The key point of contention between the two sides is whether Ukraine’s political system should be based on a “federal” or “decentralized” model.
From the beginning of the crisis, Moscow pushed for a “federal” model, which, as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov explained in March 2014, meant each region in Ukraine would possess its own “economics, finance, culture, language, education, foreign economy and cultural ties with neighboring countries or regions.”
Most recently, Russia reportedly laid out a more extreme position that clearly envisions using the separatist-controlled areas as trojan horses to provide Moscow a veto over Ukraine’s ambitions to join key Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union.
Unfortunately for Kyiv, the semantics of “federalization” versus “decentralization” can cause confusion for many, especially in the United States.
Federalization is not a dirty word in the United States. When Americans hear the word “federalization” they immediately think of their own system of governance – one which has served their country well for over 230 years.
Looking beyond the semantics, an American system of governance arguably fits Ukraine’s post-Maidan requirements perfectly.
In the United States, powers are split between Washington and each one of the country’s 50 states. Each state directly elects its own governor – surely an improvement over the current Ukrainian model where the president appoints regional leaders.
Second, all levels of government in the United States— national, state and local — possess their own tax and budget authority, and each level of government collects taxes directly. While the federal government does make some transfer payments to states, states are not required to transfer any money back to Washington. This would also be an ideal model for Ukraine’s regions, as it would ensure significant amount of local control over spending.
Third, each state and city in the United States retains full authority over a variety of local issues – including education, criminal and civil law, social issues such as abortion or gun control, and even symbolic cultural concerns such as statues and state flags.
American states are often called “laboratories of democracy,” and evince huge differences in many of their budgetary and social policies. As an example, just ask any American how different politics in Massachusetts and Texas actually are. Texas has no income tax, strict anti-abortion laws, numerous statues of southern rebels from the United States’ Civil War and its own distinct educational system and school textbooks. Massachusetts, by contrast, often receives the moniker “Taxachusetts,” has liberal abortion laws and very different cultural symbols and educational values. Not surprisingly, Texans tend to vote overwhelmingly Republican, while Massachusetts’ leans largely Democratic.
At the same time, however, the United States’ federal government is still immensely powerful. Washington collects almost $3 trillion per year in taxes, and the federal government maintains full control over all defense and foreign policy, as well as maintaining a monopoly on monetary power through the central bank. No state can join any foreign alliance on its own, nor could it enact a separate trade treaty with any foreign government.
While Ukraine need not completely imitate the United States, none of the three basic characteristics of the American political structure are deleterious for Ukraine’s broader sovereignty. The central government in Kyiv would remain in control of Ukraine’s foreign, defense and economic destinies, while local regions could emerge as Ukrainian “laboratories of democracy” while still not impacting Ukraine’s broader sovereignty. Indeed, as Kyiv Post contributor Paul Niland points out, delegating decision-making on key issues to the local level would allow a new generation of politicians to emerge in Ukraine. As in the United States, empowering Ukraine’s regions could allow Ukrainian versions of Barak Obama or young Republican Presidential candidate Marco Rubio – both of whom rose from their state legislatures – to emerge in Ukraine. These types of fresh faces are exactly what Ukraine requires to continue pushing genuine reforms in Kyiv.
Turning to any negotiations over the implementation of Minsk II, the foregoing might offer guidance for Ukraine. For one thing, it allows Kyiv’s negotiations with their Russian counterparts to focus on the constitutional amendments’ substance – and their concomitant effect on Ukraine’s governance system – rather than falling into the semantic rabbit hole of “federalization” versus “decentralization.”
Moreover, pointing to the United States’ political system as a model also simplifies the argument for a broader American audience in Washington. The United States remains Ukraine’s most important ally by far, and referring to an “American model” crystalizes exactly what Kyiv wants to achieve in a way that Washington’s politicians and pundits can intuitively understand. As Kyiv will likely continue to rely on the United States for both political and economic support, any strategy allowing Ukraine to align itself with “American values” can only help Kyiv.
In sum, Kyiv should focus on substance over semantics – and do so by hewing as closely to its American ally as possible.
Josh Cohen is a former U.S. State Department project officer involved in managing economic reform projects in the former Soviet Union. He works for an information technology company and contributes to a number of media outlets. Follow him on Twitter: @jkc_in_dc.
