Lately in Ukraine, 2004 has been feeling like an awfully long time ago.
Remember the tents in the streets, the fiery speeches, the pop stars on Independence Square, the crowds chanting the names of the hero and the heroine of the day? We all knew we were watching history in the making. What we didn’t know was how quickly the evolution of Ukrainian politics would turn the Orange Revolution into a relic.
The only tent communities you’ll find these days in Kyiv are on Hydropark Island. Political speeches are carefully planned and staged with the help of expensive foreign consultants. The pop stars are once again doing concerts at political rallies, but this time for payment. In the unlikely event that you see someone walking down Khreshchatyk dressed in bright orange clothing, it is more than likely a fashion accident rather than a political statement.
Throw everything you thought you knew about Ukrainian politics out the window. The 2010 presidential vote is shaping up much differently. Orange protagonists Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yushchenko are bitter political enemies.
Media baron (and current Foreign Minister) Petro Poroshenko, once Tymoshenko’s rival within the Orange camp, is one of her most important allies today. Persistent rumors have also placed Victor Medvedchuk, former President Leonid Kuchma administration chief of staff and Orange Revolution enemy, in Tymoshenko’s corner.
After famously castigating defeated 2004 presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych and his Regions Party as “bandits” and “criminals” on the stage of the Maidan, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko have proceeded to spend five years taking turns currying favor with Yanukovych and his powerful parliamentary faction.
This past June, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych came close to concluding a controversial agreement that would have cancelled the upcoming presidential election and merged their respective political forces into a monolith (dubbed in the Ukrainian media as “PRiByut,” or “will kill,” a word composed of acronyms of the two parties) controlling three-quarters of the Ukrainian parliament.
Meanwhile, on the blue side of the political spectrum, Yanukovych’s own campaign manager in 2004, Sergiy Tigipko, is running against him. There is regular talk of cooperation involving Yushchenko and Yanukovych. The east-west electoral polarization is not holding strictly to form this time around.
Tymoshenko, whose political career has thus far been based on her popularity in the western and central regions, has been soliciting the backing of some of eastern Ukraine’s wealthiest businessmen in hopes of making inroads against Yanukovych’s iron grip in the east. Tymoshenko is also waging an active campaign in the traditionally blue stronghold of Crimea.
In western Ukraine, the electorate is fragmented.
What about the 2004 geopolitical theme of choosing between Russia and Euro-Atlanticism? Been there, done that. Only Yushchenko continues to advocate an exclusively pro-Western path for Ukraine. But judging by his single-digit national poll ratings, this message is no longer resonating. All the other main candidates emphasize rebuilding ties with Russia while continuing on a path toward European integration.
Unlike in 2004, Russia’s strategy in this election is not clear. While everyone agrees that the Kremlin wants to see a more Russia-friendly leader than Yushchenko, no one is quite certain exactly which candidate that might be.
Back in the Orange days, the Russian prosecutor’s office had an arrest warrant out for Tymoshenko. But more recently, she and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin were all smiles at a televised joint press conference in Crimea on Nov. 19. Russian support for Yanukovych has so far been lukewarm. The administration of U.S. President Barack Obama is staying out of the fray.
Tymoshenko has been trying to turn the election back to the Orange Revolution theme of a mass popular movement with good-versus-evil overtones. But if voters were in a passionate mood in 2004, today they are feeling pragmatic. There is a healthy dose of cynicism toward politicians of all stripes.
So far, the campaign has centered mostly on the country’s economic problems, putting Tymoshenko at a natural disadvantage as incumbent prime minister. If the campaign continues to be run on economic issues, Yanukovych is likely to benefit, having positioned himself as a business-friendly candidate who can also promise higher pensions and wages.
Tigipko, a wealthy businessman and former central bank governor whose campaign is focused on the economy, has seen his numbers rise impressively in recent months.
Other issues that had been played heavily in previous elections – like the status of the Russian language – have been crossed off the agenda. According to a recent poll, only 15 percent of Ukrainians said they consider the language issue a pressing matter. Other so-called “ideological issues” that were hotly discussed in 2004, such as the possibility of Ukraine’s joining NATO and the presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, have shown a similar inability to move the voters in the current campaign.
One can currently observe distinct features of a center-right agenda from candidates Yanukovych, Yushchenko and Tigipko, with an emphasis on private investment, deregulation and free enterprise, and a center-left orientation of Tymoshenko and Yatseniuk, favoring a prominent role for the state in economic development and active government regulation on behalf of the citizenry.
Of course, no matter who wins, Ukraine will still have a long way to go towards getting rid of cronyism, pay-to-play corruption and the disproportionate influence of oligarchs. But although the election is unlikely to be as electrifying a show as the Orange Revolution, the campaign is shaping up as a lively, civil debate on the future – making it an historic event in its own right.
Will Ritter is a former managing editor of the Kyiv-based IntelNews information agency. He can be reached at [email protected].
