Her speech at Kyiv Boryspil International Airport was uncompromising; her body language in President Petro Poroshenko’s presence was defiant (respectful of the award she was given by the president, but derogatory to his persona); her insubordinate reaction to Yulia Tymoshenko spoke volumes.
Savchenko is a symbol, and has a powerful charisma.
The only people she seems to hold in any regard are those in uniform who have
direct experience of war against Russia. Her fondness for “patriots” and
suspicion of “politicians” is understandable, and it resonates in a population
tired of the current elite’s gradualist reform agenda. Whether Savchenko’s
uncompromising patriotism will turn out to be a good or bad thing for Ukraine
is yet to be seen.
On an international
level, analysts have been quick to point out that Savchenko’s release from Russia in exchange for two military
intelligence officers captured while fighting in the Donbas seemingly vindicated
the Ukrainian side (Russia has always professed
that is has not deployed its troops to Ukraine). However, her arrival in
Ukraine has also been called a “game changer” for domestic politics, and the man who signed her amnesty in the Kremlin must have known this would be the case. Vladimir Putin may be improvising his aggression in
Ukraine, but the
Russian president is not blind to the obvious: Savchenko in Russian captivity
was a symbol and rallying point for global public opinion in support of Ukraine
as the underdog against its more powerful neighbor; Savchenko free in Ukraine
may well develop into a leader that shifts the country’s domestic political
landscape towards a more radical discourse – one that strengthens the “fascist
junta” image that according to the Kremlin’s information machine supposedly defines the post-Maidan Kyiv
government.
If I were Putin, what would I be planning next? This question paraphrases what has become
a popular past-time for political scientists and journalist-analysts who have lately
rekindled the seemingly lost art of Cold War era “Kremlinology”. I don’t wish
to add to the seemingly endlessly growing number of Putin psychotherapists
within the global social science community. The thoughts laid out below are
simply speculation – no more and no less. However, given the recent doomsday
prediction by former deputy commander of NATO Sir Alexander Richard
Shirreff of a war between Russia
and NATO next year (the former British general’s book was launched May 18), and given the analysis published in the U.K.’s Guardian and
Observer newspapers last week (both articles predicted Putin would have no
qualms starting World War III in the not too distant future – one based on analysis by Kremlin watcher Pavel Felgenhauer, and the other by Guardian foreign affairs columnist Natalie
Nougayrede), one cannot
be faulted for joining the game. After all, if global thermonuclear war is
indeed among the options being considered, shouldn’t we all be concerned?
A couple of days ago I
met for beers with a very good friend – a Flexian, like me (see J. Wedel’s “The Shadow Elite” for a definition of the term) who has regular
access to the highest levels of Ukraine’s government. We both agreed that the
current state of Kyiv’s political class can best be described as
“apprehensive”. Ministers and deputies all seem to be waiting for something to
happen – no one knows what, but autumn seems to be the agreed timeframe. That “something”
may take the form of a backlash by opposition politicians against the
increasingly centralist and micro-managerial style of Poroshenko (accusations of a return to
kleptocratic practices are not uncommon in
Ukraine, though no hard evidence of presidential graft is ever presented
publicly); it may take the form of a violent reaction by demobilized Donbas war
veterans against western powers’ foisting the idea of
holding elections in the DPR and LPR (supposedly
as a sign of Ukraine’s fulfilment of the Minsk accords, but in reality as a
concession to Russia); it may take the form of mass protests against
increasingly difficult economic conditions (the average citizens’ savings are
now all but exhausted, but the long-awaited economic uptick has been very
gradual). Whatever form
it takes, the autumn months are expected to be difficult in Ukraine.
I have written
previously that Ukraine’s revolution did not end with the culmination of the
Maidan protests in February 2014. The ‘ancien regime’, and the neo-feudal,
clientilist (i.e. dependent on the Kremlin) post-Soviet system that Yanukovych
presided over no longer exists, but the ongoing process of revolutionary
transformation seems to be following the natural lifecycle of revolutions
identified in Crane Brinton’s classic work “The Anatomy of Revolution”. After a period of moderate reform similar to
what Ukraine has witnessed of late, one should expect increasing
radicalization.
