After the manipulated elections to
Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada in October, Brussels’ relations with Kyiv are in
deadlock. Ukraine is not fulfilling the conditions for signing the already
initialed association agreement with the European Union.
Against this background, we outline
an eight-point plan of further and alternative actions.
We recommend:
(1) a clearer EU statement on the
preconditions for signing the association agreement;
(2) leaking the agreement’s text;
(3) signing association agreements
with Moldova and Georgia;
(4) offering these two countries
conditional EU membership perspectives;
(5) accelerating the visa
liberalization process with Ukraine;
(6) supporting current Ukrainian
efforts at sectoral approximation with the EU;
(7) engaging with some of Ukraine’s oligarchs;
and
(8) creating a Ukrainian research and
information center. We conclude with a brief reminder on the geopolitical
relevance of Ukraine.
In
summer this year, Ukraine and the European Union finally initialed a
far-reaching association agreement.
Apart
from paving the way for a close political association between Kyiv and
Brussels, this unique treaty text includes extensive provisions for a deep and comprehensive
free trade area.
If
signed, ratified and implemented, the association agreement – the EU’s largest
ever treaty with a non-member state – would make Ukraine part and parcel of the
European integration process. The agreement would put the relations between
Kyiv and Brussels on entirely new grounds, and provide for a comprehensive “Europeanization”
of Ukraine’s economy, political system, and public administration. It could one
day be seen as having been the first step towards a full membership of Ukraine
in the EU.
In
view of how the Ukrainian parliamentary elections of Oct. 28 went, the
prospects of signing the association agreement anytime soon look now, however, dim.
After
the last EU-Ukraine Summit of December 2011, Brussels had repeatedly made clear
that the quality of these elections will be decisive for the future of the EU-Ukraine
relationship.
Two
further conditions, namely ending selective justice against political
opposition leaders, and implementing the reform priorities – above all legal
reforms – outlined in the bilateral association agenda were also voiced.
Yet
the vague language and cautious communication of these conditions indicated
that the EU also wanted to leave some room for maneuver in case not all of them
would be fully met.
Unfortunately,
however, extensive manipulations took place both before electionday and during
the counting and tabulation of votes. This led the deputy head of Ukraine’s
Central Electoral Commission Zhanna Usenko-Chernaia to admit that the October
poll was the “dirtiest [parliamentary] election in the history of
independent Ukraine.”
This
leaves little freedom of action for Brussels ahead of the foreign ministers
meeting where the fate of the association agreement and future of the EU’s
policy towards Ukraine is to be discussed.
What
should the EU do now?
Below,
we present a list of concrete steps that the EU should consider undertaking
soon. We are here not repeating general calls for more support of civil society
initiatives, closer people-to-people relations or intensifying academic
exchange.
These
suggestions are valid, to be sure. They also have they been made before. They
will also take effect only in the mid or long term. What is needed are urgent
steps that have the potential to re-intensify EU-Ukraine relations, in the
short run. We therefore suggest to:
1. Set out, in a single and clearly
formulated written document, the conditions Ukraine has to fulfill for the EU
to sign the association agreement.
So far, there has been a cacophony
of EU representatives’ statements on this issue, including in writing. As a
result, it is unclear what exactly Brussels
expects from Kyiv in order to make association and free trade between EU and Ukraine feasible.
The
exact formulation and mode of communication of these conditions are important. Such
a document should reiterate the EU’s commitment to association and outline
priority reform areas which are prevalent, in the short-term perspective. These
could be human rights and fundamental freedoms, the functioning of the judiciary
and public procurement procedures, as well as the business climate. Those are
areas which have seen significant deterioration, but in which acts of political
will could also bring swift improvement.
The
issue of selective justice is more sensitive and requires special attention. On
the one hand, the EU cannot simply ignore the fact that the leaders of
political opposition are still in prison.
On
the other hand, this condition might never be fulfilled and the EU-Ukraine relations
will be stuck indefinitely.
