Editor’s Note: This is the first part of a two-part series. Part 2 will analyze Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policies.
The Russian Federation is Ukraine’s strategic partner, an important country for the nation’s economic development and a key player in terms of security in Eurasia. It’s also a nation with deep cultural, humanitarian, informational, human and historical ties with Ukraine. Relations with Russia will define Ukraine’s future and its ability to safeguard its sovereignty, territorial integrity and survival as an independent state and a modern society.
Russia is going through a difficult time in its history. Even 18 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian elite have failed to transform its identity and develop the nation in a stable, forward-looking manner. The strategic course for liberalization and Western integration lasted from 1991-1999 before suffering a shattering defeat. In 1998-1999, Russia was on the verge of collapse.
In overcoming the threat of disintegration and all-out social degradation, the Russian leadership personified by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin sacrificed the prospects of systemic modernization – and, therefore, the country’s future. For the fifth or sixth time in Russian history, the vicious circle of reform followed by counter-reform has not been broken. Having placed his bet on restoring the authoritarian style of management (by creating territorial districts and canceling the election of governors), Putin has been following this path.
This choice has also led to restoration of Soviet symbols in Russia. First it was the Soviet anthem (2000), proclamation of neo-imperial course of an energy super-state (2003), quasi-isolationism and espionage hysteria (2005-2007), a controlled confrontation with the United States (2007), proclamation of the post-Soviet region as the zone of Russia’s privileged interests (2008) and effective rehabilitation of Josef Stalin (2007-2009).
These were not just ideological declarations. Putin’s rule coincided with a long period of high energy prices, which increased by 10 times in eight years. Some estimate that Russia received an additional income of $1.5 trillion. The giant profits were either consumed or saved as gold and hard currency reserves. The country’s gross domestic product quadrupled from $350 billion in 2000 to $1.4 trillion in 2008, and more than $500 billion were saved as reserves.
The Kremlin had enough resources to conduct an active internal and foreign policies. Moscow also had managed to provide stable and fast improvement in most Russians’ lives, which allowed for relatively painless curbs in social freedoms.
The Kremlin also managed to neutralize potential discontent among the elite. This was assisted by pressuring billionaires Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky out of the country and the mostly politically-motivated trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which served to subordinate big business to the Kremlin. The Russian leadership revived the KGB’s successor agency and restored mass political espionage, through the establishment of the Service for Protection of Constitutional Order and Combating Terrorism within the Federal Security Service (known as the FSB). It also created “anti-terrorism centers” within the Interior Ministry and changed the law in a way that made political repressions possible.
The “tandemocracy” of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Putin has proved to be quite effective for continuing this course, despite a growing conflict between the leaders and, especially, their teams.
Russia’s foreign policy since 2003-2004 has been “to be with the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, next to the European Union and carefully against the USA.” But the arrival of Barack Obama’s administration has opened opportunities for a thawing of relations with America. Besides declaring CIS nations part of its sphere of influence, since all of its members are former Soviet republics, the Kremlin showed how unwilling Europe and the United States are to intervene by armed conflict during Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008.
In general, Russia so far does not strive for a dominating position, but is rather concentrated on solving the hot issues, mostly of a regional character. One of the key foreign policy challenges is to humiliate and shame Kyiv into subservience.
Subjugation of Ukraine – or at least its southeastern part, would be a vast improvement for Russia. In particular, such a move would ease Russia’s dismal demographic future, help ensure a reliable transit of energy sources to Europe and enlarge Russia’s economic potential, mostly in heavy industry (including the military one), but also in agriculture. Russian dominance in Ukraine prevents the United States from gaining a launching pad close to Moscow. And neutralizing Ukraine removes an ideological threat to the Kremlin’s authoritarian regime.
Kremlin’s aggressive policy towards Ukraine is not provoked by Kyiv. It stems from Russia’s own needs, as understood by Putin and the current leadership. Even a radical change of political course by Ukraine would not significantly change Russian policy or cancel its aims.
There is an understanding in the Kremlin that the historical window of opportunity to co-opt Ukraine is very short. This can close after 2015, when a new generation of political elites will be established in Kyiv. In this regard, the current indifference of the United States and European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe gives Russia more breathing space. Therefore, the Kremlin’s “Kyiv offensive” will start in the near future and it will be ruthless.
