It is almost two months since U.S. President Joe Biden took over and there continues to be a lot of discussion on what his “revamped” foreign policy will be, especially regarding Europe, Russia, and Ukraine. And here the issue of the controversial Russian-German Nord Stream 2 pipeline remains at the center of attention.
Although preoccupied with huge challenges at home, and pressing issues connected with relations with China and Iran, Biden has already sent some strong reassuring messages to Europe and Ukraine. On Jan. 26, in his first telephone contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he was reportedly diplomatic but firm. Among the issues that Biden raised was that of Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine.
The American leader elaborated his broader vision in his address to the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 19, making it clear that he wants to revive U.S. relations with its traditional European allies in an enhanced partnership. The bottom line was that the U.S. is ready to resume its role in this regard and hopes that its European allies will reciprocate in kind.
For Ukraine, there have been other gestures of support ranging from Biden’s reaffirmation of support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine on the recent seventh anniversary of the Russian seizure of Crimea, the announcement of a $125 million military aid package for Ukraine, to the imposition of sanctions on corrupt Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky.
But these are still early days, and all sorts of experts are busy providing recommendations on what the Biden administration could do to be most effective in supporting Ukraine. One would hope to see something similar happening in Ukraine, for this should be a reciprocal process. Serious discussion on what needs to be done in Ukraine and by its leadership to sustain the confidence and support of Washington, and its Western supporters generally.
Despite the positive signs, some consider that there is a problem, or rather a disappointing element or gap, so far in how the Biden administration has been handling its Ukraine portfolio.
Could not Biden have called President Volodymyr Zelensky by now?
Or invited him to visit Washington, something that President Donald J. Trump demonstratively dragged his feet on?
But doesn’t that assume that Ukraine, certainly a country that the U.S. president has not been indifferent to in the past, is currently at the top of his agenda. And as they say, patience, and especially at this time, is not just a virtue but an element of realpolitik.
Zelensky’s spokesperson Iuliia Mendel reassures us that there are no grounds for concern. Biden has not yet even had time to form his entire administration, she reminds us. Contacts between Ukraine and the United States are ongoing, “there was an exchange of letters from the presidents,” and an invitation to the U.S. president to visit Ukraine on the 30th anniversary of independence in August has been sent.
But the glaring omission in all this so far has been an insistence on the part of the Biden administration that because the Nord Stream 2 project is bad not only for Ukraine but for Europe as a whole, it should be scrapped. Why has the president and his team who have openly opposed this scheme suddenly fallen silent about it?
Some observers are concluding that in this way Biden has not lived up to his pledge to be tougher with Russia than his predecessor and is engaged in some behind-the-scenes maneuvering with the Germans. Yet, as the Washington Post put it on Feb. 26, “trying to kill the project when it is 90 percent complete risks rupturing relations with Europe’s most powerful nation, which must be at the center of any democratic alliance to combat autocracy.”
Nevertheless, however important an influential role Biden can, and hopefully is playing, ultimately the fate of Nord Stream 2 will be decided by Berlin, “with a little help from its friends,” in this case, Paris. So, instead of placing all the blame on Biden, let’s consider who is dealing with.
The bad news is that despite the Kremlin’s imprisonment of opposition leader Alexei Navalny and government repression of protests in Russia and Belarus, German Chancellor Angela Merkel is still sticking with the toxic Nord Stream 2 project. Is this simply a business concern, or has it, that is, withstanding external pressure not only from Washington but within Europe, now become a question of national pride for her?
And there is more bad news.
France, which was opposed to the project until the beginning of February, has changed its tune. Following a video conference with Ms. Merkel on February 5, France’s president Emmanuel Macron shifted his stance. Furthermore, he added: “I believe that nothing can be said about Nord Stream 2, which is now almost complete, without close coordination between Germany and France.”
This betrays a certain arrogance – the assumption that France and Germany know what is best for Europe and have a self-appointed right to speak on its behalf.
What it seems to boil down to is that for all the proclaimed respect for joint European values, democracy, human rights, the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of European states, it’s really about business and national self-interest.
This was illustrated by German Economy Minister Peter Altmaier in remarks published on Feb/ 7 by the Bild am Sonntag newspaper. Cautioning against linking Moscow’s treatment of Navalny to the issue of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, he stated that “Business relationships and business projects that have existed for decades are one thing and serious human rights violations and our reactions to them are another.”
On Feb. 5 Chancellor Angela Merkel also said she did not want to see the two issues connected.
Instead, as we know, European foreign ministers have imposed tame sanctions on four Russian officials. At least the Biden administration has gone further and targeted seven Russian officials and 14 companies or entities.
Putting their own interests first and not wanting to risk alienating Putin’s Russia with the firmness that is called for, Berlin and Paris are not displaying the backbone and leadership qualities that other European states and for that matter, the new Biden administration, should expect from them.
Let’s be honest, because of their ambivalence towards the Kremlin, which often comes across as barely veiled appeasement, the German and French leaders have let Ukraine down badly in the Normandy Four format peace negotiations.
Yes, they have been involved since 2014, and supposedly stood by Ukraine’s side. But, in reality, their reluctance to call things by their name, to treat Russia as the aggressor perpetuating the conflict in the Donbas and agreement to go along with Moscow’s insistence on decoupling the occupation of Crimea from it, has produced a dead end in what can barely be called a peace process and simply prolonged a simmering “frozen” conflict.
This week, at last, there has been somewhat more encouraging news that a “peace plan” prepared jointly by Berlin, Paris, and Kyiv will be shared with Moscow. We await to see what this will entail.
And there’s also the pathetically modest and ineffective “European” response to the brutal and large-scale repression by the Lukashenko regime against its heroic peaceful democracy movement. Clearly, in this regard too, quite a few European states closer to what Russia still regards as its backyard, such as the Baltic countries, Poland, and the Czech Republic, have been dismayed by the lack of a firmer response from the “leaders” of Europe’s democratic family.
So, while still expecting the Biden administration to continue pressing for the Nord Stream 2 project to be abandoned, let’s remember that it is not the source of the problem. It’s time Berlin and Paris were properly held to account and challenged to live up to their proclaimed European credentials.
