This deterioration
of the democratic record is not new for Ukraine. Since 2010,
most democratic indexes demonstrated a steady decline. This one is
particularly disturbing because media freedom was one of
the most-often praised
accomplishment of the 2004 Orange
Revolution.
How far will this trend continue and is
civil society capable to protect democracy? How to finish the
revolution and achieve those aspirations for freedom and justice
voiced on Maidan in 2004?
Findings from my Chatham
House report shed some light on these questions and flash some
red signals for the leaders of non-governmental organizations and
Western donors supporting them.
Civil society in Ukraine, and in the
post-Soviet region as a whole, is weak as citizens remain disengaged
from public life and hold back from participating in independent
organizations, informal groups and professional organizations.
Despite 71,000 registered NGOs in Ukraine, only
5 percent of Ukrainians report any kind of membership.
They feel more comfortable discussing
politics at home in front of a political TV talk show than
expressing their thoughts in the town hall meetings or public
debates. Citizens rely on informal
clientele-type networks and corruption to
find their ways around the system.
At the same time, many well-established
Ukrainian NGOs form an “NGO-cracy,” where professional
NGO leaders use access to domestic policymakers and Western donors to
influence public policies, yet they are disconnected from the public
at large. Annually major foreign donors spend roughly $42
million for civil society assistance in Ukraine.
This includes US
Agency for International Development, the
International Renaissance Foundation (owned
by U.S. billionaire George Soros) and the European
Union. Western money allows NGOs to attract talent, but their
full-time employees are more comfortable networking with Western
embassies and various state agencies than holding public
consultations and engaging with citizens.
This assistance is roughly going to the
200 best-connected groups in
Ukraine, among them think tanks, advocacy groups, watchdog groups.
They are mostly interested in influencing policy and advocacy and
very few of them would describe themselves as an “association of
citizens.” Only 17 percent of Ukrainian
NGOs have more than 100 members.
As the result, Western assistance
focused on consolidating democracy is failing. NGO leaders themselves
acknowledge their marginal influence on policymaking in Ukraine but
mostly believe it is due to unwillingness of the government to
include NGOs in genuine public consultation. There is truth in this.
Most of the public councils that operate at the national and local
levels are either rubber-stamping decisions or are being hijacked by
the ministries,
as a
recent case with the
Public Council at the Interior
Ministry vividly
demonstrates.
The
Public Council, a public body that is supposed to oversee the
observance of human rights by the police, was dismissed in August
last year, and the ministry on Jan. 27 handpicked members of the new
council through a number of manipulative tactics. More than 50
representatives of specialized NGOs were left out of the process.
The major reason why most Ukrainian
NGOs have a marginal impact on government is lack of a
constituency and connections with
citizens. Most NGO leaders believe that their strength comes from
their expertise and connections with decisionmakers.
Political reality in Ukraine shows that
expertise alone is not enough to influence policymaking. To be
influential organisations have to be representative and enjoy public
support. Recent events proved that civil society movements such as
Tax Maidan II, network to Protect Andriyvsky Uzviz, student movement
against the new educational law turned successful due to citizens
mobilization in public space, media campaigns, active social network
strategy, clear focus on issues of specific constituency.
Both donors and NGO leaders should
embrace the fact that the fundamental problem with Western assistance
to civil society is that it leaves much of society untouched and this
undermines the transformative power of the whole exercise. When
citizens are not at the heart of these organizations, they become
passive consumers of democracy development aid instead of the driving
force behind democratic change.
Western donors should spend their money
more wisely. They should embrace the idea that
active and empowered citizens, not the expertise of a few
NGOs, are the indicator of civil society’s strength. Prioritizing
greater citizen participation in organizations, as well as social
trust, tolerance, openness and self-expression can do this.
Donors could also consider supporting
not just English-speaking, Western-oriented NGOs and shift their
attention to the grassroots
level. Non-conventional actors such as youth groups, students’
associations and universities, grassroots citizens’ initiative
groups, intellectual circles, schools and religious organizations
that pursue charitable and community goals . Donors need to consider
incorporating conditionality in their support for NGOs, based on
criteria that include connections with
citizens.
Ukrainian activists
and NGO leaders must design a strategy and engage citizens more in
what they do. If Ukrainians want true democracy, transparency and
personal freedom, they need to build social trust.
Government will not give up space to
citizens out of good will. It is up to citizens to demand and occupy
this space. To prevent further deterioration of democratic freedoms,
Ukrainians should engage in public life beyond voting in elections,
because as Karl Popper pointed out: ‘Democracy may help to preserve
freedom but it can never create it if the individual citizen does not
care for it.’
Orysia
Lutsevych is a Ukrainian civil society expert living in London. She
was Robert Bosch Fellow at Chatham House in 2012, and
formerly headed Arseniy Yatseniuk’s Open Ukraine, a private
foundation.