Russian policy towards Ukraine
1. Officially, Russia has repeatedly pointed out its commitment to established agreements, including respect of the current legal and recognized borders of Ukraine. At the same time, Russia’s official foreign policy and security doctrines contain clear definitions of its interests in Ukraine. It’s mainly about preventing Kyiv’s admission to NATO, “protection of [Ukraine’s] Russian-speaking population” and keeping Ukraine in Russia’s “privileged” sphere of influence.
2. The modern Russian state is a legal, ideological and institutional heir of the U.S.S.R. Foreign policy and security services are the most obvious sectors where the heritage is not only recognized, but emphasized, even at the official level. The key peculiarity of such a state inheritance is in institutional memory, including mechanisms for making decisions, including strategic ones. There is a high probability that Russia has not formulated a detailed program towards Ukraine. Rather, the main tasks, directions and arsenal of tools are defined. But tactical and operational decisions will depend on the situation.
3. The above-mentioned policy planks do not, however, exclude long-range intentions and a targeted policy. It seems that such a strategic vision was finally formulated and approved at a closed session of the Security Council and the State Council of the Russian Federation on Dec. 25, 2008. A preview of it can be derived from the August declarations of Medvedev, in which he outlined several reasons why Ukraine – and, specifically, Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko – were to blame for deteriorating bilateral relations. A similar speech was given by Russian Duma deputy Konstantin Zatulin in May. Effectively, the policy amounts to an ultimatum: Ukraine’s territorial integrity is dependent on its acceptance of “special relations” with Russia –or effectively, Russia’s protectorate over a weak Ukraine.
4. Nearly two decades of relations with independent Ukraine have demonstrated to Russia marginal effectiveness of gaining indirect control of Ukraine through the so-called “pro-Russian” elites. After coming to power, such elites have quickly changed orientation and, more or less, conducted pro-Ukrainian or even pro-Western policies (which is almost the same in the current conditions). So, establishing a protectorate of Ukraine is a transitional stage to further division of the nation, possibly into three parts: the south and east will be directly attached to the Russian Federation; a puppet government will be created in central Ukraine; and the west will be cut off and dismissed as the main obstacle to peace.
5. The modern Russian ruling elite have the supporters of war (the hawks) and the supporters of peace (pigeons) under their control. The “unwillingness of Ukraine to cooperate,” or the “lack of efficiency in the state policy, unprofessionalism and childish emotions” – whatever patriotic slogans the Russian attacks are covered with – will strengthen the position of the hawks. However, most problems in the bilateral relations are a result of miscommunication, and the weaknesses of tools for conducting meaningful negotiations and reaching agreements.
Pushing on levers of influence
In the last few years, to reach its goals, Russia has used all its influential levers in energy, economic, political and humanitarian sectors. Special attention was paid to Crimea, where ethnic Russians make up the majority of the peninsula’s inhabitants. The “gas wars” of 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 represented the extreme manifestations of this pressure.
One of the political components is activating pro-Russian political and social institutions in Ukraine, including militarized Cossack formations, Orthodox brotherhoods attached to churches and ethnic minority groupings.
Information assaults against Ukraine coming from Moscow-controlled media are becoming more aggressive. They include speculation about the political and humanitarian rights of ethnic minorities and a Russian-speaking population, attempts to discredit the leaders of Ukraine, reinforcement of anti-NATO and anti-West stereotypes left over from the Soviet Union, xenophobic provocations and discrediting of the state policy to restore historical justice.
The economic expansion takes place through the advancement of the Russian financial and business groups supported by the state. Their targets are basic infrastructural industries in Ukraine, mainly finances, telecom (primarily mobile sector), energy sector, transport, ship-building, energy-related heavy engineering and the media sector.
In Crimea, the key tactic is to stir up controlled instability. They seek to discredit the Ukrainian ruling elite and widen the split between the Ukrainian government and its Russian-oriented population, with the help of special services. If such methods prove ineffective and the new Ukrainian president turns out to be non-compliant, use of force cannot be ruled out.
Volodymyr Gorbulin is an academician with the National Academy of Sciences and director of Institute for National Security Problems within the president’s National Security and Defense Council. Oleksandr Lytvynenko is his adviser.
