I hope the overall averages and the scores in five broad categories I have adopted for this report card – economic policy, foreign relations, democracy and the rule of law, government effectiveness, and culture and education – helps us get a handle on where Ukraine stands under Yanukovych. (To see the full grades, click here.)
Overall findings
The overall findings show a cumulative average grade of B- for Yanukovych’s first year in power, in contrast to a grade of C under the divided Yushchenko-Tymoshenko rule.
However, the grades in each of the categories reveal more substantial differences.
There are marked improvements in economic policy and economic performance under the Yanukovych presidency; a notable though not dramatic deterioration in democratic practices and human rights under the new leadership; somewhat better results in foreign relations, significantly better performance in the functioning and effectiveness of government; and poorer performance in the broad sphere of culture, education and language policy.
Economic performance and policy have seen a marked improvement in the last year. In part, this is a consequence of real policy improvements; in part, this is the result of the global economic rebound.
Under Yanukovych serious efforts at privatization have once again begun.
Even though questions loom over the handling of the recent Ukrtelecom “auction,” a sale that generates serious new revenues for a strapped government is better than no privatization at all. More importantly, there are signs that the government is moving toward opening up shale gas exploration to private sector participation.
Even serious critics of the new government believe that revenue projections in the new budget represent a serious step forward from 2009.
The fact that the International Monetary Fund resumed its cooperation with Ukraine in 2010 is a further sign of a more responsible fiscal approach. Serious improvements in gross domestic product performance cannot be disputed.
Like the Yanukovych team or not, you cannot deny that a 15 percent decline, among Europe’s worst performances in 2009, is far worse than growth of 4.2 percent in 2010. Inflation was moderately high in 2010, but generally under control.
Pension reform is likely to be ambitious judging by soundings coming from Yanukovych’s team. However, until action is taken, they get an incomplete.
By contrast, the previous government showed no political will in addressing the problems posed by a corrupted pension system that paid huge dividends for a select few and refused to address the growing gap between revenues and expenditures in a system that unrealistically encourages women to retire at 55.
Overall, the last year has seen a measurable though modest decline in democratic practices and human rights.
The 2010 presidential race under Yushchenko was open, competitive and was judged to be free and fair. Local elections during the Yanukovych were a step away from best practices.
A Constitutional Court decision returning significant executive power to Yanukovych – and in effect contradicting court rulings that consecrated the reverse under Yushchenko – eroded faith in constitutional practices and undermined confidence in the apolitical nature of judicial decisions.
In the media and public information sphere, there was less erosion than partisans might think. News programs have become less hard-hitting than in 2009, but immensely popular political talk shows, which go on for hours in prime time, afford all Ukrainians who care significant access to opposition views.
And a new law on public access to information, at the very least, gives reporters and citizens broader legal rights to information about government activity and policymaking.
Civil society continued to show significant vibrancy during 2010, despite the more apparent interest shown in its activities by the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine].
Alas, the judicial system continues to suffer from external political influence, high levels of alleged corruption, and laws on the books since the dark days of Soviet rule.
But that is hardly different from the state of affairs prior to Yanukovych’s coming to office. The one difference, here, is that before judges maneuvered between the competing interests of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, and legal gridlock ruled.
Foreign relations
Overall, Ukraine has seen measurable improvements in its international relations. In part this improvement is occasioned by the sense in foreign capitals that there is one place where policy is made in Ukraine.
This contrasts positively to the fatigue and exasperation that greeted the endless efforts of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to undermine one another at home and abroad.
After the deep concessions made by Ukraine to Russia as a result of the prolongation of the Russo-Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet agreement, many feared that Yanukovych is ready to erode Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Instead, he has spent the last year pursuing pragmatic relations with Russia, without surrendering national interest.
By contrast, in 2009, Ukraine’s with Russia relations suffered from excessively harsh and escalating rhetoric emanating from both countries presidents and from excessive concessions made by Ukraine in a far-reaching gas deal between the two country’s prime ministers, Vladimir Putin and Tymoshenko.
Relations with the EU have become more practical under Yanukovych as free trade and open visa regime discussions move forward.
Greater progress, however, has been stifled by setbacks in human rights and the negative reaction from Europe that has greeted the wide scale legal cases against a broad swath of the former Tymoshenko government.
U.S.-Ukraine relations are on an upswing. Ukraine’s contributions to international nuclear security, its openness to U.S. participation in shale gas exploration, and its own reset of relations with Russia are welcomed in Washington.
Alas, there is little improvement as yet in the flow foreign investment into Ukraine as corporate raids, weak enforcement of shareholder rights and property rights continue to trump a market that offers potential for high returns.
Overall, policymaking and decision-making is more clear-cut. Government rule is more stable … The chain of command is clear-cut and effective.
Corruption remains an endemic and generic problem at all levels, as it did under the Orange rule of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko.
Serious anti-corruption campaigns have targeted pro- and anti-government officials alike, though the campaigns are marred by the growing international perception that they are motivated by the desire to attack political opponents.
Culture, education
If not for the disastrous educational policies pursued by Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk, his efforts to erode university autonomy and his needless polarization of relations between Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers, Yanukovych would have a higher grade in this sphere.
National unity continues to be undermined by the absence of an intelligent narrative that encompasses both the Russian- and Ukrainian-speaking communities.
Preparations for the Euro 2012 soccer championship have gathered dramatic steam as stadiums and roads are being built at an impressive pace.
Allegations of cronyism in the awarding of infrastructure contracts persist, a fact largely unchanged from the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko years.
Conclusions
Overall, the first year of Yanukovych’s presidency represented a modest step forward. In some areas – government effectiveness, an improving economy, international relations and administrative reforms – the progress over the last year has been tangible. In others – the state of the judiciary and human rights – serious problems require urgent attention.
If Yanukovych uses the next year to address international concerns, places greater emphasis on building national unity, introduces a new generation of young managers into a pared-down government, tackles corruption in a way that allays worries about politically-motivated persecution, and addresses a criminal justice system largely unreformed since the Soviet era, he will be able to start shaping a modern, European state.
Having made highly public declarations of his intention to transform Ukraine into a state that intends to be an integral part of the European Union, he has taken on a high-stakes burden.
By concentrating power in the executive, he has let everyone in Ukraine and around the world know that he bears ultimate responsibility for the success or failure of his plans.
Adrian Karatnycky is a senior fellow with the Washington, D.C.-based Atlantic Council.