In her classic work “On Revolution” Hannah Arendt pointed out that in revolutionary
societies, evolutionary erosion of the political order is a logical result of a
shift of popular demands from a discourse of freedom, rights, and dignity to
one of equality, justice, and welfare. According to Arendt, the reason the US
in the 1780’s was able to avoid a Robbespierrian and/or Leninist “terror” (i.e.
social disintegration leading to the “revolution swallowing its own children”)
was because the founding fathers were able to forestall a shift from idealist
to materialist discourse. In Ukraine, support for leftist-populist parties
(Tymoshenko and Lyashko) has been steadily rising of late…
Brian Whitmore,
RFE/RL’s Moscow-based political commentator, suggests that “Nadiya Savchenko could – and I stress
could – just turn out to be Ukraine’s Vaclav Havel; or its Lech Walesa; or its
Nelson Mandela. She returns home a hero at a time when Ukrainians are deeply
disillusioned with their post-Euromaidan leaders, frustrated by the slow pace
of reform, and angry about the persistent stalling the battle against
corruption.”
Kateryna Kruk, writing for the Atlantic Council echoes this view: “(Savchenko) is a living
legend, a symbol, and a national hero. She has immense support from society and
international leaders. At the same time, she is not a politician. She is
straightforward and honest in telling exactly what she thinks—a rare quality in
politics unlikely to bring her more political friends.”
I have no
wish to dampen the enthusiasm over Savchenko’s persona. However, given
her directness, lack of patience with the pace of legitimate political
decisionmaking, and the unquestioning authority and broad-based popularity
that she currently enjoys, one cannot help but wonder whether last week we
witnessed the triumphant arrival of Ukraine’s Havel, Walesa or Mandela, or
perhaps of its Robbespierre, Lenin, Mao, or Castro (though without the
intellectual prowess of any one of these purveyors of violent revolutionary
lustration).
Savchenko’s
core political base of support consists of politically inexperienced “patriots”
– recently demobilized Donbas war veterans who are widely believed to have kept
some of their weapons as “souvenirs” after returning from the front. Last year,
former “Right Sector” leader Dmytro Yarosh was the logical symbolic leader of
this constituency, but he withdrew himself from public politics after realizing
that much of the financing for his party’s political activities originated from
banditry and mafia-style control over contraband (not to mention widespread
suspicions of key Right Sector leadership positions in Ukraine’s regions having
come under the control of Russian agents that had infiltrated the
organization).
The leaders of other volunteer battalions who were elected to
Parliament in 2014 (e.g. Semenchenko, XXX, XXX) have not really amounted to
much.
Savchenko is now the new figurehead for Ukraine’s radical patriots. How
she decides to structure her inner circle, and what ideological and
organizational structure she chooses to establish remains to be seen. But in my
opinion, some degree of trepidation is warranted.
Some contours
of how Savchenko’s future (and that of the military-patriotic political
movement she will inevitably command) are likely to become evident by the end
of the summer. As someone who spent almost two years in captivity (much of it
in solitary confinement), and several months on hunger strike, Savchenko will
require medical treatment and convalescence. In the meantime, Ukraine’s
political scene will quieten: summer temperatures have already arrived; kids
throughout the country are now on vacation; people’s minds are on dachas and
shashlik-filled holidays, rather than on politics. But by late August
(“normality” tends to return to the political scene just after Independence
Day), social tensions will take center-stage once again. By that time, Savchenko
will have made some decisions, and Ukraine’s more traditional political class
will have made theirs.
Telling evidence of
the general direction in which the traditional political class is thinking can
be found in the recently published priorities of the Volodymyr Groysman government. The document is well structured, and
concrete, but its action plan is expressly structured to include 2016 only (no
plans beyond the end of the year). Furthermore, the reforms the prime minister’s team have included into the plan are limited to those which can be
enacted without parliamentary support. In other words, Groysman understands
that he does not have a majority in the Rada, and if he is to accomplish
anything in office, he and his team must do so within the bounds of current
legislation.
