In his inaugural speech, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy invited Ukrainians living abroad to return to their historic homeland. As someone who did this in 2015, I feel that my experience could be instructive for a new generation of reformers and expats wishing to return.
In May 2015, President Petro Poroshenko sent his friend, ex-Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, to see if he could sort out Odesa Oblast, the country’s most corrupt region. Shortly after, I accepted an invitation by Saakashvili to join him. By the time we all got together in the lovely Black Sea port city of 1 million people, we had an interesting mix of Georgian reformers, technocrats, Ukrainian volunteers and expats.
When we came to Odesa, few of us knew what we were getting into or how this would unfold. We came on a promise to rid Odesa of a trio of plagues: economic stagnation, corruption and mafia. Poroshenko pledged his full support. The place, personalities and events made us an interesting group to watch.
Smugglers’ haven
Odesa has historically been a smugglers’ haven. Writers such as Isaac Babel wrote about the exploits of Jewish gangsters, thieves and crime lords.
That romanticized picture has given way to sophisticated crime syndicates, which use the city’s sprawling port to their advantage. Odesa quickly became a key hub in post-Soviet global trafficking networks – moving anything from Europe-bound Afghan heroin arriving from the Caucasus, to the Africa-bound Soviet arms. The local groups, known for being secretive and brutal, often operate in collaboration with Russian and other international mafia gangs.
Personal ties
I had personal ties to the city and had some insight into the Odesa underworld through my father, a retired officer of the Security Service of Ukraine, or SBU. He led the agency in Odesa Oblast, where a number of SBU agents were assassinated by the gang. The agency itself has been heavily penetrated and exploited by criminal syndicates. Other than drugs and arms, the gang has been involved in protection rackets, loan sharking, murder-for-hire and the fuel tax fraud rackets. By the time we got there, it had converted its economic powers into a firm grip over the city’s politicians, media and infrastructure.
Against this backdrop, having exiles and foreigners led by Saakashvili drive the change in Odesa seemed like a good approach. We had no vested interest in the old system and had nothing to lose. We had quickly identified five key strategies: eradicate corruption at the regional administration; improve the life of citizens by building new roads and assisting the administrative processes; bring proper governance to the port; remove mafia from political power; and propose legislative changes. Being new to the city held some major disadvantages for us: we did not know whom to trust from the locals, many of whom have been changing sides during previous revolutions, had controversial reputations, dubious sources of wealth or simply were not willing to partake in our risky political expedition.
Challenging mafia’s grip
I was picked to lead the package of reforms and to challenge the mafia’s political grip on power by running for mayor of Odesa.
We used the Georgian experience and fairly quickly prepared the reform package. I presented it to the president and his team. It included draft legislation and initiatives in several areas: civil service; labor relations; simplified public service delivery; deregulation; transparent privatization; a new tax and customs system; and an economic freedom act that would cap government spending, debt and budget deficits. Tese proposals aimed to simplify procedures, withdraw government from involvement in the economy, and restrict public spending.
It was not possible to set a flat tax system just for Odesa, nor can a regional governor decide that 80 percent of Ukraine’s state assets or land should be put up for sale. So, this was our national agenda. We felt we could not achieve the desired results in Odesa unless we did so in the context of nationwide reform.
Such a plan would be radical and difficult to implement in any country. In Ukraine, where the state has been set to enrich those setting the rules, it was almost impossible. We wanted the plan adopted quickly. Poroshenko was dragging his feet. The expectation and the agreement with him were that he will take it through the National Reforms Council, and then to the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament.
None of that had ever happened. Aall our initiatives died.
Dark side of politics
In parallel to promoting the plan, I ran for mayor of Odesa. This is when I came across the dark side of Ukrainian politics: election fraud and manipulation. Odesa politics have been dirty historically. The electoral system and practices are built for mischief. Even though the exit polls had suggested that a runoff was likely and election observers reported evidence of many violations, the Odesa City Electoral Commission moved quickly to announce that the incumbent, Hennady Trukhanov, received 51.93 percent of the vote— just enough to avoid a runoff election. Poroshenko, local civic organizations, opposition parties and the Ukrainian media did not question the results. They had done nothing to stop, challenge or investigate the irregularities. I was second place and disputed the results in the Odesa courts, bringing video and other materials demonstrating falsification by the mayor’s supporters. Before the courts heard the case, Trukhanov took office, and the courts were laughing at us when we finally got there.
Presidential sabotage
For anything: funding, vital appointments, our reform package, the port initiatives or the road construction we had to turn the president, his team and the Cabinet of Ministers. And they had put us on a full red-tape circle, sabotaging our efforts. In the meantime, the media, controlled by them and by the Ukrainian oligarchs, disrupted, harassed and tried to damage our reputation. Poroshenko’s pledges and public support were hypocritical. All you had to do was look at how long it was taking for our proposals to be processed, for the nominations to get through and for the budget to get approved.
He was using politics as an excuse to bash our initiatives and hobble our team.
Mexican standoff
The problem in Ukraine is that whatever you touch you have a Mexican standoff, where everyone has something on everyone else. When there is a systemic threat, such as a reformist agenda, everyone concentrates their firepower on the source of that threat. When it is eliminated, they go back to their familiar business. At that time Saakashvili and our team of newcomers were that threat. It was hard for us to break this governance.
Our affair with Odesa lasted for just over a year. We had failed to deliver on most of our promises. What we managed to accomplish was mainly through the generous aid of Western donors. By the time we left, several of us were stripped of our Ukrainian citizenship. Some were threatened with or even faced criminal investigation.
My reform agenda was over by mid-2016. By that time, I was forcefully thrown out by two thugs from an Odesa City Hall meeting where I tried to challenge mafia’s grip on power in the city. Some of my team members were beaten and some aides had their cars burnt. No investigation followed.
What about Zelenskiy?
In May 2016, I left public service and, several months later, Poroshenko stripped me of my Ukrainian citizenship. Many from our team followed a similar path. Yulia Marushevska’s efforts to reform the port were the last to die. She exited amid threats of criminal prosecution. Our team dispersed and Saakashvili turned from Poroshenko’s friend to his bitter enemy, which ended in his infamous deportation.
It is not clear how Zelenskiy fits into this system that we tried to undermine in 2015. He may be a perfect outsider capable of seriously challenging it.
If so, soon he will be under some serious fire. In which case, anyone who wishes radical changes in Ukraine needs to support him. He may also be receiving support from some people representing the system. In this case, it will be hard for him to bring about the changes he is declaring to pursue.
With reforms, it is just like with a revolution: one never knows how they may unfold and who lands where.
Sasha Borovik is a Munich-based attorney and technology entrepreneur. In 2015, Borovik served as first deputy minister of economy and then deputy governor of Odesa Oblast until 2016.
