The key event in Ukraine’s politics soon after the overthrow of
President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 was the election of Petro Poroshenko as
president of Ukraine, in May 2014. But the most striking deal, shortly before that election and with
far-reaching consequences, was the sudden agreement between the three leading
contenders for presidency, Poroshenko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and Vitaliy Klitschko, for the last
two of them to change their sights and go for staying as prime minister and
becoming mayor of Kyiv, respectively. The
deal assured election of Poroshenko by a landslide, mainly because there were
no other contenders with broad appeal, not even from among the heroes of
Maidan.
Poroshenko was seen as a man of wisdom and, yes, as someone
best able to handle the oligarchs in
constructive and clever ways.
It didn’t quite work out that way, as
became obvious later.
Money is power, and they knew how to use it. It was and is
common knowledge that Ukraine’s government was broke at the end of Yanukovych
regime. But not all understood that it was in desperate financial straits,
aggravated by Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas. There was no military
capability to speak of, and no means to build it as needed.
That’s when acting President Oleksandr Turchynov (appointed pro- tempore by
parliament) and Yatsenyuk turned to oligarchs (those who
chose to stay on Ukrainian side or at least half-way) — in a fairly obvious way. Three of them
were appointed governors of eastern oblasts where pro-Russian rebellion was
about to sprout or was already under way. At least one of these new governors
was putting up own money very visibly to organize combat battalions, and was
sending them to frontline in the east.
Another essential defensive force came from patriotic
volunteer battalions, supplied and maintained by tens of thousands of ordinary
citizens with donations of all sorts, and weapons coming from plentiful
ex-Soviet arsenals..
From another angle, Ukraine’s government budget seems puny
in comparison with the country’s needs. For instance, for year 2015 total
expenditures were proposed as $31 billion (at official dollar conversion from
hryvnia at 17:1). The defense budget seemed to be $5 billion, and “social
policy” $6 billion. Much more money is needed by a country with a standing army
buildup to tens of thousands and at war.
Dare say, anyone with deep pockets is bound to have some
influence with the president, the prime minister, and in the parliament.
Yatsenyuk, for instance, is rumored to have strong relations with Rinat Akhmetov,
Ukraine’s richest oligarch who is playing both sides of Russian-supported
rebellion in the east. Is it conceivable that Akhmetov is doing some good for
the government in Kyiv? A good question.
In the parliamentary elections in October 2014, the big
winners were Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front party and Poroshenko’s Bloc Solidary, created almost overnight. Is it surprising that the
list of parliament members, in both parties, was made to be a mix of reformist
activists and oligarchic stooges, with the latter connected to the president or
to the prime minister?
Moreover, in
single-mandate districts (from which half of the parliament is elected),
advantage is often for candidates who spend the most money and pose as
independents.
And that’s where the country stands now, with loud calls for
snap elections to get rid of oligarchic control as the main source of
corruption in government. Polling numbers of Poroshenko’s bloc have fallen sharply in the last year,
and Yatsenyuk’s People’s Party stands close to zero. The main reason seems to
be austerity measures, brought by pressure from the International Monetary Fund as a condition for
bailout. The latest to withdraw from the majority parliamentary coalition and
joining the calls for new elections are Yulia Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna Party
and Samopomich Party.
An intriguing question is how well Tymoshenko and the
Samopomich expect to do in a new election, considering that they are doing no
better in opinion polls now than they did in the last elections. No party seems
to be doing much better either.
Another question is how immune would be a dominant
parliamentary coalition of small parties to oligarchic corruptive penetration.
Tymoshenko’s own party does not mainly consist of university professors and
playwrights. Still another is how a new government, dependent on consensus
among small parties, would get rid of the existing judiciary corps, which now
is a layer of protection for corruption.
Viktor Yushchenko as president was unable “to send bandits
to jail.”
Poroshenko may be more unable than unwilling, and perhaps
believing that oligarchs, despite their greed, are the bedrock of the country’s
economy. Wonder what would be Tymoshenko’s explanation, if elected to become president and still unable to clean
the stable.
When enough people at various branches and levels of
government are willing to accept bribes from oligarchs or from other
sources — with or without planned new elections, snap
elections or no elections – the entire system becomes corrupt. Also, it is
useless to deny that such conundrum, behavior and dishonesty prevail more in
some countries than in other, with or without revolutions or outside
interference.
Despite all the pearls of wisdom, events may spin out of
control. One of the typical triggers could be the most recent issuance of
“directions for ethical behavior” for government employees, obviously intended
to throttle the growing unrest over machinations behind the closed door. Perhaps Poroshenko is beginning to
lose his nerve after high visibility of resignations by Economy Minister Aivaras Abromavicius and others for lack of action on corruption front.
The cost of hybrid war in the east, reflected into a
shrinking economy, austerity, and decline of foreign investments all add to
weariness across population and growing demand for some action. Aside of the
possibility of an overthrow of government, polls show a third of respondents
are in favor of a military offensive in the east. The latter would be a huge
mistake that could only encourage Russia to escalate its aggression, given that
the European Union is collapsing under the weight of the Russian President Vladimir Putin-engineered refugee
crisis while the United States is humiliated in Syria by Russia’s
intervention and the incompetence of President Obama.
I wrote in the Kyiv Post on Oct. 11: “An obvious way to
a speedy exit of Putin from Syria is for NATO to become involved in removing
Russia’s presence from east Ukraine and Crimea.”
And on Oc. 24:
“Disingenuous explanations from the White House and Berlin for refusing to
provide substantive military defensive assistance to Ukraine….. carry tragic
and entirely logical consequences for the West….. Yes, the US would have to
provide weapons for Ukraine, and, yes, major air support in case of a large
invasion of Putin’s armada….”
And — as of this date — NATO still needs a wakeup call and major
rapid reinforcements from the US.
Unfortunately, the West is still floundering and badgering
Ukraine to satisfy Putin’s demands of Minsk II. Brian Whitmore put it succinctly
in “The gun to Ukraine’s head.” Europe would like to
resume its money-making business with Russia, even if it itself falls apart.
Yes,
money corrupts democracy.
