This reflection comes to mind when looking at “Pushing
Russia into a corner increases danger to world, says NATO specialist”, by David
Pugliese (Kyiv Post, Sept 7, 2014). The specialist, Paul Nitze had these words
at Congressional testimony in Washington in 1998: “Driving Russia into a corner
(by extending NATO membership to Poland and the Baltic states) plays into the
arguments of those most hostile to forging a productive relationship (of
Russia) with the US and its allies”.
To make sure we got that right, the quoted article explains:
“The support for an open enlargement of NATO has continued to send the wrong
signals to both Kyiv and Moscow. And the current reaction within NATO raises
the prospects of continual, if not accelerating, NATO-European- Russian
tensions”.
Hard as one can look, support of NATO enlargement is nowhere to be found among the movers and
shakers in the last 15 years. And where is “the current reaction within NATO”
that raises tensions with Russia? Reaction to what? To Russia’s military
aggression against Ukraine?
And who was the most hostile to forging productive
relationship between West and Russia at the time of Nitze’s testimony? Perhaps Russia’s victims Poland and the Baltic
states? Should they repent now for causing NATO-Russia tensions? Blame them for
joining NATO and thus denying Russia an equal opportunity to expand the Russian
world as she has done in the last 300 years ?
If we recognize that NATO’s ability to defend Europe has
substantially dwindled in the recent two decades, and the energies of its
member countries have been directed at doing business with Russia rather than
“pushing Russia into a corner”, how is it that we are having “accelerating
NATO-Russian tensions”?
It is because Russia is pushing Ukraine into a corner, not
the other way around, and is raising the specter of real danger to eastern NATO
members.
Russia, of course, is blaming the United States and NATO for
war between Ukraine and Russia. Its media are thriving on Orwellian logic. This
is the time in Russia’s history when Russia is becoming Russia again after its failed
experimentation with democracy in the 1990s.
Now it wants to have a clear path to an unobstructed and, in its view,
fair and equal opportunity for rebuilding the empire.
The main obstacle is Ukraine moving towards national and
political freedom away from Russia, not the bogus threat from NATO.
Arming Ukraine by the United States or NATO is opposed by US
President Obama, although he is under some pressure to recognize it needs to be
done in the face of Russia’s naked aggression. Geoff Dyer writes in the Financial Times
(“Obama faces dilemma as Putin holds all the cards”, Sept 5): “ Obama is pushed
towards an unpalatable choice —
either escalate the conflict by sending arms to Kyiv and risk NATO
unity, or pursue a diplomatic deal many at home will see as a humiliating climb
down”.
Splitting NATO? It is split already. Has no one noticed that
Germany is dead set against arming Ukraine, while eastern NATO states think
differently?
How does it strike you when “escalating the conflict” is defined
by some Obama advisers as enabling Ukrainians to defend themselves more effectively
against Russian tanks? Isn’t this Moscow’s way of thinking coming from Obama’s
White House? Do they believe there is no limit to Putin’s capacity to send more
troops if the Ukrainian army receives more powerful military hardware?
Or do they think American’s 18 mighty aircraft carriers are
most effective when placed in a bath tub, while Russian bombers are
intimidating our commercial republic by flying near Canada’s coast line simulating
a nuclear cruise missile strike against the United States?
And how is it that Putin “holds all the cards” while the
United States is outspending Russia 20 to 1 on its military? Could it be that
the fear of risk taking trumps objective view of probable outcomes of doing
something right?
Will Obama justify his climb down because the Washington
grandees (in Dyer’s words) such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski have
already chickened out and suggested to make a deal “acceptable both to Russia
and the West”?
The ceasefire in eastern Ukraine is shaky. But freezing the
conflict offers some advantage to both sides, and that’s why it may take hold,
especially because the issues stipulated for negotiations cannot be resolved to
the satisfaction of both sides.
In accordance with the 12-point protocol agreement reached
between Ukraine, Russia and separatists in Minsk on September 5, President
Poroshenko says he will submit to parliament a draft law that would grant
special status to some areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions which are currently
controlled by separatists (Reuters, Sept 10).
If that’s the path for resolving the conflict between
Ukraine and Russia, nothing could be simpler
— as long as the text of such law is preapproved in Moscow. That
process will probably stall. A frozen conflict with Russia is a likely bet for
Ukraine, albeit with unpredictable interruptions from Russia’s military
madness.
Apparently trying to avert resumption of Russian military
assault, the EU and Ukraine have agreed on Sept 12 to postpone the
implementation of their Association Agreement until January 2016. Russia seems
to be inching towards scuttling that agreement altogether.
President Petro Poroshenko will be under pressure from all
sides, including the backlash from many who will accuse him of “capitulation”
in Minsk and battlefield deaths in the east without achieving victory. What may
be overlooked is that the country’s leadership in the last six months — and this includes Poroshenko as
well as Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Rada Chair Aleksandr Turchynov —
have done an overall job beyond expectations while facing a monstrous
aggression from outside and having no attractive options.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
