Thus far, there have been only two unifying strands among the various opposition groups.
The first is the much-talked-about deterioration of democratic standards and press freedoms under the new administration, culminating in the trial of opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko on vaguely articulated abuse-of-power charges.
This theme is certainly legitimate, but it is not, by itself, a substitute for a credible economic ideology and platform.
The absence of the latter is one of the primary reasons why support for the opposition has remained stagnant even as the ratings of Yanukovych and his party have begun to decline.
The other theme which the opposition parties have latched onto is fighting tooth and nail against the government’s plans to structurally reform the Ukrainian economy, especially the measures of pension reform and utility tariff rises mandated by the International Monetary Fund .
While this second theme reflects a specific ideology, it is one which would appear to be at odds with Ukraine’s future integration into European structures.
The absence of the latter is one of the primary reasons why support for the opposition has remained stagnant even as the ratings of Yanukovych and his party have begun to decline.
It is therefore somewhat surprising to see such a virulent stance against economic reforms from parties such as Tymoshenko’s Fatherland (Batkivshchyna), Arseniy Yatseniuk’s Front of Changes (Front Zmin), and Viacheslav Kirilenko’s For Ukraine (Za Ukrainu), all of which state that they are firmly for European Union integration.
In the case of pension reform, which the above politicians have vociferously criticized, there is not much room for serious debate.
At 55, Ukraine’s current retirement age for women is between seven and 10 years less than in the rest of Europe, and simply not fiscally sustainable.
Opposition to heating tariff rises also makes little sense from a pro-European standpoint, as failure to stem the multibillion-dollar losses of state energy company Naftogaz can only increase Ukraine’s dependence on the Kremlin for a privileged natural gas price – a benefit which would only be extended if Ukraine were to renounce its European aspirations and join the Customs Union of former Soviet states.
The recent experience of Belarus illustrates the obvious perils of relying on Moscow’s largesse for economic stability.
Also opposed to the government’s reforms is the “elephant in the room” of today’s Western Ukrainian politics, the Svoboda (Freedom) Union led by Oleh Tiahnybok.
Svoboda, which subscribes to a nationalist-populist ideology antithetical to the modern European idea of “unity with diversity,” was by far the best-performing party in the Ukrainian-speaking western regions of the country during local elections held last autumn.
Protesters on July 7 take part in a rally against pension reforms that would raise the retirement age. (UNIAN)
Svoboda’s victory begs the question of why there is currently no moderate, pro-European political party with an enthusiastic following in western Ukraine, the region of Ukraine which is closest, both geographically and historically, to Europe.
It appears that Svoboda has essentially hijacked Ukraine’s respected national-democratic movement, which led the country’s independence drive in the 1980s and its push toward Europe in the 1990s.
The rise of Svoboda in western Ukraine, inasmuch as it siphons support away from pro-European, center-right parties in the region, clearly benefits the pro-presidential camp.
As 2004’s Orange Revolution vividly demonstrated, moderate Ukrainophone parties based in western Ukraine are capable of exerting a powerful influence on the country’s national politics, and would present a tough challenge to the Yanukovych’s Party of Regions in future elections.
The rise of Svoboda in western Ukraine, inasmuch as it siphons support away from pro-European, center-right parties in the region, clearly benefits the pro-presidential camp.
For their part, the president’s political camp is now at a crossroads.
They are faced with the stark choice of either moving ahead with bold but controversial structural reforms, or turning away from Europe and back down the path of populism treaded by so many previous Ukrainian governments for short-term electoral gain.
Most of the structural reforms on the table – the tax code, pension reform, cutting the public sector workforce, reducing energy inefficiency – are bound to be initially unpopular, since they will yield positive economic results for the general population only over a period longer than the election cycle.
Of course, income-boosting economic growth of 7-8 percent is a real possibility in the coming years if Ukraine signs a free trade agreement with the European Union (Ukraine’s fellow EU aspirant Turkey grew at a stunning 11 percent last year), but global factors beyond Ukraine’s control mean that such rapid growth is not guaranteed.
President Yanukovych may ultimately have to choose between being remembered as either a bold reformer who led his country into Europe but lost his reelection bid, or as a Ukrainian version of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who has clung to power through authoritarian means for a decade in Belarus while gradually surrendering national strategic assets to Moscow.
Ukraine’s opposition parties should be mindful of the irony that the more successful Yanukovych is in pushing through his stated reform agenda, the better their own chances will be of making parliamentary gains in 2012 and of reclaiming the presidency in 2015.
The only significant political forces in Ukraine today opposed to European integration are the Communists on the far left and Svoboda on the far right.
The mainstream opposition parties should therefore do the nation a favor by ending their obfuscation in regard to necessary reforms. Instead, they should declare a consensus with the Party of Regions whereby all non-extremist political forces, both left and right, commit to work together in promoting a European path for the country.
Such a broad consensus, which was a critical factor in bringing Poland into the EU fold in the 1990s, would not only be in the interests of Ukraine as a whole; it would also allow the Orange opposition to finally start climbing out of the rut of unpopularity and impotence in which it has been mired for the past 18 months, and get to work on building some positive credibility with voters for 2012 and 2015.
Will Ritter is a Kyiv-based freelance writer who can be reached at [email protected].
