The issue of a European Union membership perspective for Ukraine is central to the young democracy’s foreign relations and domestic development. At least, this is what many members of Kyiv’s political and intellectual elite believe.
The prospect of becoming a fully accepted “member of the European family” was, in the opinion of many in both the West and East, critical for Central European as well as Baltic countries in the 1990s. It was a major driving force in the quick transition of these post-totalitarian states into the largely liberal democracies that they are today.
Ukraine has been lacking this incentive for comprehensive democratization and effective state-building so far. The EU has adopted a position towards Ukraine that is more or less vague.
With the announcement of the composition of Germany’s future cabinet on Oct. 24, there has emerged a chance that the EU’s approach towards Ukraine may become clearer. In the coming four years, the Ukraine may be provided with an opportunity to improve its standing as a possible future candidate for EU membership.
As had been expected since the results of the Bundestag elections in late September, the head of the economically right-wing and politically liberal Free Democratic Party, Guido Westerwelle, was appointed as the Federal Republic’s future vice chancellor and also foreign minister.
The Free Democratic Party is the only German party that has clearly stated that Ukraine may one day have the option to apply for EU membership. The respective passage in the European and German parliamentary election programs of the party says: “The states of the western Balkans have a medium- to long-term perspective to join the EU – a position supported by the Free Democratic Party. In the long run, this also applies to Ukraine.”
It needs to be added that, while Germany is important, it is only one of the 27 members formulating EU foreign policies. Moreover, with the creation of the EU’s foreign service after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the influence of national ministries on international affairs will decline. And it remains to be seen what position the new EU foreign minister will take towards Ukraine.
Germany’s system of rule is a “chancellor’s democracy,” meaning that the Federal Republic’s head of government, Angela Merkel, determines the main directions in all areas, including foreign policy. Merkel represents Germany’s Christian Democratic Union, which has been more ambivalent on Ukraine’s possible entry into the EU.
The position of the Christian Democratic Union’s Bavarian sister party and third government coalition partner, the Christian Social Union, can be said to be anti-Ukrainian: In spite of Munich’s close relations with Kyiv, the Christian Social Union’s political program implies that, among other countries, Ukraine has no EU membership perspective whatsoever.
Ukraine, moreover, is not a burning issue in either German or European Union external affairs. Finally, in Germany like in other countries, electoral party programs do not always reflect what party functionaries do after receiving jobs in the government.
It is, thus, not clear what the partial change of staff and policy line in the German cabinet will mean for Ukraine. Still, even a short line within a long political program, like the one sentence on Ukraine in the Free Democratic Party’s official agenda, is not a trivial phenomenon. The party program is first and foremost a statement of individual preferences of party leaders. As the program has been collectively formulated and democratically approved by the Free Democratic Party’s elected organs, it gains a weight of its own. Ukraine may be one of the last issues currently on Westerwelle’s mind.
However, both Ukrainian political leaders and pro-Ukrainian civic actors in the West, now have the opportunity to mention the respective sentence of the Free Democratic Party’s European and national electoral programs when discussing Ukraine’s future with Westerwelle.
There is another twist in this plot that is lucky for Ukraine. Apart from the foreign service, the Free Democratic Party also received the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in the new coalition government that administers most of Germany’s foreign aid programs, including those related to Ukraine. The Free Democratic Party’s general secretary, Dirk Niebel, will be heading this ministry. Whatever the particular circumstances of these decisions, Kyiv will now have two institutional partners in Germany’s government who are headed by politicians presumably in favor of eventual EU membership for Ukraine.
Andreas Umland is assistant professor of contemporary East European history at The Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt in Bavaria (http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland), and general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society.” (http://www.ibidem-verlag.de/spps.html).