We
suggest that the EU mentions in the document that Ukraine should ensure that
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are implemented (the revelant
cases are under the ECHR consideration) without further specifications and continue
pressuring Ukraine’s authorities on this issue via diplomatic channels.
The
EU’s statement has to be made public and be presented as an appeal to the
society as much as to the political elites. In that way, such a document could
become a common reference point and instrument of domestic advocacy for various
civic and political actors in Ukraine.
2. Leak the text of the association agreement
– preferably, its Ukrainian-language version – to the public.
So
far, the EU’s offer has been a pig in the poke: There is much talk about the
treaty, yet very few people have ever seen it. To be sure, the agreement’s text
is reportedly very long, heavy reading, and full of technical terms. It is not
to be expected that millions of Ukrainians will start examining the text when
it becomes freely available.
Yet,
once leaked, journalists, politicians, business people, lawyers and academics will
start reading and analyzing those sections that interest, and could become
relevant to, them. While, perhaps, being fully studied by only very few
Ukrainian experts, the published agreement text may, as a reference point and
quotations source, substantially change Ukrainian public discourse about
European integration and Ukraine’s role in it.
3. Sign and ratify the association agreements
with Moldova and Georgia once negotiations are concluded, and do not wait for
Ukraine.
This way, the EU would kill two birds at once:
First, Brussels will show that its announced more-for-more principle does indeed
apply which should strengthen the credibility of its Eastern Partnership
policy.
Second,
an EU association with Moldova and Georgia will embarrass the current Ukrainian
leadership, in the eyes of Ukraine’s pro-European elites, if not parts of the
population at large.
Ukraine
had, under President Viktor Yushchenko, been the first country to start association
negotiations with the EU in 2007.
If
now, however, Moldova and Georgia get agreements that have been modeled on the
Ukrainian one, and start implementing, as well as benefiting from, them, this
would further undermine the legitimacy of Yanukovych’s erratic foreign and
domestic policies.
Obviously,
in the case of Georgia, signing the Association Agreement should be made
dependent on Prime Miister Bidzina Ivanishvili’s continuation of democratic
reform policies, and strict observation of the rule of law.
4. Consider giving Moldova and possibly
Georgia a conditional and long-term, yet, nevertheless, unambiguous EU membership
perspective.
Indicate
that such offers may be made to other Eastern Partnership countries which respect
common values and show adequate political will, in the future too.
This
way, Ukraine’s elite and society may finally understand that there is a real
chance to join, one day, the EU – if and only if Ukraine starts implementing substantive
reforms.
Today,
there are many people, even in the Ukrainian experts community, who do not
believe that Brussels will ever give Ukraine a serious chance to try entering
the EU.
Explicit
future accession prospects for Moldova or/and Georgia, however, will be seen as
an implicit membership perspective for Ukraine too – without binding Brussels,
in any way.
5. Accelerate the visa liberalization
process as much as possible. In a first step, the European
Parliament should, sooner rather than later, ratify the already agreed
amendments to the visa facilitation agreement.
Second,
the EU member states’ consulates should become more customer-oriented. The EU’s
current restrictive visa policies hurt ordinary Ukrainians.
These
policies’ often arbitrary implementation in many consulates across Ukraine has
already heavily discredited the EU in the eyes of tens of thousands of
Ukrainians.
The
EU consulates’ complicated visa application rules, heavy processing fees, and
sometimes inconsistent, if not ridiculous decision-making on travel or work
permits contrast sharply with Russia’s liberal migration regime with Ukraine.
Oddly,
the EU consulates’ policies are frequently slowing down and, sometimes, even hindering
Ukrainian-EU cooperation aiming to promote those reforms that Brussels is
expecting to accelerate.
Third,
the EU should reiterate that entirely visa-free travel will become reality once
Ukraine has implemented the reform program outlined in the visa liberalization action
plan.
6. Support Ukraine’s approximation efforts
in those sectors that are important for the future association agreement and
where no resistance from particularistic interests to their execution already
today exists.
