The narrow victory of a Russian-leaning opposition leader, Victor Yanukovych, in the Ukrainian presidential election on Feb. 7 is less of his making, but rather the orange camp’s failure to unite and deliver on their promises. As the only alternative to the discredited incumbents, Yanukovych was destined to become a Ukrainian president “by default.”
Normally, the margin of 3.5 percent — well above 800,000 votes – and no fraud reported by the international observers would be sufficient to crown a new ruler. But not in this case.
Many in Ukraine question the legitimacy of Yanukovych’s pyrrhic victory with his 48.95 percent of votes versus Tymoshenko’s 45.47 percent.
In fact, support for the leader of the Party of Regions did not increase. He lost hundreds of thousands of votes since the last presidential election in 2004. Yanukovych did not manage to secure the absolute majority of votes in the runoff, unlike all previous Ukrainian presidents. More than a million votes were actually cast for the option “against all” that was available on the ballot just below Yanukovych and Tymoshenko’s names.
Ukrainians did not have their heroes in this election. Instead they knew precisely who to vote against. Those underdogs were the current president, Victor Yushchenko, and the prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, former Orange Revolution allies and bitter enemies ever since.
Yushchenko was humiliated, ending up with just over 5 percent of votes, nowhere near the 52 percent he garnered in 2004. Tymoshenko’s disappointing result in the first round of election, 10 percentage points behind the opposition leader, left her with little hope of winning the runoff.
While Orange leaders were rejected by Ukrainians, the Orange Revolution was not. Yanukovych did not convince the majority of Ukrainians to turn to Russia or to give up democracy. In the presidential campaign, the issue of geopolitical choice between Russia and the West was actually overshadowed by much more burning economic problems.
After the Orange camp dashed people’s hopes for a “Ukrainian miracle” – Ukraine’s integration with the European Union, elimination of corruption and putting all “bandits behind bars”- now, all that Yanukovych is expected to deliver is “a stable Ukraine,” his main campaign promise.
“At least Yanukovych does not lie and does not promise anything, unlike Tymoshenko,” says Tetyana Melnychenko, a child psychologist from Kyiv. “People around him have him under control unlike Yushchenko who was running amok and no one could say anything.”
Yanukovych did not offer any new solutions for Ukraine’s problems that would attract new supporters. In the past five years, he criticized the squabbling Orange government, except for a brief time when he was prime minister himself. He nurtured his traditional electorate from the east and south of Ukraine, many of whom believed that his presidency was stolen in 2004 and viewed the 2010 election as a chance for a pay back. Yanukovych’s strategy in this election was not to scare off voters. He appeared composed and benign, while Tymoshenko’s aggressive and nervous behavior worked against her.
Despite the fact that the election campaign was competitive, the choice was always between two front-runners: Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. And these two were too familiar personages to hold any illusions about. The voters were choosing the lesser evil out of two. An anecdote reflected the voters’ gloomy mood : “There is good and bad news: the good news is that Yulia Tymoshenko didn’t become a president, the bad news is that Viktor Yanukovych did.”
This election was deprived of such positive emotions as hope and faith. People voted against rather than for. This was exploited by Tymoshenko, particularly in western and central Ukraine known for its anti-Yanukovych stance. Her campaign ads like: “Voting against all, you vote for Yanukovych,” “Staying at home – you vote for Yanukovych” helped to increase the turnout in her favor.
Mykola Smereka, a university professor from Tymoshenko’s heartland in Kyiv region, might no longer be an ardent supporter of Ukraine’s Eva Peron. But his negative views about Yanukovych are just what Tymoshenko needs in her post-election struggle. “How can we allow ‘the boor’ to become a president now if we have already rejected him once. Is he not the same person who defrauded the elections in 2004? Is he not the same former convict, illiterate clown, Russia’s pawn, who will embarrass us in the world?” Smereka laments.
Indeed, if Donetsk oligarchic clans had not put forward Yanukovych in 2004, seen by many Ukrainians as a fusion of mafia-connected Silvio Berlusconi and gaffe-prone George W. Bush, but a less controversial candidate, the revolution would most likely have never happened. And Leonid Kuchma, the outgoing president of Ukraine, would have smoothly transferred power to his chosen successor. Yanukovych with his two convictions for violent crime were strong mobilizing factors. One of the slogans of the Orange Revolution was: “We won’t let a convict into power.”
Since then, American political consultants generously paid by steel magnate Rinat Akhmetov gave Yanukovych an image makeover. Upgraded Yanukovych began speaking literary Ukrainian, and left aside his criminal jargon.
Yanukovych is still a pro-Russian candidate. He promised official status to the Russian language. He also reassured Russia that her fleet will be allowed to stay after the lease on the Ukrainian Black Sea bases expires in 2017. He spoke in favor of the indepence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and put off membership in NATO.
At the same time, Yanukovych tried to soften his “pro-Russianism.” He became interested in advancing Ukrainian interests in the European Union, sensing the economic benefits that might come from the West. Yanukovych also proposed to Moscow a new deal on the gas transit pipelines that would divide its ownership equally between Ukraine, Russia and the EU instead, as many fear giving Russians a major stake in the venture.
Yanukovych’s progress in understanding the Ukrainian national interest (or at least the appearance of it) prevented Tymoshenko from recreating a clear-cut cleavage from 2004, when a pro-Western democrat was fighting a pro-Russian autocrat. If she had done it, she would have won the election.
Instead, Tymoshenko was too smart for her own good. By trying to flirt with Russia she lost voters in western Ukraine. She also burnt down her image as a democratic figure. In summer 2009, she allied herself with Yanukovych in an attempt to usurp power through a constitutional amendment that would have abolished popular election of the president and postponed parliamentary elections until 2014. Yanukovych was the one who pulled out at the last moment.
Tymoshenko built her campaign around the claim that she would not run from responsibility and continue working as a prime minster despite unfavorable conditions. The critics accused her of using her government position and state money to wield political pressure in the election.
Others, however, hold a more favorable view of her. “She is a much more charismatic politician than Yanukovych,” notes Sergiy Kysselyov, a Kyiv-based political analyst from the School for Policy Analysis at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. “She scored an unexpectedly good result in this race, given the fact that she was viewed as the incumbent and held responsible for Ukraine’s downfall during the global economic crisis. Had she been in opposition she would have easily won over Yanukovych.”
The Ukrainian “iron lady,” by not accepting the results of the vote, might drag Ukraine into a deeper political and economic crisis.
In a historic turnaround, Yanukovych defended his victory with the backing of the international community that lauded the election as free and fair. Hopefully, now that he is sworn into office, Yanukovych will remember that the Orange democracy propelled him into power and that the majority of Ukrainians do not want to become a Russian satellite.
Olena Tregub is a Ukrainian journalist working as a foreign correspondent in the United States for the UNIAN news agency in Ukraine. Her article appeared first on www.opendemocracy.net.
