The idea of a defensive wall first appeared in Ukraine
earlier this year, and some folks took it seriously, as evidenced in Zenon
Zawada’s article in the Ukrainian Weekly (June 22). Someone performed a cost
analysis and concluded that the project would be a breeze, around half a
billion dollars. The plan was submitted to the Presidential Administration.
Such plans should be seen from a skeptical perspective, if
not as a joke to entertain friends at a house party. Yes, in normal times it is
part of a president’s job to tell the nation a good story. But it never should
be a tall tale, an anesthetic to sooth the anxieties of a nation finding itself
in an existential struggle against a voracious enemy. It is no substitute for
having a modern army and air force able to stop the Russian aggression.
Former US President Bill Clinton said last week that Petro
Poroshenko is the best president Ukraine can have. I agree. For instance, his ongoing handling of the
so-called ceasefire negotiations with Russia, including the “special status”
proposal for the secession areas in Donbas is the least onerous realizable
outcome for Ukraine after the rout suffered by the Ukrainian army in the east
at the end of August and the real danger of a continuing Russian invasion. Getting rid of those enclaves in the Donbas
outright would be better, but it is coming to that anyway. It is the enemy territory already lost from
the day one, even if saying so is politically incorrect.
Loss of those areas, with much of their rust belt, is not a
disaster for Ukraine as it is made out to be by some politicians. It will turn
out to be a net gain in terms of jettisoning a fifth column that clearly showed
hate of Ukraine and love of Russia.
Surprisingly,
criticism of Poroshenko’s acceptance of the ceasefire comes also from Prime
Minister Arseny Yatseniuk, a very capable leader who should know better,
considering that only a few days ago he acknowledged that Ukraine alone cannot
stop the Russian army. Maybe this inconsistency of judgment is what also
prompted him to like the wall building fantasy even before Poroshenko talked
about it.
Also , Yatseniuk’s announcement that “Ukraine will not
legalize self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics” (Sept 17)
sounds hollow and stale. A well known Russian proverb says: “Posle draki
kulakami ne mashut” (Shake not the fists after the fight).
Similarly, the criticism of ceasefire arrangements coming
now from Yulia Tymoshenko, the former prime minister seems to be motivated
mainly by scarcity of meaningful initiatives she can offer. The only remarkable
feature of the opposition now forming against President Poroshenko is the absence of
substance.
Interestingly, there seems to be no opposition to the wall
of fantasy, maybe because the notion of a wall against the technology-powered
attack in modern warfare is inherently ridiculous to begin with, and does not
require a second thought. A wall can discourage terrorist infiltration and
obstruct the heavy-duty contraband (such as some rocket launchers for
subversion in Donbas), but not to stop an invasion.
Hopefully, the president’s talk about building a wall is
not an act of desperation.
Also, the reference to the Mannerheim Line only obfuscates
history. The defensive strategy used by the Finns in the winter of 1939-40 took
advantage of the geography and terrain, deep snow, multitude of lakes and
forests, and extreme weather. The details are available from numerous sources.
For instance, pertinent points were made as written in the
account used for instruction at the US Military Academy, Department of Military
Art and Engineering, West Point, NY, and easily found on Yahoo.
On the northern front of the war, where terrain was not
suitable for rapid maneuvering, the Soviet army divisions were stopped by
Finish guerilla warfare. Long Russian columns were attacked by ski patrols
which struck at kitchen and supply lines (the strategy used by Russians on
Napoleon in his retreat from Moscow). Two Soviet divisions, cut off from supply
lines, surrendered.
On the central front, stretching northward from Lake Ladoga,
the Finns yielded some ground, but were able to prevent the Russian
break-through and thus protected their southern front (running westward from
Lake Ladoga to the Gulf of Finland) from encirclement.
It was at the southern front, in Karelia, where the famed
Mannerheim Line was facing the Russians. But it was nothing like a fortified
position in the sense of the French Maginot Line or a concrete wall imagined by
some amateur strategists.
Quoting from West Point source, “The Karelian fortifications
were mostly field works of the type constructed in WWI, with an occasional
machine gun and artillery emplacement. There were 96 localized concrete
strongholds of that kind”. Also, as later in WWII, “numerous ditches were dug
and granite boulders were placed along possible tank routes”.
With a touch of irony, “neither the Finns nor the Russians
bothered to correct the erroneous information sent out to the world that the
Mannerheim Line was a strong wall of steel and concrete. For the Russians it
offered an excuse for their setbacks.”
To suggest that the Mannerheim Line saved Finland from Stalin
is an oversimplification, to say the least. In fact, General Carl G. Mannerheim,
commander of Finnish forces told his government in January 1940 that he would not
be able to hold the front against the expected Soviet spring offensive, and
advised to seek negotiated settlement. His advice was
welcomed. Both sides, exhausted by bitter grind, agreed to end the war, albeit
with the Russians keeping the territory they were able to grab.
Boris Danik is a retired Ukrainian-American living in North Caldwell, New Jersey.