Down-to-earth
technical standards will, in any way, have to be implemented at some point. If
it is possible to move forward already now without yet having the official
framework of the association agreement, the opportunity to achieve instant progress
should be grasped.
Energy
cooperation requires special attention. East European energy security,
diversification and savings as well as modernization of Ukraine’s gas
transportation system should be the EU’s particular focus for the next years. Concurrently,
implementation of the Russian South Stream project in the Black
Sea – aimed at devaluing Ukraine’s major strategic asset,
her pipelines network – should be prevented.
7. Engage more actively with some of
Ukraine’s so-called oligarchs.
Politics in Ukraine is, like in other
post-Soviet states, a two-level game: What is happening in the public domain is
only the tip of the iceberg of what is going on under the carpet.
Often
substantive decisions in Ukraine are predetermined behind the scenes by actors
who may not hold any significant official posts, but control significant parts
of Ukraine’s gross domestic product.
These
oligarchs include a variety of personalities – some of whom are more dubious,
and some less so.
With
a selected circle of the latter, the EU should seek a dialogue concerning what
the EU wants from the Ukrainian government, and what the association agreements
means for Ukraine’s economy.
More
communication with some of Ukraine’s grey cardinals could facilitate closer
relations in the official realm. Yet, the EU needs to make sure that such
communication is not perceived as an attempt on the part of the EU to support
non-transparent structures in Ukraine. We only suggest diversifying channels of
communication with Ukraine
to include actors who might be interested in bringing Ukraine closer
to the EU.
8. Create a Ukraine research and
information center providing competent political, economic, social and legal
consulting, on current Ukrainian affairs.
This
center could be publishing a weekly analytical bulletin as well as a monthly or,
at least, bimonthly specialized journal on Ukrainian politics, business,
history, society etc. Such a center may also hold annual conventions, monthly expert
round-tables, irregular public conferences, or occasional press conferences which
would bring together academic researchers, policy analysts, journalists, social
activists, and decision-makers dealing with Ukraine.
Much
of what went wrong in the EU’s policies towards Ukraine over the last 20 years
has to do with the shockingly scant knowledge, across Europe, about the territorially
largest European country.
Even
high-level bureaucrats in European foreign ministries, chief administrators in
major international organizations, influential journalists in leading media
outlets, or policy experts in top notch think-tanks often operate with common
places, stereotypes, and travesties when it comes to Ukraine.
No
European country has a center equivalent to the Harvard Ukrainian Research
Institute in Massachusetts, or the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies in
Alberta. Europe needs at least one analytical center
that regularly produces and publishes topical investigations and in-depth
research, on contemporary Ukraine.
While such a center could also be partially or fully financed by the Ukrainian
side, it should be made sure that its scholarly competence, professional
reputation, distance to particularistic interests, and position above politics
are beyond any doubt.
If
implemented swiftly and simultaneously, these measures could produce tangible
results in EU-Ukraine relations within a relatively short period of time, e.g.
within the next three to five years.
They
would not cost the EU much, but could strengthen domestic pressure in Ukraine
on the current authorities that resist reforms, improve mutual perception
between the EU and Ukraine, and
consequently change the atmosphere in relations between Kyiv and
Brussels. Ukraine
is a pivotal country in the creation of a new transatlantic security structure.
If Ukraine’s
transformations is successful, this will have positive effects across the
post-Soviet space and in the Black Sea area.
Should the Ukrainian state-building process fail, the repercussions would be
felt far beyond Ukraine’s current borders.
Iryna
Solonenko is a Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (German Academic
Exchange Service) researcher of European Union Eastern policies at the European
University Viadrina of Frankfurt/Oder, Germany, and project leader of the
European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries (www.eap-index.eu).
Andreas Umland is a Deutscher
Akademischer Austausch Dienst (German Academic Exchange Service) senior lecturer
in European studies at the National University of KyivMohyla Academy and
general editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and
Society” (www.ibidem-verlag.de/spps.html).
