2021 saw China and Russia instigate, each in their own way, the return and redistribution of spheres of influence.

For China, the strategy is to become the dominant power of the 21st century, while Russia has sensed a moment when they can achieve, in part if not in full, their three key aims.

The first is an agreement that there will be no outside influence on any resetting of power in Russia. The second is to remain a world player, able to speak to China and the U.S.A on equal terms. The third is to retrieve priority influence over the ‘post-Soviet space’ and, if they are ‘lucky’, over the greater part of Eurasia, including Central Europe.

The Kremlin understands that now is the time to increase the stakes.

The future has limited potential, while the current energy crisis allows considerable influence over European countries.

The West should raise the stakes in response, otherwise the moment will be lost. Washington has understood this well. Europe is beginning to see it too. However, the West has paused while they try to formulate a response and find a way to act in a unified manner. So far, we have seen no concrete political decisions or signs of a will to make them. However, Russia’s raising of the stakes is causing a great deal of discussion.

Most likely, the ‘carrot and stick’ policy will continue unless there is significant escalation. This is demonstrated by how the West views the Kremlin’s desire for discussions on so-called ‘red lines’ concerning NATO expansion.

The very fact of this discussion is a modest achievement for Russia. The Kremlin will employ tough and systematic blackmail through the military buildup around the border with Ukraine to force the continuation of these discussions with the aim of creating a new reincarnation of Yalta.

The Ukrainian government’s desire to stabilize, contain, or better still to ‘freeze’, the war with the Russian Federation is understandable. It wins them time, but it is vital to use that time properly. Moscow understands this too. They are not interested in empty threats towards Ukrainian territory. They want to return Ukraine to their sphere of influence.

The imperial emotion that swept Russian society following the occupation of Crimea has waned. They need a new stimulus – some kind of ‘success’ in Ukraine. This is how the Kremlin sees it, especially through the prism of 2024 – the year of the next Presidential elections. So, 2022 could be rich in events and the raising of stakes. The main thing is for us to know when those stakes are being raised at our expense.

The West understands that any compromise with Putin will be costly. Winning back respect lost on the world stage will be difficult. The West can quickly lose its dominance if agreements with the Russian Federation are interpreted as weakness. A joint strategy between Ukraine and the West at this time would strengthen both. No joint strategy will weaken both.

For Ukraine, it is also a matter of respect and trust. It is difficult to talk about objectivity if we are not involved in the negotiations around our own future and very existence – negotiations concerning European security.

The achievements of 2021, like the Crimean Platform summit, will be undermined by this.

Serious discussions about membership of the EU and NATO will be postponed for years – pushed into the unforeseeable future.

2022 might see the end of the Covid crisis. It must not be the year a major new foreign policy crisis begins. A crisis is always a challenge and an opportunity. We can make our return to the foreign policy table. or disappear from it altogether.

Now is the time to place your bets on 2022.