ne’s pro-Western forces, led by the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, they are on the cusp of suffering a humiliating defeat in the May 25 election for Kyiv’s mayor.
It’s embarrassing enough when the parliamentary coalition’s biggest faction, the Tymoshenko Bloc, not only blocks the presidium it itself controls, as it did on May 13, but also obstructs President Viktor Yushchenko from delivering an address.
Mind you, he’s the leader of the “Democratic Forces Coalition’s” other faction, and an ally from that Orange Revolution that seems so long ago.
“An unprecedented event happened today, when the parliamentary majority, responsible for the Ukrainian parliament’s work, began blocking it,” a visibly stunned Yushchenko said afterwards.
What will be more embarrassing is oncoming mayoral election debacle. It was the Tymoshenko-led pro-Western forces themselves which voted to call the pre-term mayoral election in the first place, in order to unseat Leonid Chernovetskiy, who stands accused, but not convicted, of rampant corruption during his two years as Kyiv’s mayor.
Regardless, Chernovetskiy is on his way to victory, and the lack of unity among Ukraine’s pro-Western forces is to blame. President Viktor Yushchenko is engaged in an all-out war with Tymoshenko, who is threatening their second divorce.
In one of the dozen or so battles in this war, Yushchenko has threatened to veto any legislation creating a second round in the May 25 election, which would significantly boost the odds of Chernovetskiy’s defeat.
At present, three contenders are splitting the antiChernovetskiy vote among themselves, including boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, essentially paving the way to victory for the incumbent.
That Ukraine’s top two proWestern politicians and their respective forces can’t unite at least on the goal of ousting Kyiv’s allegedly corrupt mayor is a sad reflection on just how much of the Orange Revolution’s promise was squandered.
After coming to power in January 2005, Ukraine’s proWestern politicians had a chance to prove they’re a cut above the rest of Ukraine’s politicians. Rather than seizing the opportunity to harness the onceinalifetime public support to implement sweeping reform in governance, the courts and education, the Orange leaders let it slip through their fingers as they pulled each other by the hair (or braids).
As a direct result, the Ukrainian electorate isn’t much interested in what Yushchenko has to say anymore.
He would gain about 8 percent of the vote in a presidential election at this point, according to polls.
While Yushchenko’s party, Our Ukraine People’s Union, can’t field a mayoral candidate and is doubtful to qualify for the Kyiv City Council, the Tymoshenko Bloc’s candidate for the mayoral post, Oleksandr Turchynov, has only about 7 percent support.
That’s because the Tymoshenko Bloc’s huge success so far is largely based on Tymoshenko’s personality and charisma, and not any concrete political platform or specific principles the bloc represents.
As evidence, after a few weeks of campaigning, the Tymoshenko Bloc decided it needed to depict Tymoshenko’s radiant visage alongside Turchynov’s image on all campaign advertising.
It’s no secret many Tymoshenko Bloc politicians are mostly opportunists, who also served former President Leonid Kuchma.
Meanwhile, the Novynar magazine revealed Tymoshenko has established pragmatic relations with Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend to Russian leaders Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. In spite of such associations, Tymoshenko somehow remains untainted in the eyes of her electorate.
Ukrainian political observers conceded these elections would be a useful barometer to predict the next presidential election, likely to occur in early 2010, five years after Yushchenko’s inauguration in January 2005.
Three basic conclusions can already be drawn.
1. More than three years after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s proWestern forces have failed to convince a definitive majority of Ukrainians they offer a better vision for the nation. Chernovetskiy, the ultimate pragmatist with few political principles, has mustered far more support among Kyiv residents than any of the other proWestern candidates competing. Meanwhile, polls reveal the Russianoriented Party of the Regions of Ukraine, and Viktor Yanukovych, remain just as popular as the Tymoshenko Bloc.
2. The mayoral election campaign has further damaged the Orange forces’ credibility. In supporting Chernovetskiy, a politician reviled by Kyiv’s intellectuals and middle class, by threatening to veto a second round, Yushchenko has once again demonstrated, barring any breakthroughs, that he is more interested in keeping power and manipulating the levers of government than unseating an incumbent widely accused of corruption, particularly in allegedly misappropriating government funds and improperly redistributing thousands of hectares of land, allegedly worth hundreds of millions of dollars, as political tribute. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko could suffer her first big defeat that threatens to be the first major blow to her popularity.
3. Ukraine’s proWestern forces face their biggest crisis yet. Revealing their hubris in hastily launching preterm elections, their failure will only reinforce Chernovetskiy’s grip on the Kyiv City Administration and bolster his authority. While that may serve Yushchenko’s shortterm goals as president, it doesn’t help his Our UkrainePeople’s SelfDefense bloc, which is likely to collapse after he likely loses the presidential election of 2010. In fact, both of Ukraine’s leading proWestern forces, the Tymoshenko and Our UkrainePeople’s SelfDefense blocs, hinge entirely on their leaders – Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. Either bloc would disintegrate if either personality failed in politics.
How tragic it is that two forces so dependent on each other are causing each other’s demise.
And the Russians didn’t even need to lift a finger!
Zenon Zawada is chief editor of the Kyiv Post.
