“Everything we have to look and evaluate as to will (it)
advance the ball toward the political solution that we have to find here.”
If this sounds a bit confusing, it may be because John
Kerry, U.S. secretary of state, came to Kyiv on the same day with a similarly
halting message.
Breedlove’s words were quoted the same day on the
BBC America News in Washington with some trepidation. But it was U.S .Senator Bob
Portman of Ohio, interviewed on the same subject of sending weapons for
Ukraine, who put Breedlove’s warning into perspective: “The general’s
message could have made sense some months ago, but not now.”
Breedlove is not in an enviable position. Suppose he
is asked by U.S. President Barack Obama: “Can you defend Central Europe with available
forces against an intrusion from Russia?” (Don’t ask what “intrusion” means). Consider
NATO resources:
NATO ministers are soon expected to approve an increase of a
reaction force from 13,000 to 30,000 men. That will take some time. They will
also flesh out details of a “5000-strong” spearhead force with a faster
reaction time of only days. There are
also national forces of various European states with questionable
readiness — the kind that Russia’s
president brags he can ride over into Europe’s capitals in a week or less time.
Yes, there is also a pair of U.S. Army brigades and U.S. Air Force in Europe, but it
is not the same as enough boots on the ground.
The scenario that has to be most troubling for Obama — if American weapons are sent to
Kyiv — is an overwhelming Russian military push into Ukraine in the absence
of credible NATO deterrent. For the West to abandon Ukraine at that stage would
be inconceivable and then some. The alternative would have to be a major
American involvement.
In Putin’s worldview, the risk for Russia in such major
conflict may be flaky. If Russia is
pushed back to its borders, the West would call it victory. Russia would not be
bombed or invaded, but for Putin it would be a mental disaster nonetheless.
Given the possibility of a major collision, it is no wonder that
“a negotiated solution” may look deceptively appealing to the West. That’s why Chancellor
Merkel and French President Hollande travelled to Moscow on February 6. The
problem is that a negotiated solution is not possible except on Putin’s terms,
such as the constitutional reform enabling Donbas to be treated like Moscow’s
special constituency and yet having a full voice in Ukraine’s internal affairs,
a prescription for paralysis of Ukraine as a nation and a state.
Donbas as part of
Ukrainian state makes devious logic for Moscow, but it is absurd for Ukraine’s
government to insist it wants Donbas to remain part of Ukraine. War between Ukraine and Russia is not about
Donbas. Nevertheless, a decision to leave Donbas cannot be made while bullets
are flying, as it would be at odds with the territorial integrity narrative.
Those who feel strongly against leaving Donbas out should be
reminded that its pro-Russian majority is undeniably anti-Ukrainian and is
visibly supportive of the separatists. “Glaringly” may be a better word.
At the end of the day, a “frozen conflict” in Donbas could
be the best tolerable outcome among all the miseries, as I had pointed out 8
months ago. No entirely happy ending is in sight.
Given the ongoing dash of the European Union power brokers
towards “a new peace plan proposed by Mr. Putin” (per the Financial Times,
February 6), President Poroshenko needs to maneuver the best he can and reject
the compote of the kind already floated earlier.
As pressure is mounting in the United States to send weapons
for Ukraine, the government in Kyiv must stand firm. It has already taken major
risks, like making the decision to hold on to Debaltsevo in the east after
losing a similar bet at Donetsk airport. It is the escalation of fighting
imposed by Russia that motivates perceptive
moves in the USA to persuade Obama
to send weapons needed by Ukraine to defend itself and also helping to revive
NATO as bulwark of the West.
And, yes, despite Putin’s reckless bravado, he is more
likely to end up with tail between his legs rather than risk a military
showdown against the United States.
