If an enemy country should
believe that it has identified all the key political leaders and their wartime
locations or their means of maintaining control and communication under
degraded war-time conditions, then the enemy will feel much more empowered and
certain of its success. A nation without
leadership is incapable of offering much resistance to an invading force, and
each citizen is left to decide for himself what to do and how to survive. Ukraine
has already experienced the disaster that follows a largely uncoordinated and
unprepared response to the Russian take-over of Crimea. If its military or
civilian leadership had the foresight to understand the danger posed by a large
(potentially) enemy base on its territory, and established action plans and a
chain of command to respond to a break-out, Crimea might have remained under
Ukrainian control. Instead,
communication between Kyiv and Ukrainian military units in Crimea were almost
non-existent or unsecured and each unit had to decide for itself how to react
to the “little green men” at the gate. Unless Ukraine’s National Security
Council drafts or has drafted detailed plans to ensure that both the national
government and local governments know how to react, what resources are available,
and their authorities and responsibilities under war-time conditions, Ukraine –
as in centuries past – will dissolve into local, easily subdued, self-defense
units.
Conversely, a nation that is
over-run by an enemy force but still maintains cohesiveness, leadership, and
hope is much more difficult to subjugate. The Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) is
the best example of this. Even though
the UPA had no safe sanctuaries, no state
support, no stockpiles of armaments, food, or medicines, no means of communication
except through couriers, and was constantly hounded from one village to
another, it continued as a fighting force for years after the fighting in
Europe ended.
Ukraine is facing – at least
in the short term – the reality of an unpredictable and psychopathic Putin,
frustrated by Ukraine’s failure to give in to his bullying and intimidation,
throwing sufficient military forces against Ukraine to take the capital and a
revived version of his “Novo Rossiya”. If that were to happen, he would plan,
first and foremost, to “decapitate” the nation’s top leadership – the
president, the prime minister, the chairman of Parliament, the National
Security Council, etc. The strike would be synchronized so as to capture as
many of Ukraine’s critical communication facilities as possible. A nation without communication is a blinded
nation. And one without recognizably
legitimate surviving leaders devolves into a mob, anarchy, and “otamanschina”.
What this simply means is
that Ukraine must prepare – if it has not done so already – a top secret plan,
known only to a very few of its most loyal and trusted (“need-to-know”)
officials, on the line of succession, covert relocation sites in various parts
of the country (including friendly neighboring states), and critical lines and
means of communication. Bits and pieces of the plan would have to be shared
with key individuals in every region who would be expected to report on
conditions in their area and take pre- planned countermeasures. Caches of critical emergency supplies needed
to sustain a covert command and control network as well as weapons, explosives,
sniper rifles, medical items and other equipment required to maintain an
in-depth partisan homeland defense should be stored in small quantities at
dozens of covert locations throughout the country.
The mere existence of such a
plan and capability serves as a deterrent because the enemy would be forced to
factor into his war plans and calculations the risk and cost of lives and
materiel expended in occupying Ukraine,
and the international revulsion and sanctions that may result from the
bloodshed. A determined partisan resistance under the command of the surviving,
legally constituted political leadership would encourage NATO and the
neighboring countries to re-supply Ukrainian resistance forces and create
nearby sanctuaries and command, control, and communication centers. Unlike the
trickle of arms to Afghan forces through treacherous, mountain passes during
Soviet occupation, resupply of Ukrainian forces could proceed in great quantity
and at great and continuing risk to Russian military and civilian personnel. It
is very probable that a legally constituted government-in-exile would garner
the support and “diplomatic recognition” of friendly powers during the period
of occupation. Ukrainians have already demonstrated – in both world wars and
now in the Donbass – that they will not give up their land or their freedom
easily and that the enemy will have to pay a very heavy price for every
kilometer of Ukrainian soil.
Contingency planning for a
worst-case scenario costs relatively little but is a necessary function for
every government to perform. The mere
existence of a plan and the occasional exercise of its various parts puts an
enemy on notice that the price of its aggression may be far greater than it is
prepared to pay.
