We were lodged at the Hotel Dnipro at a time when the
elevator never stopped on the 2nd floor, and attractive young women
lounged in corridors deep into the night. But our first splash of cold water was upon entering the
large conference hall. The hall was
filled with burly-looking, sleepy-eyed spectators who (allegedly) came to drink
of the heretofore-forbidden, American waters of ethics and public service. As spokesman for the delegation I made the mistake of
providing an overview of how the U.S. Government manages its anti-corruption
programs, including its Inspector General and whistle-blower components. Upon mentioning “whistle blower”, the hall
came alive as one spectator after another accused our small embattled delegation
of maintaining the “stukach” system – the notorious, KGB -enforced practice of
reporting on neighbors, colleagues, and friends.
Two decades later, much has changed.
The audience now
would be a mixture of top civil service administrators, private citizens,
media, and perhaps a parliamentarian or two interested in learning. “Whistle blowing” – its confidentiality,
protection, and due process – would have been seriously discussed as a
significant corruption-fighting option.
And the elevators now stop on the second floor.
I hate to be a skunk at the garden party by taking a
contrarian view of a widely accepted position, but I respectfully differ with
those who insist that “nothing has changed” since the Maidan. Much has changed, and – excepting the devastation
to the economy and the humanitarian catastrophe resulting from Russian
aggression – most of it for the better.
In fact, more progress has been made in improving governance and
fighting corruption the last two years than in the prior 23 years. Admittedly, much of it has been “forced” on
Ukraine by its financial benefactors and western supporters, but there has also
been an acceptance – even by oligarchs – that change is necessary and
inevitable.
How many citizens of Ukraine are aware that there is a
National Reforms Council that developed and approved a strategy and “model” in
2014 and began serious work in 2015? The
model is based on five strategic documents, including the EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement and the IMF- Ukraine Agreement. Its strategic and operational goals are
virtually a text-book model of some of the best practices that have been
successfully applied in breaking corruption’s hold on other societies.
The council has identified, targeted and is now
tracking 18 core areas of public life that are most in need of fundamental
reforms, including corruption, healthcare, the judiciary, education, public
administration, etc. It uses a
sophisticated system of color- coded graphs, charts, and textual material to
list tasks, outcomes, and public perceptions of progress. Every required task
is listed and each is color coded and annotated to show the extent (percentage)
of completion (including timing) and to ensure that responsible parties are
accountable for their specific performance. It even lists what tasks have not
been accomplished and the “measures required to speed up reform progress”.
The council, comprised of top government officials,
including the president, the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, the prime minister, members of parliament, community and business leaders, and
representatives of an international advisory body has met 17 times this past
year and already enacted into laws, regulations, and government documents 73 percent of the 200 decisions approved by the council.
This is an
extraordinary and wide-ranging, transparent document requiring results from, and holding the feet to the fire of,
top officials in government, starting with the president. Even if we were to apply a healthy dose of
skepticism in recognizing that all governments are inclined to do some
“spinning” and “puffery”, the published report, the scope of involvement, and
the minutes of the meetings create a record that – even if partially inflated –
is very impressive and does not allow for much “wiggle room” . We can anticipate that some of these
enactments and resolutions will be watered down in the implementation (e.g. In
the selection of personnel), while others may simply gather dust on a shelf,
but the remainder will have an enormous positive impact on Ukraine’s future –
both in good governance and freedom from corruption. The privileged, ruling elite in every society
will resist changes that threaten it, and Ukrainians can still expect to see
news reports of financial, political and bureaucratic skulduggery, but – in the words of George Herbert’s Jacula
Prudentum – “God’s mill grinds slow but sure”.
The 98- page,
2015 “Reforms Monitoring Progress” report should be required reading for any
critic who seeks to capitalize on the public’s perception that “nothing has
changed.”
I took the time to study in
some detail just two of its most controversial parts: anti-corruption and
Judicial reform. Coverage of measures
that had been taken to reform both of these sectors were comprehensive,
accurate, and very encouraging showing completion rates of 59% and 70%. But the report also noted that no more than
17% and 14% of the general public “perceived” any improvement.
Where is the
disconnect?
Obviously, it is one thing to legislate, fund, establish, recruit, and train an anti-corruption agency
within a one year period, and quite a different thing to see the results of its
investigation and prosecution start bearing fruit. It is one thing to legislate lustration, new
qualification and selection standards and procedures, formation of a
Qualification Commission, and requirement of a “judge’s dossier” and
disciplinary measures, and quite another to await the finding of the Venice
Commission, overcome judicial foot-dragging , and contend with overt resistance
to such changes on grounds of judicial “independence”. We can expect that even more time will pass
before new, better qualified, and better monitored judges are finally in place.
“Public perception” of judicial reform will remain low for a while longer, but the
future looks very bright. Short of arbitrary, authoritative, and extra-legal
measures, are there alternatives?
Perhaps this discrepancy between the administration’s
very impressive reform effort and public perceptions of those efforts requires
greater government and civic attention. The Council, its records, its reports,
and even its opinion surveys are wonderful measuring tools that have been
lacking throughout the controversies and accusations of “stalled” reforms. Now that a self-assessing document that is
both clear and action-oriented has been published, it is time for the media and
civic society to fully grasp it, study its content, check its accuracy and completeness, request
public meetings, and, through a representative civic group, sit at the table
and introduce proposals and comments for open deliberation and resolution.
This, more than any protest meetings with posters and bullhorns in front of the
presidential administration, is the constructive and effective way of moving
forward.
And perhaps, the wide gap of mistrust between the
government and the people will be markedly reduced….to the great
disappointment of Mr. Putin, his cronies, and his Western supporters.
Report: reforms.in.ua/sites/default/files/upload/brochura_eng.pdf
