The main argument of the nay-sayers is that in a military
escalation Russia will decisively defeat Ukraine, based on the arithmetic of
military power comparison. Russia outspends Ukraine in its military budget by
something more than ten to one.
They go on to say that the same argument of numbers game doesn’t
apply in a possible (non-nuclear) encounter between the United States and
Russia — if the US becomes entangled full-scale on Ukraine
side. Although the U.S. defense budget is at least six times larger than
Russia’s, Moscow has a huge logistical advantage of short supply lines, while
the U.S. would be stretched out (so goes the narrative) like the Swedish army of
King Karl XII was in Ukraine in 1708, when the Swedes were defeated with their
Ukrainian ally Hetman Ivan Mazepa at Poltava by Russian Tsar Peter.
Suffice it to say that this logistics argument is piffle,
not the least because the U.S. Army and Air Force NATO bases are in Europe and
not in Alaska. The distance from Munich to Kyiv is a couple hours, given U.S. air superiority, with
plenty of airfields allover Ukraine and the Ukrainian people and army standing
with the West.
But why might the United States intervene for Ukraine? The
answer is, to make it a great deal easier to defend Europe. And why should the
US defend Europe? Or why should NATO defend Europe? Maybe the former U.S. President Harry Truman forgot to explain this to Barack Obama. The long and
short of it is that the U.S. national interest requires to keep Europe out of
hostile hands. It is always a priority over “pivoting on China” or fighting
against Japan (check with Franklin Delano Roosevelt if in doubt). And, might as well mention that America
must never fight a land war in Asia, as the former Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates has concluded after the Afghan experiment (not to mention Vietnam).
Yes, some may point out a depressing picture of inefficiency
of American defense dollar. Skeptics say that a hefty driver for huge U.S.
military spending in the last 20 years (which is almost as large as the
spending of the rest of the world combined) is lobbying of the military-industrial
complex, and it is now larger in real terms than it was during the Cold War. And much of it is by deficit financing, to
boot. But regardless, such a sideline does not mitigate the logistics tale
above.
It is plausible to say that, as of now or in the next year
or two, in any conventional war between the United States and Russia the latter
would be decisively beaten, given the existing NATO framework. The only caveat
is NATO’s ability to stay politically solvent under the current pressure from
Moscow on some of its members, and given the incompetence and slow motion of
the Obama administration. This is perhaps the time to say that, contrary to
earlier indications, Barack Obama’s best performance was as a community
organizer in Chicago, and not as president — an opinion now widely shared in
America. President Obama is also in a long-lasting conflict with Congressional
Republicans over the handling of the porous US border with Mexico, where
millions of illegal immigrants have become an invasion similar to the influx into
Western Europe from Africa in the last 25 years. Major demographic changes are
underway in North America and in Europe
— a self-inflicted folly.
Time may not be on the side of the West, given Russia’s gradually
growing military capability with advanced weapons technology and its
operational armored ground forces already as big as America’s and becoming
bigger, as well as a sizable air force. And, remarkably, this growth of
military power is not visibly hampered by Russia’s lackluster Gross National
Product (about the same size as Switzerland’s)
— the criterion used by Western bankers to size up the country’s
overall significance.
It may be recalled that NATO was no match for the Soviet
Union’s armies during the Cold War. It was common knowledge that NATO forces
could be overrun by thousands by Soviet tanks in Europe’s northern plains. The
US had to introduce tactical nuclear weapons (such as the Pershing short-range ballistic
missile) in the 1970s as a deterrent in Western Europe — which did not sit well with the
Europeans. The main American weapon was
the strategic nuclear deterrence, the doctrine of mutual annihilation.
Does it not make sense to say at this time that Russia must
be stopped now, before it builds up its land power capability like the Soviet
Union’s during the Cold War? Does it make sense to deny that such a buildup is
what Vlad Putin has in mind, when in his own judgment the collapse of Soviet
Union was the greatest tragedy?
Is it not preposterous to give much weight to studies of
what is really on Putin’s mind? To save time, some credence should be extended
to geopolitical evidence of Russia’s aspirations throughout history. To assume
that it is only Vladimir Putin in Moscow who makes life difficult for Russia’s
neighbors is to ignore historic evidence.
Throughout centuries, Russia had expanded eastward until
there was nowhere to go (except Alaska), and southward until they could not
climb Himalayan mountains into India. Why such a drive? Was there some genetics
at work? And why is it that since the 17th century Russia has been
pummeling Poland and the Baltic region, besides swallowing Ukraine and pushing
into the Caucasus, Crimea and Moldova?
Was it because there had been a fascinating and very
successful ethnic mixing of Slavs, Finn-Ugric tribes and the Chuvashi of
Bulgarian descent in the upper Volga River region, at the time of the
appearance of Moscow in the 13th century, and enduring the Mongol
Yoke lasting over two centuries afterwards? Had not such a unique experience become the
cornerstone of a distinct Russian civilization eulogized in today’s Russia?
Frankly, it doesn’t matter why. What matters is the need to
confront the facts today. Certainty the number one is that, if Russia is not
stopped in Ukraine now, it will be directly menacing Poland and the rest of Central
Europe, where it had such a grand time between 1945 and 1989.
In that case, would it not be much more difficult for the
United States, NATO or whoever to confront Moscow’s push into Central Europe?
These are the questions on which the decisions should be
based, and not waiting for the outcome of putative ceasefire and humiliation pressed
on Kyiv for a second time in Minsk on Feb. 12. And, after this cease-fire
collapses like everybody says it will, there is no use going back into the same
routine of talkie-talkie peace with Russia while Ukraine is fighting alone and
postponing the turn of Europe.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
