First, a very convincing proactive and large part of Donbas
population, if not a majority, want to be part of Russia. Secondly, Russia is
providing enough military support for militants to successfully resist “anti- terrorist” pressure from Ukraine’s
army and security forces.
The argument that polls showed a majority of voters in
Donetsk and Luhansk regions want to be part of Ukraine is misleading because it
does not explain that it would be so only if Donetsk elite calls the tune in
Kyiv, as it did during the Yanukovych reign. The Party of Regions, which
basically represented the pro-Russian fifth column, was always getting close to
90 percent share of Donbas vote.
It should be as clear as a day that Ukraine is in no
position to afford to waste its limited resources, especially under the
constraints imposed by both the West and Russia. Two recent articles come to
mind that explain the underlying realities.
One is the editorial in the Kyiv Post, “Ukraine goes it
alone” (June 12). It is self-explanatory. No support for Ukraine from the West,
other than financial incentives and lukewarm sanctions on Russia.
Weak as those sanctions are, they may be factored in when
explaining why the Kremlin has recently redefined its aggressive stance towards
Ukraine, as explained in the other, no-nonsense article by Paul Goble in the
Ukrainian Weekly, “Putin won’t make further concessions on Ukraine, say two
Moscow experts” (June 15). Not surprisingly, it confirms that the overriding
goal of Putin’s actions in Ukraine was the annexation of the Crimea, with
Sevastopol as a strategic prize. Mainland parts of Ukraine are targets of
opportunity.
The two Russian analysts in Goble’s article, Vitaly Leibin
and Valery Fadeyev, also look into four conceivable outcomes of the Donbas conflict. One is the
defeat of pro-Russian insurgents by Ukraine’s forces. Russia will not let it
happen. Another outcome would be just the opposite, and Donbas annexed by
Russia. This one can be ruled out because it would require “Russia’s
involvement” (putting it mildly), according to these Russian analysts.
A third outcome would be a negotiated re-constitution of Ukrainian state, so that
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions agree to be part of it. This result now looks
unlikely, considering the unitary state position represented by President Petro
Poroshenko and embraced by Ukrainian people.
Which makes the fourth alternative the only viable outcome,
acceptable to all sanity-conscious parties: Donbas becomes an independent
state. With over six million people and natural resources, it would be by far
more viable than, say, Russia-sponsored
Abkhasia in the Caucasus.
Without a doubt, Poroshenko fully understands
these realities, but one can be less certain about some of his entourage, or
the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The current Ukrainian public narrative about the
Donbas conflict is a combination of the self-delusional and self-deceptive in
all three domains: the patriotic, the literati, and in much of the government.
Almost no one seems to openly recognize that getting out of the Donbas is
inevitable.
Yes, the government may need some face-saving to pacify the
uproar of the super-patriots. Poroshenko is already quietly moving
the (largely non-existent) Donetsk oblast administration from Donetsk to
Mariupol, where it still has a modicum of control. And, incidentally, if
Ukraine manages to keep Mariupol, a strategic industrial city on the Azov Sea,
it would be more than face-saving.
And finally, what about Donbas performing the function of a
buffer state between Ukraine and Russia? Is this not a better concept than
Ukraine being a buffer between Russia and the West? It might even make sense
for Russia as Ukraine moves closer to the European Union. Hopefully, Ukrainians
may have enough noodles to understand that exiting from Donbas may be a win-win
for all.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