But calendars
inevitably advance. A new budget for 2017 must be passed by parliament in
November-December. Furthermore, real systemic changes in Ukraine’s tax and
judicial systems (both highest priority) cannot be accomplished without parliamentary support. By mid-autumn it will surely become obvious that
progress with the current Rada is simply not possible, and early elections will
be the only viable political option. According to one highly placed source,
former Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s team expects a parliamentary vote by March 2017 at the
latest (probably earlier). Incidentally, by that time Savchenko will have had
ample time to assemble a viable political alternative to the current factions
and party brands. So will Mikheil Saakashvili. So will Igor Kolomoiskiy. So will Viktor Medvedchuk…
Street protests are likely in the run-up to the election; possibly (some say
likely) accompanied by violence.
Knowing the above (and
I have little doubt that the Kremlin gauges social mood in Ukraine at least as
well as I do), if my name were Putin, I would be wringing my hands
with glee. The stars seem to be coming together – finally, evidence (and press
imagery) proving that Ukraine is a failed state!
But Putin’s thinking
is likely not limited to Ukraine (although this county does seem to represent a
kind of fetish for him). One of the dangers of focusing strictly on domestic
Ukrainian political commotion, is that one neglects the wider picture within
which the Kremlin operates. Putin has made it amply clear that the end goal of
his foreign policy strategy is a “new
Yalta” – an agreement
with the US as to spheres of influence in Europe and the world. The current US
administration has shown that it wants no part of this plan, but Obama’s term
in office is coming to an end. In the meantime, Russia has been working hard to
destabilize European Union institutions by funding the activities of right-wing
parties, and most
recently by covertly undermining the leadership
of Angela Merkel in Germany. All of these
activities may well be coming to a head in the autumn.
October will be the
time when Russia’s perceived adversary, the US, will be most politically vulnerable.
By this time polls will show which candidate for the Presidency will be in the
lead, and the serving President will be focused on winding down international
commitments, rather than extending them.
A Trump presidency would likely give
Putin the opportunity to strike the deal that he craves, but if pre-election
polls show Clinton leading, Kremlin strategists might well consider overt
military action against the Baltics in order to finally test the durability of
NATO’s Article 5 (this is former general Sir Alexander Richard Shirreff’s scenario). It is widely known that the Latvia and Estonia are
effectively undefendable in case of direct Russian attack, and a politically
weakened Merkel, a lame-duck Obama, and an ISIS-occupied Hollande, may well opt
for negotiating with Putin under such circumstances, rather than responding
militarily. The strategic fact that NATO would be ruined as a result of their
inaction would likely fall victim to political expedience of the moment.
Weakness in the face of Russia would certainly boost Trump’s chances of
election (the US electorate could doubtless be encouraged to vote against the
“weak” Democrats), and Putin would face a more amenable US rival after January
2017. Checkmate for the Kremlin…
Now back to Ukraine. If Western
leaders balk at the risk of triggering nuclear war by defending the Baltic
states, Putin will certainly feel emboldened in Ukraine, and a renewed attempt
to occupy a land bridge to Crimea (via Mariupol and Berdyansk) may well be in
the cards.
The Ukrainian electorate, faced with a very real external threat,
would likely turn to more radical political figures (e.g. Savchenko) for
solutions, but this choice will be uneven territorially. The popular backlash
against “three years of lost time” (possibly violent) would likely target the
entire political elite (i.e. anyone holding political office), but the
alternative figures that could come to power are unlikely to enjoy national
support. Effective disintegration of the country into individually ruled
fiefdoms cannot be ruled out…
I have been criticized
for scaremongering before, but ignoring scenarios is never healthy. More than
anything I hope I’m wrong about Savchenko, and that I’ve given way too much
strategic credit to the Kremlin. Ukraine and Ukrainians will (of course)
survive, and even prevail. But the autumn is shaping up to be hot – both
domestically and internationally.
God help us!
