But on July 24 the Rada coalition has collapsed and the
Cabinet of Ministers resigned. The day before, the coalition was abandoned by
the UDAR Party led by Vitali Klitschko and the Svoboda nationalist party led by
Oleh Tiahnybok, after they failed to vote for tax code amendments.
According to comments from the CASE Ukraine Center of
Socio-Economic Research (as reported by Zenon Zavada in The Ukrainian Weekly,
July 27),“it is no secret that UDAR and Svoboda deputies, among others, were
fulfilling the wishes of oligarchs in rejecting another measure that would have
tripled the royalties gas producers would have to pay to the budget”. Other amendments would have provided
desperately needed financing for the military.
Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk was explicit in his
statement: “Government has no answer to the question how to pay wages, how to
maintain the army, how not to demoralize the spirit of tens of thousands … in
the trenches under flying bullets”.
All this goes to remind that when push comes to shove,
Ukraine’s parliament is at a tipping point that can make or break the
existential decisions.
Accelerated parliamentary elections apparently are now
scheduled by President Petro Poroshenko for October this year.
No one should discount the possibility of the makeup of the
next Rada showing a nearly a 50-50 divide, similar to that marking all previous
regimes in the independent Ukraine. This divide essentially exists into this
day, with deputies now committed to the oligarchs able to swing the outcomes.
Having little choice after the ouster of Yanukovych, they have swung to shape a
pro-Ukrainian majority.
Looking with open eyes, it is impossible to deny that
elections for Ukraine’s parliament in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, if they take
place there, would be for a party agenda similar to that of the Party of
Regions.
Notwithstanding Russia’s role in stimulating the Donbas
separatism, large segments of population in that area didn’t need much
stimulation to vote with guns against the new Ukrainian government which they
detested. And many still feel the same
way, embittered by urban destruction and civilian casualties for which they
blame Ukrainian troops.
Denial of the evidence of hate which is there for all to see
doesn’t help. Patriotically-inclined citizens who avoid a reality check can
only lead to collective mistakes and exaggerated expectations. And, conversely,
there is a silver lining in the unfathomable Donbas standoff that should not be
overlooked.
As long as large population centers in Donbas are under
rebel control, they will not take part in the next parliamentary elections, and
will not help split Ukraine.
On the same arena comes the subject of Ukrainian army
casualties in the east: over 363 killed and 1300 wounded as of the end of July
2014. The Kremlin wants nothing less than keeping up this pace. Its supply of
armaments for pro-Russian insurgents to keep the war going is common knowledge.
From a Ukrainian point of view, the question is not what
would be best (the pace of war is hardly under Kyiv’s control), but rather what
options not to take. Attempts to crush the rebels in their city stronghold
would be countered by more firepower from Russia, including direct across-border
shelling.
Hypothetically, reconquering all of Donbas would open a
plethora of problems for Ukraine’s democratic government, how to accommodate
the traditionally pro-Russian population that basically despises Ukraine
not of their own making, with Russian civilization attributes.
Perhaps the best realizable outcome could be a semi-permanent
ceasefire if all sides would be willing to accept it. After all, a ceasefire in
Korea has held a long time. Or think of Transnistria, and don’t reject it out
of hand. It may be a puny model but better than the non-stop war. Again, this is hypothetical, but so are most
other solutions.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
