Perceptions are incredibly important, and that is why the recent announcements that Ukraine has created, not one, but two information security centers should be greeted with enthusiasm. The news also calls for caution and expertise of the highest level.
Russia’s weaponization of (social) media, opaque funding of lobbyists, businesses, civil society groups and poignantly placed academicians expertly manipulate public perceptions in favor of Russia’s geopolitical strategy. The seriousness of the threat posed by the Kremlin’s disinformation channels had long been ignored or disregarded as conspiracy. This all started to change when experts began realizing the Kremlin’s aggressive psychological operations effectively facilitated the illegal annexation of Crimea, the war in Ukraine’s east, and targeted the stability of Western democracies. Today, NATO, the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States all acknowledge these facts and have created special centers to address this hybrid threat.
In Ukraine, the National Security and Defense Council has only recently started working openly and consequentially in the interests of Ukraine’s internal security. By promoting the sanctioning of Russian operatives, their media and contraband channels, it is exposing and culling the power of Kremlin’s fifth-column in Ukraine; long recognized as the key threat to Ukrainian statehood. This is why the creation of information security centers in Ukraine should also be welcomed.
One of the centers, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, falls under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy and is headed by Liubov Tsybulska. The other center, the Center Counteracting Disinformation was created by the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of March 11, 2021, was put into effect by Presidential Decree No. 106/2021 of March 19. Its newly appointed head, Polina Lysenko, is a recent post-graduate lawyer. She had been the director of the Department of Information Policy and Public Relations at Ukrzalyznytsia, Ukraine’s state railway company since August 2020. Lysenko is quoted as announcing the new body’s mandate is countering threats to national security and national interests of Ukraine in the information field, to combating propaganda, destructive disinformation influences and campaigns, and preventing manipulation of public opinion.
This very tall order requires clear definitions, sound methodologies, expert analysis and coordination. Contrary to what many may argue about democracy, the freedom of speech is not an absolute right. Its limitation by the state is not only a national security prerogative, it is an obligation. In the past, however, The European Court of Human Rights was forced to rule against countries, who in their fight against Russian propaganda failed to provide adequate legal mechanisms, detailed reason and identification as to which materials threatened their national security and territorial integrity.
This is why it is crucial for Ukraine to break away from its populist track record which threatens to convert these centers into instruments that protect and promote the self-interest of political leaders. Any lack of coordination, professionalism, strategic programming or curricula will impact the centers capacity and capability to properly categorize and map information warfare operations. Even with the proper professionalism and technologies, Ukraine’s outdated 1992 media legislation stands to hamper the efficacy of these centers because Ukraine still lacks the requisite legislative environment to combat misinformation.
Information security is directly related to the most pivotal parts of national security. That is why Ukraine must ensure the success of its anti-propaganda centers. To this end, four main tasks must be accomplished.
First, the activities of the centers must align with Ukraine’s Strategic Defense, Development and National Security strategies using a results-based management system in strategic aims and the mandate of the centers are reflected in the key performance indicators of their employees. Second, recognizing Ukraine will never reach the budget Russia has set aside for its information warfare, innovative methodology and technology must be compared, contrasted and updated to suit Ukraine’s reality. This is where cooperation with NATO centers in Estonia and Latvia should be complemented by a partnership with the private IT sector as well as the European Union’s new Cyber Competence Center. Third, the centers must engage the public to the highest extent possible. All levels of society, both local and external must be taught to recognize aggressive information attacks. Effective curricula must be developed in this regard. Finally, Ukraine’s leaders must draft and adopt legislation against fake news and systematic information campaigns which target its national security.
With Russia’s increasingly Machiavellian behavior, the individuals employed by these centers carry a great responsibility. Ukraine’s national security and territorial integrity may very well depend on their success.
Lada Roslycky is the founder and managing partner of Black Trident, LLC.
