This is, by no means, an exoneration of either the current administration’s or the Verkhovna Rada’s record of performance.
There is much more that could and should have been done – starting with the replacement of a prosecutor general who (rightly or wrongly) is widely regarded as part of the problem rather than the solution.
The court system isanother major roadblock that should have been tackled from the very beginning with enforced lustrations and replacement of judges widely known to be corruptor shown to have unexplained assets far in excess of their income.
Expedited “due process” procedures should have been put into place to ensure that suspects receive every opportunity to disclose the source of their (and their family’s) gains or respond to supported allegations of corruption, followed by swift justice, including, when appropriate, confiscation of all assets. Cases in which frozen assets are released for lack of prosecution should never have been allowed to happen without identifying and penalizing the responsible parties.
But Ukraine has never functioned very efficiently…..the bureaucracy is creaky and tainted…..the self-serving interplay of corrupt oligarchs and law enforcementis inbred……and even the most determined president, working within the ruleof law, would have a difficult time of it. So what is he and his administrationto do?
U.S. presidents appoint a variety of “czars” whose prime responsibility is to concentrate on specific programs that are of special interest to the presidentand/or the country.
There has been an AIDS czar, a bird flu czar, a border czar, a cyber security czar, a domestic policy czar, a drug czar….etc.
These positions are generally part of the office of the president and do not require special legislation. They are established whenever the president finds a need to have a trusted, unbiased adviser and a single point-of-contact to review the whole issue and advise him on both problems and solutions. Very often, program responsibilities (as inthe case of Ukraine’s anti-corruption programs) are spread out among variousagencies with differing, overlapping or self-serving authorities and responsibilities, and the president needs a central point to which he can deferto get the “big picture.”
At times he needs a “czar” who will take some of the political heat off him and be able to articulate clearly what measures are being taken. He needs someone who can take the time to listen to the various interested parties.
President Petro Poroshenko may need such a “corruption czar.” It should be obvious that no Ukrainian citizen would be trusted in such a position because no Ukrainian would be seen as sufficiently independent, detached, or objective, or competent to satisfy all parties.
A foreigner would benefit from immediate credibility. He or she should have a legal background, be able to speak Ukrainian and/or Russian, have at least a decade of experience in fighting governmental “waste, fraud, and abuse” at senior executive levels, be financially independent and not associated or affiliated with any Ukrainian power centers or parties, and capable of dealing with both foreign institutionsand domestic media.
A “czar” should not have any direct management authority, because that would run counter to the work he isassigned to perform. His or her job would be to (a) provide oversight of all parts of the nation’s anti-corruption program to ensure that all necessary areas are properly covered and funded, and that there are no overlapping orunclear responsibilities that would cause friction or competition amongagencies; (b) consult with a large variety of people – in and out of government- to get their best insight into both problems and solutions; (c) report his/her findings to the president together with optional solutions; (d) with the president’s approval, report back to the media and to foreign institutionswhat has been uncovered, proposed, and resolved; and (e) oversee theimplementation of solutions and determine their effectiveness.
A czar needs an office close to the president and a staff capable of handling much of this work under the“czar’s” direction. The czar’s effectiveness and authority is based entirely on his relationship to the president. It is his/her job to take some of the pressure off the president on the issue forwhich he is responsible and to provide truthful responses to the media anddomestic and foreign officials on those issues. The position can be effective only as long as everyone is convinced ofthe “czar’s” integrity and objectivity, and only as long as the czar is content to work in the background.
Although this is far from the solution to the corruption problem, it is the beginning of a solution if the nation’s chief executive truly wants to leave a legacy of honest government, and is prepared to use the full powers of his office and the “bully pulpit” to do so. More than anything, a president needs honest advice – “speaking truth to power” – and someone – other than himself – to tend to all the nuts and bolts required to keep the momentum going in the right direction.
