaries? From which an estimated 1.5 million people have been displaced, ethnically cleansed, and so many imprisoned and tortured?
And what does Berlin have to say about the fact that in the meantime Russia has issued 600,000 Russian passports to local inhabitants?
Is the purpose of the Steinmeier formula to help create a Russian trojan horse that Ukraine should naively welcome, with Berlin’s blessing, within its gates?
For some reason, Germany’s Iron Lady, on the eve of her relinquishing the political helm, has progressively gone soft on Putin’s Russia and what it represents, yet become tougher with its aggressed victim, Ukraine.
With Trump democratically removed, and the new U.S .president pledging to take a more uncompromising – read principled – line towards Moscow – Merkel has in effect convinced him to hold back and accept the customary German ambiguous approach.
Berlin continues to insist that despite Russia’s hostility towards the democratic world and aggression towards its immediate European neighbors, this eastern bully should not be isolated; that doing business with it is a bridge that needs to be maintained and even reinforced, especially via engagement through joint energy projects.
The latest leaks as reported by Bloomberg on Aug. 2 suggest that Berlin may have even duped Washington into believing that it serious about not allowing Moscow to exploit Nord Stream 2 against Kyiv.
“Germany has little intention of shutting off Nord Stream 2 if Vladimir Putin tries to use the controversial pipeline as a geopolitical weapon, whatever the U.S. might say, according to Berlin officials familiar with the plans,” Bloomberg reports.
Yes, Germany is a European economic powerhouse. But a devious member of the European Union and NATO at the same time. It wants to have it both ways – to be regarded as a pillar of NATO and the EU, and at the same time to continue a “special relationship” with anti-Western Russia which systematically exploits any perceived weaknesses of its democratic adversary. Realpolitik in the German way!
The Nord Stream 2 projects and Steinmeier formulas may suit Berlin and Moscow, but they only tarnish Germany’s reputation. The conflict of interest is clear enough.
What is awaited from Washington and Berlin are clarity not ambiguity, firmness not appeasement, and principles over expediency.
It is not only Ukraine that expects this.
