The continuing success of a political party in power depends on its interactions with a range of other actors, at home and abroad.
The Party of Regions has a plan for dealing with these actors – its own electorate, the opposition, political allies, the democratic international community and internal powerhouses.
This plan manifests itself in public and goes some way to defining the party’s image.
Analyzing how the governing party handles its interactions with other players gives us an idea as of how long it will remain in power.
With respect to its electorate, the Party of Regions – which backs President Viktor Yanukovych – has completely changed its rhetoric since the election, fearing criticism from the public-spirited population as well as the international community’s response.
Yanukovych, therefore, will be losing members of his electorate, but the question is – how fast?
In Yanukovych’s election program, he targeted people who respect the history of Soviet Ukraine, perceive the leaders of the party of power as “friends” — contrary to [the previous government of] “Orange” [Revolution] nationalists — and look forward to integration with Russia.
The idea of stability was a cementing element, which should have lead to automatic prosperity in contrast to the instability under the previous government.
Now, the ruling party says it is firmly set on European integration and unwilling to enter the Customs Union with Russia and its allies.
Other pro-Russian policies, such as making Russian an official state language, have also not been implemented.
The president has set a course to unify the country. He cannot just represent his electorate, but has to represent the interests of all Ukrainians.
This, however, could lead him to lose his electorate while such actions will never bring voters in Kyiv and in western regions to support him.
Yanukovych, therefore, will be losing members of his electorate, but the question is – how fast?
This can be countered by the ruling party’s very effective strategy against the opposition.
After the presidential election, the most dangerous opponent – Sergiy Tigipko, who placed third – was neutralized by bringing him into government as deputy prime minister.
Other former members of the Orange camp, such as Andriy Portnov, Vladyslav Kaskiv and Viktor Baloha, have taken seats in the executive branch.
The rest of the opposition looks decidedly weak or unelectable.
Oleh Tyahnybok is in many ways doing them a favor by transforming the national patriotic movement into a far right one leaning towards Nazism, discrediting it and making it unelectable in the east and center of the country.
Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s success depends on television appearances, money and his team, all of which are weak points.
One way to weaken the opposition is to increase the threshold for parties to get into parliament in elections next year, although this could backfire if the electorate mobilizes and actively opposes the ruling party.
The question is what strategy will be more efficient: full monopolization or the creation of the effect of democracy.
Parliament could become more unruly, as under previous presidents, given that self-nominated candidates will also be able to stand for parliamentary seats in the elections.
It is possible, of course, to rely on repressive measures, but in today’s world, these methods are fraught with bad endings.
The Party of Regions’ main advantage in parliament is its ability to bring effective and experienced politicians onto its side without forming a bloc. This has allowed the party to maintain cohesion in its ranks.
A key issue now is whether to involve current allies with their own parties, such as Volodymyr Lytvyn and Tigipko, or let them go it alone while raising the threshold for parties to get into parliament from 3 percent to 5 percent of the popular vote, probably shutting them out.
The question is what strategy will be more efficient: full monopolization or the creation of the effect of democracy.
Ukrainian members of parliament and Ukrainians living in France and Germany protest against President Viktor‘s Yanukovych in Strasbourg, France, outside the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on June 21. (Volodymyr Ariev)
The latter strategy allows for allies to be used for radical policies, such as Tigipko pushing for an unpopular increase in the retirement age for women.
The ruling party’s interactions with the international democratic community are facing a number of challenges.
In recent months, the authorities have been accused of repressing freedom of speech and carrying out reprisals against members of the previous government, who are now in opposition.
Accusations persist that corruption is growing, and that the country is moving into the geopolitical and economic field of Russia’s interests.
It is interesting that the authorities react most painfully to the latter accusation.
The democratically-oriented and pro-European electorate hears criticism of Yanukovych from the global and European community and does not trust his words.
They are also highly concerned about claims that it is clamping down on freedom of speech.
The accusations of political repression and corruption fall almost on deaf ears, however.
These priorities have been chosen incorrectly in the way they influence Yanukovych’s public positioning.
He is constantly trying to prove that he and his team are trying to implement European values, while accusations to the contrary are black PR attacks by the opposition.
The democratically-oriented and pro-European electorate hears criticism of Yanukovych from the global and European community and does not trust his words.
And the eastern electorate considers his pro-European rhetoric to be a rejection of promises to move closer to Russia, leading to disappointment. This is a dilemma.
It demonstrates that the era of multi-vector policy, which Leonid Kuchma relied upon to find a balance between Russia and Europe while he was Ukraine’s president from 1994-2005, is outdated.
Russia and the European Union will not allow any Ukrainian leadership to sit on two chairs anymore.
The fourth issue for the authorities to deal with is the role of Ukrainian elites.
The role of those grouped around the president drastically increased after the Constitution was changed last year to increase his powers.
Since the distribution of state and public goods, in their opinion, now depends on the president, the violation of any balance in the system of power or in the system of economic interests can lead to a considerable aggravation of the internal inter-group conflicts and to the emergence of entirely new political motivations on the part of these groups.
They can seriously affect the controllability of the system as a whole and, in the worst case, even lead to betrayal.
This happened in the groups around Kuchma when he was president and repeats itself under Yanukovych.
When the popularity of the leader falls, his circle starts looking for a new leader.
The position of the ruling party is very strong, but there are no guarantees that the chosen strategy will yield results in the long term. Much depends on the president’s choices.
The key question is how to respond to the question of what Ukrainian democracy is.
Will he rely on the Party of Regions to fill executive roles, or involve outsiders?
Will he rely on political alliances with people like Lytvyn and Tigipko, or will he try to monopolize the political field?
What strategy will he choose for dealing with the oligarchs?
Will he continue leading the country toward the EU? How will he deal with economic challenges?
The key question is how to respond to the question of what Ukrainian democracy is.
Is it like in Kazakhstan, Belarus or Russia, or somehow different, like, for example, Poland?
For the time being, none of the post-Soviet leaders of these countries knows how to win the next election in democratic conditions, and when choosing either force or democracy, force is chosen.
While president of Ukraine in 2005-2010, Viktor Yushchenko chose democracy and lost.
For the time being democracy is a very complicated mechanism that is largely not understood by post-Soviet elites in terms of state administration and electoral procedures.
Vladimir Granovski has been a consultant to politicians and businesses since the 1990s. His clients have included President Viktor Yanukovych and the pro-presidential Party of Regions.
