The op-ed can be read here
By way of summary,
we believe that NATO will probably not be able to respond quickly and
convincingly to a surprise attack on any of the member states, and, even if
could, there is no assurance that all members would respond. NATO is untested
and no country should feel entirely safe behind its “red line”.
At present, Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine may relieve
some pressure from other frontline states. However, if it should overwhelm Ukraine, its military capability
will be increased by as much as 50 percent and nothing will then stand in the way of
making good on its threats against Poland, Romania, and the three Baltic states, or
its long-term strategic goal of dominating Europe. So the first and most
important defensive option for Europe is to assist Ukraine to whatever extent
is needed, because its own peace and security is linked with Ukraine’s ability
to hold out militarily and economically. Ukraine is truly carrying the cross
for all of Europe.
But, in addition, the frontline states must take immediate
action to ensure that they, in conjunction with Ukraine, can offer a credible
deterrence to Russian aggression.
No
diplomatic assurances from the White House., no basing of a few hundred NATO troops,
and no rapid reaction force can deter a fast-moving, overpowering military
force of 750,000 soldiers such as Russia’s. The “inconvenient truth” is that Europe and
NATO are unprepared to take on Russia without months of lead time – long after
Russian troops may have occupied the frontline states and appear on Germany’s
border. Even the U.S., with its own
serious economic, financial and domestic problems, declining military power,
and growing isolationist sentiment may not be in a position to affect the outcome.
At the very least, therefore, the frontline states,
including Ukraine, must be ready to hold off any threatened action long enough
until the rest of Europe can mobilize and come to their defense. They may not
be able to defeat the Russians but they don’t have to. They simply must be able to delay Russian
penetration and inflict sufficient early losses on the Russian military so as
to ensure that other NATO members have time to reinforce them .
Almost five years ago, a “Protocol of Intent” was signed by
Defense Ministry officials of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine for the formation
of a joint military brigade consisting of units from each country’s
armies. The trilateral agreement
remained inactive until March of this year when Poland’s Defense Ministry
announced that it was re-launching plans to establish a 4,500-strong brigade,
to “straddle NATO’s eastern border and bring Ukraine’s armed forces closer to
the Western fold.” The brigade is to be
headquartered in Lublin, Poland, though
its military formations will remain in their own countries. This concept of a
combat-ready, multinational, front-line, force (MFF) “straddling NATO’s eastern border” is an
excellent beginning but requires depth, strengthening, and modification.
The protocol anticipates additional frontline participants,
and such states as Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, and Georgia would be
likely to join. Its sole mission must be homeland defense. Its participants would jointly decide on the
size of the total deterrent force (e.g. 250,000) and allocate manageable staffing
and budgeting quotas among themselves to ensure that such a force – based in
their home countries – can be trained and kept at a high state of combat
readiness with pre-assigned and pre-positioned stations, ordnance and
equipment. (Each participating state should be encouraged to regard its
allotment as merely the floor, not the ceiling, of its military
preparedness.) The joint senior staff would be responsible for the preparation of flexible plans for
responding to any serious provocation; the acquisition of advanced,
cross-border weapon, communication, and
intelligence systems; joint exercises and cross-training; and the oversight and
support of the states in meeting their
goals.
The eight frontline states listed above have a combined gross domestic product of more than $1 trillion and a population of 115 million. This presents a very credible counterforce to
Russia’s $2.1 trillion economy and 143 million population. The two “anchor”
states should be Poland and Ukraine: Poland, because of the size of
its economy and population, and its influence with NATO and the EU; and Ukraine
because it has the largest population base, the most combat-experienced
personnel, and a large defense- industrial base.
Although most
frontline states should be able to meet their manpower quotas, the
equipping, arming, and maintenance of combat- ready forces may prove difficult for strapped economies. Local
production of military supplies, and the sharing of facilities, combat
expertise and training, as well as intelligence, communications, and advanced
weapon systems, may reduce those costs very substantially.
Ukraine, for example, inherited one-third of the
USSR’s defense industry including a large and sophisticated complex of 134 production,
engineering, and research and development enterprises employing 120,000 people. However, much of Ukraine’s production would
require modernization in order to compete with Russia’s more advanced and
sophisticated systems. In meeting the
supply and maintenance needs, Ukraine has excellent potential as a
low-cost source for many of the more conventional items that are needed, while,
at the same time, these states can offset Russia’s advantage in more advanced
armaments and systems by acquiring these systems from other NATO countries.
The frontline states of Eastern Europe have one of two
choices: they can live in fear of
Russian aggression and fully entrust their security to NATO; or they can begin
to take control of their fate by developing a strong, joint deterrence, and,
thereby greatly increasing the
likelihood that they will never have to use it.
George Woloshyn worked in the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan. He is a former naval intelligence commander and former director of U.S. National Security Preparedness and a former director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Security Investigations.
