Although it is never wise to underestimate a potential adversary, it is equally unwise to overestimate his strength. After the Iron Curtain came down and Westerners had the opportunity to closely observe the conditions of the Soviet Union, they admitted that they had greatly overestimated the U.S.S.R.’s state of development. Throughout its history, Russian military capability had often been exaggerated, as its government sought to gain diplomatic advantage through inflated public perceptions. Even today, the bellicose statements from the Kremlin mask the severe shortfalls of its military capability.
There is little doubt that – in terms of sheer numbers – Russia’s conventional military strength is several times that of Ukraine. But numbers can be misleading. Poor training, weak morale and poor quality and availability of supplies and armaments can easily transform a seemingly formidable military into a “hollow force.” On paper it may look impressive, but operationally it can suffer defeats as embarrassing as Stalin’s disastrous war against the Finns or Russia’s defeat at the hands of the fledgling Japanese military in 1905.
Russia’s attack on Georgia in August is illustrative of the serious problems it faces in bringing its operational capability in line with its “superpower” pretensions. Russia’s 58th Army invaded tiny Georgia with 500 tanks and an equal number of combat vehicles. However, prior to the attack, the Russian army secretly transferred its top-of-the-line T-80 and T-90 battle tanks and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles from its Moscow and Western military districts to the Caucasus, thereby hoping to hide the obsolete and dilapidated state of its equipment. Despite the pre-planning and the “show” pieces Russia put on display, observers commented on the numerous stranded tanks and generally unimpressive “ragtag” performance of the Russian military.
Participants in an April conference in Washington on Russian military reform unanimously acknowledged that “there was no revival of Russia’s military might to be observed, and there was hardly any hope for Russia to create a modern and effective army by 2020.” Russia’s armed forces remain beset by manpower and morale problems, aging equipment, graft and unfulfilled promises. Although Putin has increased the defense budget to a level five times greater than when he became president, it is still only 7 percent of U.S. spending. With the decline in the price of oil, it is doubtful that Russia will be able to continue its planned expansion and to afford the $200 billion needed for modernization.
According to a 2005 Defense Ministry report, 60 percent of Russian missiles have exceeded their service life and half require major repairs. Just 30 percent of the country’s fighter planes are combat-ready. John Pike, director of a Virginia-based military research group, noted that Russia suffers from endemic draft avoidance and that 9 out of 10 of eligible draftees escape service: “If you’ve got 90 percent draft evasion, those who show up are just too stupid to evade it.’’ Imagine the kind of military you can make out of that.
An article in an Estonian newspaper in 2007 quoted a Russian officer as saying that “we lack armaments, and the weapons we do have don’t work…..only about 15-20 percent of Russia’s military hardware meets Western quality standards.’’ Then, with the obvious intent of dramatizing the state of decline of the Russian military, the officer went on to say “if Estonia attacked us tomorrow, its soldiers might well reach Moscow.” It was interesting, however, to read a rebuttal of this last point by the military observer for “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” who went on to analyze the manpower and logistics of the Estonian army and reassure the reader that “one Russian division would suffice to defeat it.”
Even the much-favored strategic arm of the Russian military is increasingly obsolete. Of the 500 ground-based ICBMs in Russia’s strategic arsenal, 400 are old and need to be replaced. Of the 12 nuclear-powered submarines, 2 are ready to be scrapped. Of the 79 strategic bombers, many are 30 years old. Even the much ballyhooed “new strategic bomber patrols” that Putin ordered to be resumed in August, are done mostly by aging Tu-95 “Bear” bombers that have turbo-prop rather than jet engines, carry no nuclear weapons, and are limited to about one flight a week by budget and equipment constraints.
Can Russia reverse the decline in its military capability? Not according to Stanislav Belkovsky of Russia’s Institute for National Strategy. According to him, “it’s impossible to reverse these trends in current policy.” He explained that the steady decline of the Russian military-industrial complex would make it impossible to increase weapon production without huge investments.
These numbers and observations, however, give little cause for comfort. Although – with the exception of the airborne divisions, the air assault brigades, and a few tank and motor-rifle divisions – Russia has relatively few competent, deployable formations, Ukraine’s military is in no better shape. Both Russian and Ukrainian military forces are largely “hollow.” Both countries produce a great deal of military hardware for export, but relatively little of the new equipment is sold to their own armed forces. Most of the weapons used by Ukraine’s military are inherited from the Soviet armed forces.
In 2007, the Ukrainian state-owned arms exporters generated $1 billion in revenue (more than half of the total annual budget of Ukraine’s defense ministry) placing Ukraine in the top 10 worldwide exporters. Yet the Ukrainian army’s 800 tanks are modernized versions of tanks produced in 1964 and its planes were manufactured 25-35 years ago.
Although Ukrainian law requires that the defense ministry be financed with 3 percent of the gross domestic product, no government has even approached the 2 percent level. Its 2008 funding has been 1 percent of GDP while Russia has earmarked 7 percent and NATO requires 2 percent. The 2009 budget, although nearly doubling, is still less than 1 percent of GDP.
Predictably, such a budget does not allow much for training, and soldiers are engaged in such activities as picking potatoes to feed themselves. Conscripts get marksmanship training only several times during their 10-month compulsory service. Ukrainian officers and enlisted personnel are notoriously underpaid and cared for. A lieutenant’s wage is $422 per month and a serviceman is allocated only $7-8 per day for food. “Contract” volunteers earn $175 per month – a fifth of what a Kyiv taxi driver takes home. Poor morale, poor training, outdated equipment, and loss of skilled personnel have placed Ukraine’s independence at risk.
The “good news” is that Ukraine – in defense of its borders – does not need to match Russia’s military strength. Russia has a huge land mass to protect and will never leave its Chinese, Caucasus, or Western borders unguarded. A country with pretensions of “superpower” status must field and finance a force larger than it needs for its own defense. Ukraine, on the other hand, needs a military force only large enough to ensure that the cost of foreign aggression will be too high a price for the aggressor to bear. It does not need a larger military force … only one that is well-trained, adequately paid, and equipped with the latest technology, supplies, and equipment.
In short, Ukrainian politicians must decide whether they want to have a real military force capable of protecting Ukraine (with or without NATO), or simply pay lip service to national security. Russia’s military may be as hollow as Ukraine’s. And Ukraine need not (currently) be intimidated by threats, but the day will come when that may change. It is time for Ukraine to begin the long but critical process of upgrading its military capability. A good beginning is the allocation of the 3 percent of GDP that has been promised but never delivered.
George Woloshyn, a native of Kupnovychi, Ukraine, is an American citizen living in Linden, Virginia.
