ed with political and radical slogans.
On the day of the demonstation, a roundtable organized by the Adenauer Foundation and the Institute for Strategic Research in Kyiv discussed the issue of social justice, a topic that is seldom raised in Ukraine. The general conclusion was that both the government and the opposition are likely to continue losing public support until they can come up with some realistic proposals for raising social well‑being.
After 36 months of growth, the government is reluctant to bring paychecks, pensions and subsidies into line with the price of the consumer basket. As long as those employed (or formerly employed) by the state remain Ukraine’s largest social group, these policies will not help the ratings of the president and his appointees. In these circumstances, the public’s sympathies might be expected to turn elsewhere. But this is not happening. Of four opposition parties, the Socialists and the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc do not seem to have any serious economic program whatsoever, the Communists are bent on abolishing private property altogether, and Our Ukraine’s free market social policies are unlikely to find favor with the impoverished classes. Seen this way, it is clear why the opposition has little chance of attracting attention and support.
In most industrialized nations, labor movements have been decisive in forcing through fundamental changes in social policy. In 1992, Budapest taxi‑drivers blocked the streets of the capital and forced the government to abandon its austerity program. Romania’s miners change governments. But who came to protest on Sept. 16? Mostly professional party activists and young people who are not noted for stable political views. Only a handful of miners were present.
Ukrainians do not have the free time to take part in public politics. The labor unions are passive while most people are dependent on the shadow economy for the bulk of their income.
The truth is, calls for Kuchma’s resignation are not a slogan around which it is possible to build mass support. The silent majority sneers at such demands. They do not believe that a change of president, even if it were possible, would bring any real change. Some may recall that under Viktor Yushchenko’s government people started receiving their paychecks on time, but inflation quickly put state employees right back where they started. People have seen what happened in Russia as a result of the simultaneous introduction of a liberal tax policy, an increase in the welfare budget, and the expulsion of the most notorious oligarchs. They are waiting for similar signs of success in Ukraine too.
The situation is one of stalemate. The president is desperate to avoid a scandalous end to his term and ensure a safe scenario for the future transfer of power. The opposition demonstratively treats welfare issues as secondary. Labor unions are conscious of their weakness and unwilling to take sides.
The only place where a major breakthrough is possible is in the Rada. However, a number of steps have to be taken before the support of the public can be secured for a new kind of politics:
* Yushchenko has to stop dreaming about a Kuchma‑style presidency and instead concentrate on turning Our Ukraine into a large, united, ideologically distinct right‑wing party, which will be able to become senior partner in any right‑wing coaltion government;
* The United Social Democrats should either reduce their role to junior partner in the majority project or join the leftist opposition, finally bringing their practice in line with their ideology;
* Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc should find an ideological platform for itself;
* Symonenko should stop thinking of Moroz as a traitor and renegade;
* A new government should conduct a braver and more patriotic policy – one that will bridge the gap between consumer baskets and paychecks.
An incident at the Sept. 16 roundtable serves to illustrate the distance between the expectations of the public and the elite in modern Ukraine. Ihor Yukhnovsky was a presidential candidate in 1991, one of the authors of the Constitution, and is now an Our Ukraine deputy. He was asked whether some of the empty and populist rights proclaimed in the Constitution (like the one promising free higher education) should be scrapped or the wording changed. Yukhnovsky replied that the situation is in general satisfactory. When I heard that, it seemed as if our elite does not even live in Ukraine. Maybe all the people who did not go to European Square felt the same way – that it was just a case of one elite group trying to push another aside.
Maksym Mykhailenko is an observer with International Institute for Political and Humanitarian Research, a Moscow independent research center.
