In addition, it should recognize that Russia rarely cedes any ground it has taken (consider the Sakhalin Islands) except through force (consider Afghanistan). And the wars that Russia has lost or won have been mostly through attrition (of one side or the other) rather than through military prowess or enlightened leadership. That is the reality facing Ukraine’s leaders; and unless they implement a military strategy that forces Russia back into its borders, the rest of the world will – despite all the diplomatic blather – accept the facts on the ground.
In certain respects Russia’s new, “21st century” type of war – the “hybrid” war– contains within it the elements of its own defeat: infiltrate, destabilize, recruit local supporters and malcontents, establish puppet “states” and support the whole bloody mess with funds, weapons, strategy, and leadership from across the border.
After a secure base is established, its governance now becomes the responsibility of the aggressor, but without a declaration (or even acknowledgment) of war or war-like intent. In this new hybrid war theaggressor is careful to maintain the fiction of a sympathetic outsider with noultimate commitment to the outcome except peace and “justice” for the “oppressed.” But the hybrid war formatis also the format that allows for OSCE monitoring. and provides a legal framework for 3rd party “peacekeepers.” A traditional, 20th century war does not. More importantly, a victimized nation’s reverted use ofthe hybrid war format against the aggressor would be fully justified asrestoration of its territorial integrity and liberation of its citizens, while entrapping the aggressor in a fiction of his own making.
Ukraine’s positioning of a sizeable, hastily mobilized and trained military force facing Russia’s more advanced and renewable firepower is an appropriate, emergency, prophylactic measure to contain thedamage, but will not – standing alone – withstand the longer term, sustained destructive force of ever-increasing assaults.
We have seen what happened in Debaltseve and in other sectors along the front where Russians concentrated their forces. If (or when) Russia starts supporting land assaults with aerial strikes, Ukrainian forces will be decimated for lack of air cover and defense. Much of this could be mitigated or even averted if Ukraine were to receive the lethal military weapons it seeks, but neither the U.S. nor Europe seem prepared to offer more than token support. Containment and a “frozen conflict” is no solution. It merely impoverishes Ukraine.
Ukraine must force the issue and turn the tables on its enemy by means of a low-intensity, “hybrid war” against the two puppet enclaves. Instead of budgeting for a full-sized, quarter-million-man defensive force (with all the attendant costs of conscription, training, motivation, compensation, discipline, andsupport) Ukrainian leaders should place priority on establishing a large, well-paid, highly selective and motivated volunteer force of superbly trained,equipped, and supported Ukrainian counterparts to the SAS, Navy Seals, Green Berets or Russian Spetsnaz. Although accurate numbers (off the internet) are hard to come by, we estimate that the Russian KSO (Special Operations Command) has between 40-50,000 men, and there is no reason why Ukraine can not match at least the lower end of that range.
Their training would facilitate infiltration into enemy-controlled territory, and (in the words of Mao Zedong) to “move amongst the people like fish swim in the sea.” Their mission would be to disrupt military traffic; stage ambushes on convoys and troop formations; locate and target or destroyordnance depots; conduct reconnaissance and intelligence gathering; assassinate officers and officials with sniper fire; disrupt communications; and, generally, make governance of the enclaves and the cost of aggression intolerable for the Kremlin.
This elite force should be the mainstay- not an adjunct – of Ukraine’s military establishment. While regular military forces are still required to take up defensive positions along the front lines and seal the enemy within the occupied enclave, much of Russia’s offensive capability will have been defused and compromised. Russian advantage intechnology, firepower, reconnaissance and aerial support will have been largely negated. Even a massed, frontal assault against Ukrainian regular forces would expose the Russians to encirclement orcut off of supplies and reinforcements.
As an added benefit, Ukraine is likely to find eager acceptance of, and support for, this new strategy by the frontline states of Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania. They may want to conduct joint training and exercises and share the most advanced individual and unit commando equipment with Ukrainianforces under the supervision of current and former commandos and special operations instructors. Ukraine’s real-world battlefield experience would be invaluable to its neighbors in dealing with their own Russian threats of hybrid war.
Those who had seen the movie “Rambo III” will remember the dialogue between the movie’s heroic commando and the sadistic KGB Col. Zaysen. There may yet be delicious irony in that somefuture Ukrainian “Rambos” may also identify themselves to the Kremlin’s resident KGB colonel with the words: “We are your worst nightmare.”
.
.
