One of the reasons for
restarting the military operation was the killing of 27 Ukrainian soldiers during 10 days of
ceasefire agreed in June. It must be remembered that in the last two months
Ukrainians in Donbas were dying at a minimum rate of 45 people, including 15
Ukrainian soldiers, a day. The cost of
war in terms of loss of life will always be greater than that during a ceasefire
no matter how fragile that ceasefire is. This does not even take into
consideration massive infrastructure destruction and committed resources to
conduct a military campaign.
Most importantly, the
Ukrainian government’s decision to wage war in Donbas turned out to be a major
strategic blunder. Some battles were won but war was lost.
For some bizarre
reasons, the Ukrainian military hawks failed to plan for the Russian military
intervention.
Unreasonably so, they hoped for the best outcome – a quick
military victory over the insurgents, Russian President Vladimir Putin passively watching his rebels
pulverized by the Ukrainian army and the West extending help to Ukraine beyond its
limited sanctions, intelligence sharing and nonlethal aid.
Neither of these
best-case scenarios undergirding the Ukrainian military campaign in Donbas had
eventually materialized. This
astonishing naiveté of the Ukrainian military and political establishment
reminded me of the Polish commanders’ decision to take on the German army in
Warsaw, in August 1944.
Like Ukrainians with regard to Putin, Poles bet that Josef Stalin and its army positioned that time on the other bank of the river Vistula
would act somehow in Poles’ interest while the West would come with
military assistance. This naiveté cost 200,000 lives and the capital city levied
to the ground – during just about the same period – 63 days – as Ukraine’s military summer campaign. At least in terms of
self-preservation, Ukrainians scored better than Poles but that is of course
nothing to be boastful about.
In my earlier piece published in Kyiv Post on July 2 after Ukraine’s military campaign was re-launched, I warned “As long as the borders [with Russia] remain porous
the Ukrainian army is likely to be kept at bay if not defeated in a protracted
conflict.” I wrote that Ukraine would then face the same defeat that awaited
NATO in Afghanistan with open borders with Pakistan. The difference was that
the Ukrainian army was not NATO while “separatists in eastern Ukraine with
Russia’s help can in fact become militarily stronger than the Taliban ever
were.”
I also emphasized that it was Russia and rebels that wanted war in
Donbas and asked why would Ukrainians want to give Kremlin what it really desired
– war – and why would they want to play the violent game in which Putin held and
still holds a clear advantage? Right now we know the answer. The Ukrainian
military strategy seems to have relied on unfounded hope that Putin would not
use his war skills – and this was after Putin had already sent his military to
take over part of Ukraine – Crimea. Myopia to say the least.
I
also wrote that given “the previous experience of the military operation [in
April and May], thousands are likely to die and hundreds of thousands will
become refugees in the current phase.” With more civilians being killed during the anti-terrorist campaign “the greater the hatred … among the locals towards their supposed
liberators.” Finally, I warned that the first victim of the war would be
Ukraine’s democracy.
Sadly,
my predictions turned out to be based on more sound strategic estimate of the
outcome of a violent campaign in the circumstances at hand than that of the
Ukrainian political and military establishment.
What
we see now reflects what I wrote then or perhaps worse. Ukraine’s control over
Donbas is even more tenuous than it was two months ago, there are now many more
Russian troops in Donbas than they ever were before, morale of the Ukrainian
army sank while rebels’ skyrocketed, thousands died, a humanitarian crisis is in
full swing, those who remain in Donbas are as divided in their loyalties to
Ukraine as ever before and the Ukrainian government did enact war laws that
human rights organizations decried as undermining democratic
rules and civic liberties.
Because
of many lives that were lost in Donbas people would believe that too much blood
had already been spilled to give up now. For them the struggle over Donbas could
become even more existential than it ever was. They would be vocal about
restarting military campaign.
Every time, such voices are heard there must be
some brave Ukrainians that would stand up and ask pointed questions – What are
the costs? What are the risks? What are the worst case scenarios and how well
Ukraine and Ukrainians themselves are prepared for them? What are the prospects
of victory? What will that victory look like? How can we consolidate democracy
and reform economy while, at the same time, waging war? Finally, what are the
alternatives short of armed campaign that we can and should consider? And
finally, what political resistance
behavior
can we encourage in places like Crimea where it is at least clear Ukraine does
not have military options?
Perhaps once the same is realized for Donbas, the
warfare strategy could finally shift away from a simplistic logic of how many
enemies are killed to more sophisticated strategizing for a long term,
protracted struggle that Donbas is bound to become – of how many hearts and
minds of locals and Russians can be won over. The type of questions will
influence the type of thinking about appropriate strategies and tactics.
Maciej
Bartkowski teaches civil resistance in Krieger School of Arts and Science at
Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C. and is the editor of Recovering Nonviolent History.
Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles. The views expressed here
are his own. He can be followed on Twitter @macbartkowski
