Did this refusal provide safety from Russia’s threat to Europe? A New York Post editorial from Oct. 3 put it this way: “Putin remains unchallenged in his invasion of Ukraine, leaving him free to intervene – again unchallenged — in the Middle East.” Specifically in Syria.
While conservative politicians and media in the United States are pillorying President Barack Obama for undermining American prestige by allowing Russia “to fill the vacuum of leadership” in Mideast, the much larger destabilizing impact on Europe from continuing Syrian migration and refugee flow at this moment is suddenly mentioned much less. It is likely to become larger and longer, as the fighting in Syria becomes intensified with Russian presence and Putin’s incentive to make migration more destructive to the European Union.
It is noteworthy that no meaningful, constructive suggestions are coming from those piling up on Obama. Again and again he is blasted for withdrawing from Iraq (never mind that over many years the majority of Iraqis desired no American presence). And, our draw-down in Afghanistan is too quick, we are told repeatedly, even when the continuing American military engagement there is accomplishing little beyond the inevitable but questionable collateral damage.
The blueprint for moving Russia back into the borders of Russian Federation is still here. If Russia’s invasion in Syria has logically followed from its unchallenged invasion of Ukraine — as the New York Post has pointed out — does it not make sense that now, yes now, to challenge Russia in east Ukraine and in Crimea is the way to make Putin expeditiously slide out of Syria?
Remarkably, in a meeting of presidents of Ukraine, Russia, France and German Chancellor Angela Merkel on October 2 in Paris it was agreed to postpone the implementation of Minsk 2 into next year. Read it as postponing the renewal of fighting in east Ukraine until Mr. Putin can comfortably juggle it with his moves in Syria. Although President Obama was not there, putting off what looks like shooting in the foot is his style too.
Defining the “special status” for Donbas, as a consequence of Minsk II, to make it acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia will be impossible. Ukraine does not want Donbas on Moscow’s terms. The EU and the US need to acquire a mindset recognizing that arming Ukraine and together confronting Russia is in their own interest. Gutting Minsk 1 an 2 one way or another is the right answer.
There is no shortage of thinking people in Washington, albeit not in the inner circle of the president, who just forces out people who suggest more aggressive action. Recent resignation of Evelyn Farkas, deputy assistant secretary of defense (for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia) and earlier departure of Charles Hegel, Secretary of Defense came amid debates how to respond to Putin’s moves.
It boils down to this: When our side is clobbered in battle, with over 2,000 killed soldiers and many thousands badly injured, saying that “there is no military solution” to this conflict (“crisis” in Western double-speak) is very much like proposing capitulation. It was couched in the language of Minsk 1 and 2.
Bad habits make more nonsense. Incredibly, in a BBC America interview at the end of September, a former official close to the White House suggested that “there is no military solution in Syria”.
No less troubling is an apparent disarray in what normally could be a coherent moderate opposition in the United States to the present administration of Obama. The issues such as weak gun control under existing laws in the US and the appalling frequency of mass shootings on college campuses and in random locations steal the show. None of the presidential candidates in the evolving campaigning seems to inspire much confidence to handle domestic crises, much less overseas challenges. Remarkably, if Vice President Joe Biden decides to make a run, his reputation of honesty (shared by so few) may be the winner.
Could Biden be another Harry Truman, who came to power as almost an after-thought and put Europe on its feet against formidable Soviet threat of that time? Much weaker by comparison is the puny flexing of today’s Russia, which dumbfounds the money managers of the commercial union into which the West has converted itself in the last several decades. The West’s military power has been and still is largely wasted on entanglements of minor strategic importance to rationalize military-industrial spending in trillions of dollars. But the will to resist real threat from the zoological nationalism of today’s Russia seems to be missing.
