A well-known and widely circulated lie is Russia’s President
Vladimir Putin’s canard that the rights of Russian speakers are abridged in
Ukraine. This is a simple lie of the first oder accepted by people in Russia as
an act of faith, trumping the truth in war against Ukraine.
A higher rating for lying is deserved when the same lie is
sandwiched by someone knowingly in a broader argument, while purporting to
present an objective view of how to settle “the Ukraine crisis”.
Note that this “crisis” sounds repeatedly like the West’s
cover over its embarrassment from a belated discovery that its post-Cold War
order is in shambles, a victim to NATO’s disarmament and mental slouching vis-à-vis
the resurgent Russia and its growing menace to Europe.
Unable to confront Russia with a dysfunctional NATO,
willy-nilly appeasement of Russia’s Putin by the Wes is now underway in full
flourish, dressed in whatever sanctions could be grudgingly mastered by the US
and the European Union.
It is in this light that false inferences and lies of a
higher order than simple lies can be found about alleged suppression of Russian
language in Ukraine, sandwiched in more than a few writings in the West that
dabble in trying to find solutions for
the “crisis”, solutions that largely mimic Mr. Putin’s agenda.
Take, for instance, a New York Times article by Andrew S.
Weiss (“Is Putin really concerned?” August 8). He is vice-president for studies
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served at the National
Security council of the Clinton administration. He writes:
“Our immediate priority should be establishing real channels
of communication with Mr. Putin…., with three proposals from Mr. Obama, to be
closely coordinated with Kyiv. The first would be to establish a lasting,
verifiable cease-fire under the auspices of the UN…. Second, Kyiv would agree to honor its
commitments to transfer power to regional governments, protect the Russian language,
and arrange for direct elections of local officials.”
An obvious inference is that the Russian language in Ukraine
needs protection. Never mind that Russian is dominant in print and carries tons
of weight in the media in Ukraine. Russian is the language of choice by
Ukrainians in many urban centers, including the Russian-speaking“radical
nationalists” in the Right Sector, branded by Moscow as “fascists”. By law,
Russian is official language beside Ukrainian in any region in Ukraine that
chooses such status. It is almost shameful that some leading western opinion
gurus comply with the Kremlin line, despite knowing it is a lie.
And what about “transfer of power to regional governments”
as an immediate priority visualized in the op-ed by Andrew Weiss? There never
was such a self-destructive commitment from Kyiv, except in the wishful
interpretations from Putin’s appeasers, who repeatedly discredit themselves.
Move on to “How to bring the Ukraine crisis to a peaceful
end”, by Rodric Braithwaite, former
British ambassador in Moscow (Financial Times, August 11). Among priorities he
suggests as essential for peace he lists “better guarantees for the rights of
Russian speakers, perhaps involving some devolution (of power) that
nevertheless preserves the integrity of the Ukrainian state, and an end to
outside meddling in Ukraine’s affairs.”
He describes Western policy as
knee-jerk escalation of sanctions. The central issue, he writes, is “how to
combine Ukraine’s prosperity, security, and openness to the outside world with
what Russia insists are its essential interests”.
Unfortunately, Russia’s “essential interests” as understood
in Moscow are to keep Ukraine under its foot. It has been almost done over most
of the last 23 years with the help of a powerful fifth column rooted mainly in
the Donbas with its population that is essentially Russian in culture and in
its political passion. Pointing this out loud has been looked at in Ukraine’s
polite circles as politically incorrect. Awareness of this fact of life has lingered
in a state of denial, and still is. Not even when this blooming mill exploded
in the gunfire of secession.
Moscow will want to keep Donbas in play as part of Ukraine
in any negotiations, as a region that will continue to exercise strong leverage
in Kyiv (as it had done) and at the same time permanently pull the country
apart, serving Russia’s interests. In the West, this arrangement is brazenly
visualized by some as a place with a government “acceptable to all Ukrainians”
— and gleamed in a BBC America TV interview with
a former high US government official on August 7.
With cards lined up that way, Ukraine’s top leaders have
done an uncanny job moving forward under wartime pressure. Principled positions
they now take are correct regardless of Putin’s moves. The government is struggling
with its many shortcomings inherited from the overthrown regime, and is often
justly criticized for moving too slow in clearing the bureaucratic hurdles. But
it stays mostly on the right track.
The war with Russia may become a “frozen conflict”, dreaded
by some but perhaps inevitable because a diplomatic solution (“the only way”,
according to western insiders) acceptable to both an independent Ukraine and
imperialist Russia probably does not exist. This reality transcends the Putin
era and is likely to stand for generations. Ukraine must learn to live without
gas from Russia — and without the rust
belt of Donbas.
As for western links, US Barack President Obama’s strategy of
incremental sanctions against Russia’s aggression is probably the best Ukraine can get for the
time being. Much will depend on Kyiv’s resolve to stand firm.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
