The popularity of democracy had fallen in Ukraine by 42 percent between 1991 and 2009 – the sharpest fall in all the post-Soviet countries where surveys had been carried out. The 30 percent who still supported democracy in 2009 was the lowest figure of the countries in the study.
A factor contributing to the Ukrainians’ growing discontent with their political system has been rarely acknowledged in both Ukraine and the West: semi-presidentialism – the political system in place, in Kyiv, since the Orange Revolution.
At the height of the uprising, a political compromise between pro- and anti-Orange groupings was arrived at in a short period of time. It led to a hasty constitutional reform implemented at the end of 2004 and coming into force on January 1, 2006. As a result, a division of executive power between the president and the prime minister became set in concrete, rather than just nominal, as it had been under Leonid Kuchma.
However, this now properly semi-presidential form of government is problematic for societies in transition, not least for Eastern European countries, as has been amply demonstrated in comparative research.
Ukrainian attitudes to democracy and the international reputations of their politicians have been negatively affected by the destructive repercussions of that system, i.e. the conflict inherent in the divided executive. The new balance of power between the state’s two rulers, and the parliamentary-presidential system which came into force in January 2006 were important, if not the chief, determinants of the prolonged standoffs between President Victor Yushchenko and Prime Minister(s) Victor Yanukovych or Yulia Tymoshenko.
The failure to understand these problems and the nature of the political crisis has not only distorted Ukrainian attitudes to their young democracy in recent years, but also the opinion of foreign commentators, not familiar with recent political research. Semi-presidentialism’s effects on this post-totalitarian state has even compelled some people to question the suitability of democracy for Ukraine or even of Ukrainians for democracy.
While Ukraine’s current semi-presidency is, as such, relatively democratic, governmental prerogatives within this system are fractured. Ever since the fall of the semi-presidential Weimar Republic in 1930-33, comparative studies have shown that a divided executive is, especially in transition countries, ineffectual. But outside the narrow circle of international political analysts, this issue is rarely recognized as being a problem of Ukraine not specific to this post-Soviet country. As a result of such misunderstandings, dissatisfaction with Ukraine’s government at home and abroad has bred fatalism. The strange political spectacles in Kyiv during the past few years are seen as reflecting the political immaturity of the Ukrainian elite or even of the whole population.
What needs to remembered, however, is that from 1991 to 2004 Ukraine has carried out one of the most impressive democratizations in recent European history, and done so in the teeth of tremendous difficulties. Seen in comparative perspective and properly contextualized, Ukraine’s performance was, in fact, remarkable.
It was only in 1998, for instance, that the Germans, for the first time in their history, removed via popular vote their ruler, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, from power. The Ukrainians, already in 1994, had kicked out, by a popular vote, their ruler and first post-Soviet president Leonid Kravchuk, who had been elected in 1991. In doing so, they met early on a criterion used by political scientists in determining the maturity of a democracy. Since then, Ukrainians have two more times rejected incumbents, in presidential elections: Yanukovych (who had been Prime-Minister since 2002) in December 2004, and Yushchenko (as President standing for a second term) in January 2010.
This illustrates that Ukraine is – for all the mess in its politics – today a democratic country. The West should pay more attention to this young nation-state, as well as help Ukrainians to restructure and consolidate their current political system.
Andreas Umland is assistant professor of contemporary East European history at The Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt in Bavaria (http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland), and general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society.” (http://www.ibidem-verlag.de/spps.html).
