Increasingly, there are, rumors, chatter, and trial balloons
coming out of Washington suggesting private, back- channel peace talks between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and between Russian President Vladimir Putin and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.  

These rumors are both hopeful and
troublesome.  Hopeful because Ukrainians
yearn for peace. Troublesome because they often portend the up-dated replay of
diplomatic performances known as “Betrayal at Munich.”

Act I always begins with a flurry of
activity – the so-called peace process- and an expectation that the principal
brokers will resolve differences without war and with neither side conceding
the interests of its client states. 

Act II of this script would have the negotiators, with
a grim-faced, unhappy Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in
tow,  taking credit for bringing “peace
in our time.”  

Kissinger had played this
part before when his Vietnam peace treaty proved to be disastrous for America’s
ally.  Kerry also has become proficient
in reciting his line that “the U.S. and the European Union stand with the people of Ukraine.” And President Barack Obama would have sounded a bit more convincing if he
hadn’t constantly denied “lethal” aid to the country to which the U.S. had
promised to stand shoulder-to-shoulder if threatened.

Act III unfolds with blowing of trumpets as the
“peace terms” are announced. 

Ukraine’s Western partners agree to concede some
Ukrainian territorial interests, as well as some “provocative” portions of its
sovereignty (such as the option of entry to NATO).

Putin, for his part, promises, on his
mother’s grave, to withdraw support from the terrorists and thugs he unleashed
on Ukraine, and – with a pained expression –throws in some other dubious
concessions.  And both Europe and the
U.S. sweeten the deal by promising billions to rebuild what Russia destroyed,
and to rescind the most effective sanctions. 

The foregoing, of course, is all speculation – merely a
nightmare that has been replicated much too often in real life. But it is also
a warning to the players  – now acting in
secrecy and back channels – that Ukraine will no longer be scammed as it was in
1994 when it renounced nuclear arms in the Budapest Agreement .

Any “peace process” that has a chance must
start and end with two simple premises:

(1) that the US, Britain, and Russia
guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in exchange for
Ukraine’s nuclear weapons; and

(2) that Russia is the sole aggressor and
violator of international laws and treaties, while Ukraine is the peaceful
victim mugged by a thuggish Kremlin. There is no moral equivalence between the
two.  One is entirely in the right; the
other is entirely in the wrong.

Only if Western negotiators adhere strictly to these two
foundational principles will the peace process yield fair and lasting
results.  Conversely, any attempt at
introducing that favorite western diplomatic euphemism for concession and
compromise – “realpolitik” –  will doom prospects
for peace. 

Western diplomats like to talk of “saving face” and “compromise,” while Russia’s odious regime has core, long-term, strategic interests and
superpower ambitions that form the baseline from which it perceives the world
and measures all concessions.

In
pursuing these goals it may take a step backward, but only if it also intends
taking two steps forward. Ukraine is one of Russia’s core, strategic interests,
and the only way that Russia will back off 
(long enough for Ukraine to stand up to Russia on its own) is if it truly
feels the pain.  We will know the time is
right when Russia – not the U.S. or the E.U. – 
urgently and insistently calls for the “peace process”. 

If U.S. commitments are to carry any weight in the future,
then the Budapest Agreement must be honored to the fullest in any peace
agreement.

Ukraine’s territorial
integrity must be restored and its sovereignty honored.

Until such time as Russia is made to
understand that the U.S. and Britain intend to live up to their agreements and
expect Russia to do likewise, Ukraine must be provided with all the weapons it
needs to level the battlefield in defending itself; its war-degraded economy
must be supported; and sanctions on Russia increased to a level that threaten
Putin’s retention of  power.  Until it becomes clear to that 85 percent of the
Russian population that now support him in his “victory” in Crimea and invasion
of the Donbas that their wretched livelihoods are further endangered, Putin
will rely on traditional Russian chauvinism to carry him through the bumps in
the road. Only when the price of his aggression and destabilization becomes too
costly for him to bear, will Europe enjoy an enduring peace.

George Woloshyn worked in the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan. He is a former naval intelligence commander and former director of U.S. National Security Preparedness and a former director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Security Investigations.