The problem is actually both higher and deeper. It is the same conundrum that flourished during the previous presidential administrations over 25 years in Ukraine, and it is widely despised. If there is some occasional misunderstanding of its durability, it is due to overly optimistic expectations from the overthrow of the Yanukovych regime, by uprising at Maidan.
Yes, it was a revolution, but perhaps not quite in the profound sense as was the French and Russian revolutions that drastically changed not only their societies but also much of the world. In both of them, violence and the reign of terror were certifying the change. The names like Robespierre, Danton, Marat, and Lenin meant that everything had changed. Most certainly, royal noble elites were sent to the guillotine in Paris, and Tsarist aristocracy was wiped out by firing squads.
What has changed — or did not change – in Ukraine after Maidan two years ago? The oligarchs and government employees, helping them at various levels, carried on as usual almost from the day number one, after some initial confusion and political jockeying, when the Verkhovna Rada was compliant with demands from Maidan. Apparently there was an implicit threat that armed insurgents will get really tough if the parliament drags its feet.
But there also was a prevailing mood that the tiger of revolution needs to be constrained by moderate democratic leadership.
The most significant step that re-invented the oligarchic grip on the country was the agreement, some now say collusion, between the trio Poroshenko, Yatseniuk and Klitschko to divvy up the spoils and basically extend the existing way of governance, with some touch-ups. It seems that inclusion of oligarchs as part of the solution was seen as unavoidable by the big three.
Virtually excluded from shaping the new government, except in secondary role, were the activists and leaders of the fight at Maidan (“Our last hope is Yarosh and The Right Sector” was the mood at Maidan when the chips were down). Most of them quit after meeting stubborn resistance to change in government.
But was there an alternative, other than making all the players and oligarchs honest by fiat? Could the oligarchs be banned from corrupting the Verkhovna Rada (“lobbying” is the euphemism acceptable in the West) in connection with their business? And what experts would be taking over the nation’s economic engine, overnight, if oligarchs had disappeared? Or could thousands of Judiciary personnel be physically replaced, say, by battalions of pre-screened lawyers? And who would be “the untouchable” brigade in charge of such proceedings?
And so, it was no surprise that some actions were tried including the motions of lustration, vetting, investigating and ferreting out corruption, and then seeing what happens when no one is charged and brought to trial.
Some now say you either have a revolution or you don’t. There is no such thing as removing an existing elite peacefully. And it takes at least a generation to firm up something new, different and semi-permanent. Napoleon, who commanded French troops in Africa during revolution, feared for his own safety if he went back to France. Only later, when the country was fed up with disorder and was facing external anti-revolutionary enemies, he was welcomed back to become an emperor with revolutionary flavor, but not for long.
In retrospect, it seems doubtful that anything could or should have been done differently from what was actually done by democratic leaders after overthrow of Yanukovych regime. Nor was there any other choice while facing Russia’s aggression.
Russia, and not the economy or corruption, is Ukraine’s biggest problem. War in the east is very costly. It drains Ukraine’s financial resources and requires bailouts from the West, which depends on political calculus between the United States, the European Union and Russia.
Russia has captured strategic initiative with its recent moves in Syria, which left the West befuddled. At the end of the day, US Army chief of staff General Mark Milley made revelations, testifying on Capitol Hill: “US military forces on the ground face a high level of risk if the US gets into a full-scale conflict against a power such as Russia or China. Years of fight in Iraq an Afghanistan, constrained budgets and troop cuts had a cumulative effect” {New York Post, March 16).
For the U.S. army to get into such poor shape (while the US defense budget is about ten times larger than Russia’s), someone in Washington had to be screwing up royally over the last 15 years. Who could have done it besides the Bush and the Obama administrations?
The US spent trillions of dollars in Afghanistan and Iraq (losing both wars by most accounts), while aiding Ukraine with an estimated half a billion, plus one billion loan guarantee in its war with Russia, America’s main enemy — according to military opinion shared by Pentagon and Mitt Romney, Republican Party nominee for president in 2012, among others.
